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his thesis comprises two main topics. The ff-irst part of"the thesis focuses 
on the regulation of health care provision, whAe the second part provides empirical 
evidence of the economic consequences of chronic diseases in develof".,, g countries. 
The first part examines the incentives that condition the relationship between 
hospitals and health care purchasers (Chapters I and 2) and the provision of prev. -n- 
tive care in a competitive health insurance market (Chapter 3). There are three main 
areas of consideration. Chapter I presents an axiomatic bargaining model of prices 
and activity, examining the negotiation between hospitals and purchasers in situa- 
tions where, as usually occurs, none of the parties hold all of the bargaining power. 
Chapter 2 estimates the effect of waiting times on hospital costs using a sample of 
283 hospitals over the period 1995-. '-1002 in the NHS. This analysis seeks to clarify 
the efficiency effects of imposing waiting times for elective surgeries. Chapter 3 ex- 0 
+ fitive Lends Rothschild and Stiglitz's (1976) model of adverse selection in a com. pel 
heallth insurance market by considering the incentilVes for -prevention. 
The second part of the thesis consists of two empirical investigatu . ons regard- 
ina the economic effects of chronic diseases in Brazil, India and Russia. Chap- 011% 
ter 4 provides an analysis of the relationship between socio-economic inequality 
and chronic diseases, whilst Chapter 5 estimates the effect of chronic diseases 
on household -economic performance, as measured 'by health expenditures, non- 
health expenditures and labour produc-LIVIty. 'I"he results emphasise the relevance of 
11 
chronic diseases for developing countries, challenging the view that this problem is 
restricted to more developed societies. 
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Introduction 
This thesis comprises two main topics. The first part of the thesis focuses on the 
regulation of health care provision, while the second part provides empirical evidence of 
the economic consequences of chronic diseases in developing countries. 
Chapters I to 3 investigate both theoretical and empirical issues associated with the 
provision of health care, considering two situations. Chapters I and 2 will firstly examine 
the incentives that shape the economic behaviour of hospitals in an environment similar to 
the UK National Health Service (NHS). In this environment, a single purchaser establishes 
contracts with individual hospitals for the provision of health care services for the popula- 
tion at large. The system is financed by general taxation and patients receive free care at 
the point-of-use. 
Chapter I explicitly models the negotiation process between hospitals and purchasers 
using an axiomatic bargaining framework (see Nash 1950, Nash 1953, Osbome and Rubinstein 
1990, Barros and Martinez-Giralt 2006). Bargaining occurs in tenns of both prices and 
quantities. This approach allows the investigation of recent developments in health care 
financing, such as the policy of payment by results, currently under consideration in the 
UK. 
The discussion about hospital incentives is extended in Chapter 2, which estimates 
the effect of waiting times on hospital costs in the UK NHS. In recent years, there has 
been substantial interest in waiting times for elective surgeries. Given the limitations in the 
amount of resources allocated to the NHS, waiting times have become an inescapable real- 
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ity. Moreover, there is an established view that waiting times increase economic efficiency 
by prioritising the cases that are treated, and decreasing the need to hold installed excess 
capacity to attend emergency cases (see Hughes and McGuire 2003). This chapter provides 
an empirical test for this view by directly estimating the effect of waiting times on hospital 
costs. 
Chapter 3 concludes the first part on the regulation of the provision of health care. 
However, instead of considering the interplay between purchasers and hospitals, this chap- 
ter focuses on the incentives for the provision of health care by health insurance plans in a 
competitive market. More specifically, this chapter extends the study of adverse selection: 
explorations in this area nonnally focus only on curative care, rather than considering the 
effect on the provision of preventive services. 
The second part of the thesis is essentially empirical, and considers the economic as- 
pects associated with chronic diseases in developing countries. In recent years we have 
witnessed an increased awareness of the epidemiological burden of chronic diseases in 
the developing world (see Epping-Jordan, Galea, Tukuitonga and Beaglehole 2005, WHO 
2005, World Bank 2005). These two chapters examine the channels through which chronic 
diseases have an impact on economic well-being in Brazil, India and Russia. These coun- 
tries, particularly Brazil and Russia, currently display an intermediate level of economic 
development and possess large populations. Moreover, the prevalence of chronic diseases 
is projected to increase in the future, due to lifestyle changes, increases in life expectancy 
and associated population ageing. 
Introduction 3 
Chapter 4 opens with a study of the association between socio-economic inequality 
and the prevalence of chronic diseases. The results suggest that the burden of chronic 
diseases disproportionately affects the poor in Brazil and Russia. Chapter 5 extends this 
analYsis and evaluates how chronic diseases affect economic welfare at the household level 
in Brazil, India and Russia. The analYsis shows that chronic diseases have significant 
economic consequences, increasing the level of health care expenditure and decreasing the 
ability to work and earn income. Ultimately, household non-health related consumption is 
negatively affected. The results from Chapters 4 and 5 suggest an important role for chronic 
diseases in determining the economic possibilities for households in developing countries. 
Below, we provide a more detailed overview of the main topics covered in each chap- 
ter. Chapter I "Bargaining and the Provision of Health Services" is a theoretical investiga- 
tion where we model and compare the bargaining process between a purchaser of a health 
service, such as a health authority, and a provider (the hospital) in three plausible scenar- 
ios: a) The purchaser sets the price, and activity is negotiated behveen the purchaser and 
the provider: activity bargaining; b) The price is negotiated between the purchaser and the 
provider, but the activity is chosen unilaterally by the provider: price bargaining; and c) 
Price and activity are simultaneously negotiated between the purchaser and the provider: 
effiCient bargaining. We show that: 1) If the bargaining power of the purchaser is high 
(conversely, low), efficient bargaining leads to higher (lower) activity and purchaser's util- 
ity, and lower (higher) prices and provider's utility compared to price bargaining. 2) In 
activity bargaining, prices are lowest, the purchaser's utility is highest and the provider's 
utility is lowest; activity is generally lowest, but higher than in pfice bargaining for the high 
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bargaining power of the purchaser. 3) If the purchaser has higher bargaining power, this 
reduces prices and activity in price bargaining; it reduces prices but increases activity in 
activity bargaining; and it reduces prices but has no effect on activity in efficient bargaining. 
Using a sample of 283 hospitals over the period 1995-2002 in the NHS, Chapter 2 
empirically estimates the elasticity of hospital costs with respect to waiting times. Total 
hospital costs are estimated using pooled OLS, fixed effects and random effects model. In 
each case waiting times are entered in the regression in both linear and quadratic terms, 
assisting in the identification of the curvature of the cost function. The signs of the esti- 
mated coefficients are consistent with Iversen's (1993) model: the coefficient is negative 
for the linear effect and positive for the quadratic effect, suggesting a U-shaped relationship 
between hospital costs and waiting times. However, the coefficients are generally not sta- 
tistically significant, suggesting that waiting times have no impact on hospital costs. This 
casts some doubt on the effectiveness of waiting times as a tool to control hospital costs. 
Chapter 3 develops a theoretical model, focusing on the incentives for the provision 
of preventive care in a competitive health insurance market with adverse selection. This is 
an extension of the model proposed by Rothschild and Stiglitz (1976) with the introduction 
of prevention. We assume that patients differ with respect to the probability of illness and 
with the efficiency of prevention in reducing this probability. 
Comparing the first best with the unregulated market equilibrium, we show that 
asymmetric information distorts the equilibrium levels of both preventive and curative care. 
Low-risk patients are separated by receiving less than optimal curative care. Moreover, the 
level of preventive care is also distorted, with the direction of distortion depending on the 
Introduction 5 
relative efficiency of prevention for each risk type. Compared to high-risk patients, low- 
risk patients receive lower (higher) marginal benefit from preventive care if prevention is 
relatively more (less) efficient. 
The second part of the thesis then extends the discussion about prevention by fo- 
cusing on the economics of chronic diseases, more specifically in the context of low- and 
middle-income countries. There are two empirical chapters in this part. Chapter 4 provides 
evidence of the detenninants of inequalities for chronic diseases in Brazil and Russia, fo- 
cusing on three specific diseases: heart disease, hypertension and diabetes. 
We show that in both countries, poorer households face a considerably higher prob- 
ability of being affected by chronic diseases. The concentration index in Russia starts at 
-0.021 in 2000, peaks at -0.046 in 2003, and is equal to -0.035 in 2004. In Brazil the con- 
centration changes from -0.028 in 1998 to 0.003 in 2003. The health inequity index is 
around -0.01 in Russia (with a rising trend) and -0.06 in Brazil. Standardising variables 
have opposite effects in each country, reducing the level of observed health inequality in 
Brazil, but increasing the level in Russia. This suggests a differential impact of recent 
economic changes on the socio-economic inequality among demographic groups in each 
country. Socio-economic status, co-morbidities and education are the most important fac- 
tors explaining worsening health inequalities over the time, with the bulk of this effect due 
to changes in elasticities with respect to the determinants of chronic diseases, rather than 
changes in the concentration of such determinants. The results suggest that efforts to re- 
lieve the burden of chronic diseases from poorer households should aim at maximising the 
impact of externalities from other policy areas. 
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The study of the economic effect of chronic diseases is continued in Chapter 5. This 
paper presents some evidence of the effect of chronic diseases on household health ex- 
penditure, non-health expenditure, labour productivity (earned income and work days lost) 
and remittances from other households, using data from the Living Standard Measurement 
Surveys (LSMS) from Brazil, India and Russia. 
The results indicate that each additional case of chronic disease in the household gen- 
crates a conditional increase in health expenditure of 21%, 120% and 14% in Brazil, India 
and Russia respectively. Since the potential to work is affected by chronic diseases, labour 
income reduces by 7.9% in Brazil and 4.8% in Russia. This effect is partially offset by a 
conditional increase in remittance of 3.1 % in Brazil and 8.7% in Russia. In Brazil, the net 
effect on non-health consumption is an increase of 3.9%, suggesting that households are 
able to insure non-health consumption against chronic diseases, possibly from remittances. 
In Russia, however, where unobserved heterogeneity is accounted for, there is a net reduc- 
tion of non-health consumption of 3.2%, suggesting that chronic diseases actually reduce 
overall household welfare. 
Chapter 6 concludes, discussing the policy implications, and presenting the limita- 
tions and possible extensions of the study. 
Chapter I 
Bargaining and the provision of health services 
1.1 Introduction 
Prospective payment systems are used widely to remunerate health care providers. They 
usually take the form of Diagnosis Related Groups (DRGs) pricing or similar methods, 
such as Healthcare Resource Groups (HRGs) in the United Kingdom or Group Homo- 
genes de Maladie (GMC) in France. Depending on the institutional context, purchasers and 
providers bargain on price, activity, or both. For example, in the US, Health care Mainte- 
nance Organisations (HMOs) or private health insurers bargain on price, and seldom activ- 
ity, with the hospitals (see Barros and Martinez-Giralt 2006, Brooks, Dor and Wong 1997). 
In the UK, Health Authorities and Primary Care Trusts negotiate price and activity with 
NHS Trusts under "cost and volume" or "sophisticated" contracts. The government is dis- 
cussing the implementation of the policy known as "Payment by Results", where prices are 
regulated, but activity is negotiated between the Primary Care Trust and the NHS Trust. 
Within the Medicare Programme in the US, prices are chosen by the purchaser (Medicare), 
while activity is either chosen or bargained with the provider. Similar arrangements exist 
throughout Europe (see Figueras, McKee, Mossialos and Saltman 2005, Le Grand, Mossia- 
los and Saltman 1999). 
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Although we observe a substantial amount of bargaining between purchasers and 
providers, the theoretical literature on the relative merits of prospective payment systems 
non-nally assumes that payers are able to set the prices, and often activity, unilaterally, 
while providers choose the amount of quality and cost-containment effort (see, for exam- 
ple, Ma 1994, Chalkley and Malcornson 1998a, Chalkley and Malcornson 1998b, Mougeot 
and Naegelen 2005, de Fraja 2000). This implies that purchasers have all the bargaining 
power, which is a simplifying assumption, as the empirical evidence suggests that providers 
may hold at least some of it. Propper (1996) shows that in England purchasers with higher 
bargaining power could secure lower prices. Brooks et al. (1997) estimate that US hospi- 
tals hold on average 65% of the bargaining power when negotiating with private insurers. 
Melnick, Zwanziger, Barnezai and Pattison (1992) find a negative association between pur- 
chasers with greater market shares and prices charged by the providers. 
This study models the bargaining process between a purchaser of health services (a 
health authority) and a provider (a hospital) in three plausible scenarios: a) the purchaser 
sets the price, and the activity is bargained between the purchaser and the provider: activ- 
ity bargaining; b) the price is bargained between the purchaser and the provider, and the 
activity is chosen unilaterally by the provider: price bargaining; c) price and activity are 
bargained simultaneously between the purchaser and the provider: efficient bargaining. 
The background context of the interaction between providers and purchasers differs 
across countries. It is important to consider the implications of the bargaining framework 
for the health care sector. Price bargaining is relatively more common in health systems 
based on private provision of healthcare and insurance. In this case, insurers and providers 
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bargain on the price of procedures, whilst providers decide on the amount of activity. On 
the other hand, under public health care programmes one usually finds the other two types 
of bargaining. In some cases, purchasers have the ability to set prices unilaterally, whilst 
having to bargain on the amount of activity supplied by the provider. In others, such as 
in the current situation in the UK, efficient bargaining occurs, meaning that purchaser and 
provider bargain simultaneously on both activity and price. The results of this analysis 
suggest some specific implications for the health care sector of the different bargaining 
scenarios. This points some directions that might help policy makers in deten-nining the 
most appropriate setting according to the specific conditions of the market. 
Our main objective is to compare prices, activity and the utility of provider and pur- 
chaser in each of the three different scenarios. The results are: 1) if the bargaining power of 
the purchaser is higher than a certain threshold, efficient bargaining leads to higher activity 
and purchaser's utility, and lower prices and provider's utility, compared to pi-ice bargain- 
ing. The results are reversed if the bargaining power is below the threshold. The threshold 
is higher when the marginal benefit function is steeper (ie the benefit function is more con- 
cave) and when the marginal cost ftinction is flatter (ie the cost function is more convex). 
This result is surprising, as one would expect the purchaser to be better off when she can 
bargain with both instruments, price and activity. This intuition proves correct only when 
the bargaining power of the purchaser is high. When it is low, the purchaser would be bet- 
ter off contracting on prices only. 2) In activity bargaining, price and the provider's utility 
are lowest and the purchaser's utility is highest. The level of activity in activity bargaining 
is always lower than in efficient bargaining. It is also lower than in price bargaining, but 
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only if the bargaining power of the purchaser is below a certain value (which, according to 
numerical simulations is at least 0.59). This also implies that moving from price to activ- 
ity bargaining might reduce activity. It will certainly be reduced if we move from efficient 
to activity bargaining. 3) In price bargaining, higher bargaining power of the purchaser re- 
duces prices and activity; in activity bargaining it reduces prices, but increases activity; and 
in efficient bargaining it reduces prices but has no effect on activity. 
This study contributes to the literature on purchaser-provider bargaining in healthcare 
(for a recent survey see Barros and Martinez-Giralt (2006)). The model focuses specifically 
on the interaction between purchaser and provider, and does not consider an active role for 
patients. Ellis and McGuire (1990) develop a model in which patients and doctors bargain 
about the intensity of treatment, and derive the optimal combination of patient's insur- 
ance and reimbursement for the provider which maximises consumer welfare. ' Barros and 
Martinez-Giralt (2005a) show that, when bargaining with providers, purchasers may prefer 
to bargain with a professional association rather than a subset of more efficient providers. 
Barros and Martinez-Giralt (2000) analyse the bargaining process, in which the purchaser 
can choose whether to negotiate with each provider separately or jointly, or announce a 
contract that any provider is free to sign (the "any willing provider" clause). They show 
that if the total surplus is high, the purchaser prefers the system of "any willing provider", 
but if it is low she prefers either joint or separate negotiations. Gal-Or (1997) shows that 
purchasers (private insurers) might be willing to sign exclusive contracts with a subset of 
providers in order to secure more favourable terms during bargaining. Gal-Or (I 999a) stud- 
1 Dor and Watson (1995) evaluate how different payment mechanisms affect the incentives in the relation- 
ship between hospitals and physicians. 
1.2 The model II 
ies whether vertical mergers between hospitals and physician practices might enhance their 
bargaining power with the insurers (see also Gal-Or (1999b)). Barros and Martinez-Giralt 
(2005b) explore the implications of the coexistence of a public and a private sector in the 
provision of health services. They argue that the public sector might choose to hold idle 
capacity in order to extract more beneficial conditions when bargaining with the private 
sector for the provision of services. There are other applications of bargaining in the health 
economics literature. Clark (1995) examines how to divide a budget between two patients 
with different health conditions and capacity to benefit. Pecorino (2002) models the ef- 
fects of drug reimports from Canada on the profitability of US domestic pharmaceutical 
companies. 
The study is organised as follows. Section 1.2 presents the model. Section 1.3 pro- 
vides a comparison of the different scenarios. Section 1.4 extends the model by adding 
quality and cost-containment effort. Section 1.5 offers concluding remarks and policy im- 
plications. 
1.2 The model 
We model the bargaining process between a purchaser of health services, such as a health 
authority, and a provider (a hospital). Define y as the number of patients treated and p as 
the price the provider receives for each patient treated. The provider's utility U is given by 
2 See also Wright (2004) for a model of price regulation in the pharmaceutical sector where the regulator 
and the pharmaceutical company bargain over a subsidy. 
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its surplus U(p, y) = py - C(y), where C(y) is the cost function of the provider, which 
satisfies Cy > 0, Cyy >0 (increasing marginal cost). 
The purchaser's utility (or health authority utility) is given by the difference between 
the benefit for the patients B(y) and the transfer to the provider: V(p, y) = B(y)-py. The 
benefit ftinction satisfies By >0 and Byy < 0. ' 
We analyse three plausible scenarios. 1) Activity bargaining: the purchaser sets the 
price, and activity is bargained between the purchaser and the provider. 2) Nice bargaining: 
the price is bargained between the purchaser and the provider, but activity is chosen by the 
provider. 3) Efficient bargaining: price and activity are bargained simultaneously between 
the purchaser and the provider. 
Define -y, with 0< -y :! ý 1, as the bargaining power of the purchaser, (1 - -y) as 
the bargaining power of the provider, V and U as the outside options for the purchaser 
and the provider respectively, and ý7 =V-V and FJ =U-U. The outside options 
represent the payoff that each part would attain if they failed to reach an agreement (see 
Muthoo 1999). Consider for example the case of negotiations on the price of services. If the 
negotiations fail, it might be the case that the purchaser would need to contract at current 
market prices. In this case, this is the purchaser outside option. For notational simplicity let 
Vi = V(pý, yi), Ui = U(p', y'), where i=a, p, e denotes respectively activity, price and 
3 Amore general objective function for the purchaser is B (y) - (1 +A)py+JU, where A is the opportunity 
cost of public funds and 5 is the weight attached to the utility of the provider. The main results of the analysis 
with this more general specification would be qualitatively similar as long as either A>0 or J<1. We 
therefore focus on the special case where A=J=0. 
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efficient bargaining. In all the sections below we use Nash bargaining to solve for optimal 
conditions (see Nash 1950, Nash 1953, Kalai 1977, Osborne and Rubinstein 1990). ' 
1.2.1 Activity bargaining 
In the first scenario, we assume that first the purchaser chooses the price, then the purchaser 
and the provider bargain on activity. ' For a given price p, the bargained activity can be 
detennined by solving: 
max [B(y) - py - -V]'y [py - C(y) - y 
The First Order Condition (FOC) is: 
(By - p) =- (Cy - p) u 
ProoL The result is obtained by differentiating -y log [B(y) - py - F] + 
(I - -y) log 
[py 
- C(y) - -U] with respect to y. The Second Order Condition is 
ByyV-(B! _02 C YyFj+(V_C Y )2 
V2 U2 < 0, which is always satisfied. 0 
To interpret the optimal condition on the bargained activity it is useful to distinguish 
two cases, low price and high price (see Figure 1.1). 1) If the exogenous price p is low 
(BY(ya) >p and CY(ya) > p), the desired activity for the purchaser is highet- than the 
desired activity for the provider. The bargained activity lies somewhere between the desired 
activity of the two parties. The LHS of Eq. (1.2) is the net marginal benefit of activity 
' The Nash bargaining solution has been used extensively in labour economics to examine negotiations 
between trade unions and firms with respect to wages and employment. See, for example, Oswald (1985) for 
a survey of the literature, and (and Manning 1987, McDonald and Solow 198 1, Sampson 1993, Bulkley and 
Myles 1997). 
5A different interpretation is that the Department of Health fixes the price, then the Health Authority 
and provider bargain on activity. The implicit assumption is that the Department of Health and the Health 
Authority share the same objective function. 
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for the purchaser, weighted by her utility and her bargaining power. The RHS is the net 
marginal cost for the provider, also weighted by his utility and his bargaining power. 2) If 
the exogenous price p is high (p > By (y') and p> CY(ya)), the desired activity for the 
purchaser is lowei- than the desired activity for the provider. The FOC can be rewritten as 
V 
(p -By) =iuI (p - Cy). Again, the bargained activity lies between the desired activity 
of the two parties. 
Figure 1.1 illustrates different bargained activity levels (y'(p)) for three different 
values of the bargaining power of the purchaser, equal to 0.3,0.5 and 0.7 respectively. In 
equilibrium it is always the case that 0- >0 and ý' > 0, so that the equilibrium lies in 
the area between the average and marginal benefit, and the area between the average and 
marginal cost. 
Finally if p= By(y') = Cy(y') (i. e. where the marginal benefit curve crosses the 
marginal cost curve), there is no disagreement between purchaser and provider, so that y' 
is such that By = Cy- 
By differentiating Eq. (1.2) with respect to -y we obtain 22! = 
(By-p)FJ-(p-C, )V- 
. If the 197 iýij(-F) 
price is low, a higher bargaining power of the purchaser increases activity (22ý > 0). If the 0-Y 
price is high it reduces activity (9-"' < 0). a-Y 
The effect of a change of price on activity is: 
oya 1 
(1 
op -r 
( 
Fj 2 ý7 2) 
which in general is indeterminate. According to our assumptions, it is always the case that 
Cy > -9 and 11 > By, since the marginal cost is higher than the average cost, and the yy 
1.2 The inodel 
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Fig. 1.1. Activity bargaining 
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average benefit is higher than the marginal benefit. For low levels of P the provider utility 
U is low (and the purchaser utility V is high) so that > 0. In this case, the provider is ap 
interested in increasing activity because the equilibrium is below the marginal cost curve. 
The purchaser will also be interested in increasing activity since this brings the eqdilibrium 
closer to the marginal benefit curve. On the other hand, for high levels of p the purchaser 
utility iý is low (and the provider utility FJ is high) so that 22! <0 for low p. This result is ap 
consistent with the example shown in Figure 1.1. 
The above analysis holds for a given price. The purchaser chooses the price to maxi- 
Mize 
max B(y'(p)) - py'(p) p 
The FOC is: 
pa: Byy,, =y+ pyp 
The optimal price is determined such that the marginal benefit of higher activity 
2 equals the marginal cost. The SOC is: Byyyý + Byypp - 2yp - pypp. 
1.2.2 Price bargaining 
In the second scenario, we assume that first the purchaser and the provider bargain on price, 
then the activity is chosen unilaterally by the provider. ' By backward induction, for a given 
price the hospital chooses the level of activity, which maximises U= py - C(y), leading 
6 This setup is analogous to the model of bargaining between a firm and a union over wage and employment 
(McDonald and Solow, 198 1; Manning, 1987), where the firm sets the employment, but the wage is bargained 
with the union. 
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to the FOC: 
yp :p= cy 
with 2Z - -L- >0 and 
2! Z =0 (the SOC is -Cy. < 0). The bargained price can be OP GYY op2 
detennined by solving: 
max [B(y"(p)) - pyP(p) - -V] 
" [pyP(p) - C(yP(p)) - 
p 
Thanks to the envelope theorem, Up = yP(p). The FOC for the bargained price is: 
7 (1 - -Y) y+ pyp pP : =Byyp +v-1 
v Fj ý7 
ProoL By taking the log and differentiating with respect to p we obtain -y 
Byyp-y(p)-pyp + 
Y(P)+Py'-c I'YP = 0. From the FOC of the provider we know that p= Cy. By simpli- u 
fying, we obtain: -y 
BVyp-V(p)-pyp 
+ YLP) = 0. The SOC is -2 
ij-2((BV_P)YP_Y)2+(I_, y)iF72y2 
f7 u f72 CJ2 
-y(2- 
BYY ) 
CYY 
Vu 
The LHS of Eq. (1.8) is the marginal benefit of a higher price, and includes the mar- 
ginal benefit for the purchaser of higher activity (weighted by her bargaining power, her 
utility and the responsiveness of supply) and the marginal benefit for the provider of a 
higher surplus (also weighted by his bargaining power and utility). The RHS is the mar- 
ginal cost for the purchaser of a higher price and overall transfer (also weighted). 
If the purchaser holds all the bargaining power (-y = 1), the optimal price is such 
that: Byyp =y+ pyp. If the provider holds all the bargaining power, the optimal price 
is the highest possible compatible with the purchaser having a non-negative utility. The 
I 
bargained price is an intermediate level between these two extremes. 
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1.2.3 Efficient bargaining 
18 
In the third scenario, purchaser and provider bargain simultaneously on activity and price. 
This setting is called efficient bargaining, because it reduces the potential for unexplored 
opportunities from mutual gain. ' The bargaining problem is: 
max [B(y) - py - [py - C(y) - ply 
After obtaining the FOCs and rearranging, we obtain: 
y': By = Cy (1.10) 
P, 
B(ye) _V c(ye) +U 
ye I ye 
ProoL Define Q= [B(y) -py-V]-' 
[py-C(y) 
--U]'-". Then: 
a'092 -- -ty ap - B(y)-py-V+ 
("), =0 and a"92 - 
-y(By-p) + ('-')('-c -1) = 0. From the first equation Py C(Y)-U Oy B(y)-py--V Py-C(y)-U 
we obtain p 
[C(y)+-U]+(l--y)[B(y)--Vl 
, which, substituted 
into the second one, yields: y 
19'109Q 2 
(-ýL 
+ 1-Y) 0,19210go = ýYByyý'-(By _P)2 By Cy. The SOCs are: '9 P2Y V2 
CJ2 09Y 2 V2 
2 
CYYCj+(P_CV)2 a2 log n 02 log p j92 log 0 a2 log f2 -y + L_-y + 
U2 < 0, and Op2 vy 2( apay 
). 
. 9pay vU 
y (By - p) AL 
+ !; -2 - 
(1--y)B+IC-py+y (By - p) -ýL + 
! 
=-a) =y (By - p) 
(-ýL + 1ý2 U2 f1ci 
(V2 
U2 ý12 CJ2 
O_g f2 ýOf2a2 log f2 
(21L 
where the last simplification follows from the FOC for price. ap2 j9y2 i9pay 
2 (ý2_ +C 
C1 
P)2 _2L + 
1_; 12 -Y V2 CJ2 ý12 "Y - (By Cj 2 f/ 2 U2 
Y2 (By _ P)2 
2 
c,, u > 0. All three SOCs are + 1--2 + 02 V2 U2 
) 
V2 
always satisfied, since Byy < 0. E 
7 The outcome achieved in price bargaining is not efficient. As remarked by Aronsson, Lofgren and Nvik- 
strorn (1993), "there are unexplored profits and/or utility gains from bargaining". 
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The negotiated level of activity maximises the sum of the surplus for the purchaser 
and for the provider U+V= B(y) - C(y). In this respect the level of activity is efficient. 
The optimal price is a weighted average of the average cost of the provider and the average 
welfare of the purchaser! 
1.3 Regime comparison 
1.3.1 Constant marginal benefit 
To gain some insights into how the different scenarios relate to each other, we consider the 
following functional fonns: a) the benefit function is linear in activity: B(y) = ay; b) the 
cost function is quadratic: C(y) = ý2y' with Cy = cy; c) the outside options are normalised 2 
to zero (V =U= 
The equilibrium for the three scenarios is reported in Table I. I. Proofs are in the 
appendix. 
Table 1.1. Equilibrium with constant marginal benefit 
a= p a = atz-, y) pp pe = at: 
z-, y) 
a= y 
2 
a 
2 
yp = a(2--f) e= y 
2 
a 
c(2--y) 2c c 
Va = a2 vp =7 a2(2--y) Ve, = -ya2 '(2- l c 4c 2c ý (1 Ua = a ' Up = 
a2(2_, Y)2 Ue = a2 
(1 _, Y) 
2ý (72 Sc 2c 
8 This result is in line with the model of employment-wage bargaining analysed by Manning (1987) in 
the context of firm-union negotiations. The level of employment does not depend on the payoffs of firm 
and union. Consequently, they "can agree on this level and then bargain about the distribution of the rents" 
(Manning, 1987, p. 13 1). 
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) 
The following proposition compares prices, activity and utility under different regimes. 
Proposition I (a) pe = pp ý, pa; (b) ye ý: lyp; ya}, yp > ya if 7<0.59; 
V, > V, > Vp; (d) Up > Ue > Ua. 
ProoL (a) pP ý-(-2--') >ý= pa if 1. (b) Va 22 =a c(2--y) < ve =a if -C 
a<2 
c(2--y) -C 
or -y :51; yP < ye a if -Y ý: 0; YP = 
a(2--y) 
2c -C 2c 
> ya == 
- 
a if (2 _ c(2--y) 
7)2 >2 or 
-y < 0.59. (c) Va a2 > V, = 2a2 if 27 - _Y2 _ ýc(-2--y) - 2c 
1<0o r- 1)2 < 0; Ve 
-ya2 > Vp = -ya2(2--y) if Y ý: 0. a2(2_, y)2 > Ue 2c - 4c 
(d) UP 8c = a2 (1 TC 
2 
_, 7) if 
L : ýYf 
4 > 
(1 Y - 
+ _y2 if 72 > 0; Ue == E2 (1 or 4- 4-y >4- 4-y, or Y) 2c > Ua = 
2 -, y a if (2 ýc ýT7ýf) _ 7)2 > 1, 
which is always the case, since 0<<1.0 
The price in efficient bargaining is equal to the price in price bargaining, which is 
higher than or equal to the price in activity bargaining. The activity in efficient bargaining 
is the highest. The activity in price bargaining is higher than in activity bargaining when 
the bargaining power of the purchaser is below 0.59. 
The purchaser weakly prefers activity bargaining to efficient bargaining, and efficient 
bargaining to pi-ice bargaining. The provider weakly prefers pi-ice bargaining to efficient 
bargaining, and prefers efficient bargaining to activity bargaining. 
In summary, the purchaser is better off in activity bargaining and the provider is better 
off in price bargaining. Activity is highest in efficient bargaining and prices are highest in 
efficient or price bargaining. 
Figure 1.2 below displays the solution under different regimes. An arrow indicates 
increasing bargaining power of the purchaser. In efficient bargaining, a higher bargaining 
power of the purchaser reduces prices but has no effect on the level of activity. In activity 
1.3 Regime comparison 21 
) 
bargaining, higher bargaining power of the purchaser induces higher activity, but has no 
effect on prices. In price bargaining, higher bargaining power of the purchaser reduces 
both prices and activity. 
The solution in price bargaining, where the purchaser holds all the bargaining power, 
coincides with the solution in activity bargaining, where the provider has all the bargaining 
power (point A). The solutions in price and efficient bargaining coincide when the provider 
holds all the bargaining power (point B). The solutions in activity and efficient bargaining 
coincide when the purchaser holds all the bargaining power (point Q. Finally, the activity 
in pi-ice bargaining is higher than in activity bargaining only for low bargaining power of 
the purchaser. 
Figure 1.2 also compares the solution when both parties have the same bargaining 
power (-y = 0.5). Prices are higher in efficient and price bargaining (points E'Y=' .5 and 
P'Yý'-' respectively). Activity is highest in efficient bargaining and lowest in activity bar- 
gaining (point A'Yý'-'). 
1.3.2 Decreasing marginal benefit 
We extend the previous analysis, and assume a more general specification of the benefit 
function: B(y) = ay - ty2' with decreasing marginal benefit, while we maintain the other 2 
assumptions: C(y) f y2' U=0. Table 1.2 reports the solution in pl-ice and 2 
efficient bargaining. Proofs are in the appendix. The solution for activity bargaining is 
more involved, and is derived separately in section 3.2.1. 
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1; 
B(y) 
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Fig. 1.2. Comparison of scenarios with constant marginal benefit 
Table 1.2. Equilibrium with decreasing marginal benefit 
Price bargaining Etti cient bargaining 
= pp a c(2--y) b+2c pe = 
a((I-, y)b+(2--y)c) 
2(b+c) 
p- 
Vp 
- 
Up 
a(2--y) 
b+2c 
_ -ya 
2 (2 - -y) 
2(b+2c) 
_ a2c(2_. Y)2 2(b+2C)2 
e y 
Ve 
Ue 
a 
b+c 
-ya 2 
2(b+c) 
(1--y)a 2 
2(b+c) 
1.3 Regime comparison 23 
The following proposition compares the two regimes. 
Proposition 2 If -y > TTb, then (a) pP > pe, (b) ye > yP, (c) UP U', (d) b+, 
VC > VP. 
Proof. (a) pP > Pe if ac(2--y) > a((l--y)b+(2--I)c) or b(c-y + b-y - b) >0 or -y > b+2c 2(b+c) b+c' 
(b) ye > yp if a> a(2--y) or b+ 2c - (2 - -y) (b + c) >0 or -y > --L. (c) UP > Ul b+c b+2c b+c 
if a2c(2 _-Y)2 > 
(1--y)a2 
or b2y+ bc-y 
2+ Cý, y2 -b2>0 or -y =I-ý, -ý- 1. (d) 
Ve > Vp if T(-b-+ -2c-) 2' 2(b+c) c b+c 
-ya2 > ja2(2--y) or (b + 2c) - (b + c) (2 ->0 or > -ý-. E 2(b+c) 2(b+2c) b+c 
If the bargaining power of the purchaser is sufficiently high (-y > -L-) prices are b+c 
higher in price bargaining, activity is lower, the provider is better off and the purchaser is 
worse off. If the bargaining power of the purchaser is sufficiently low (-Y < all the b+c 
results are reversed. The threshold --L increases with b and decreases with c. Note that b+c 
if b=0 we are back to the results of proposition 1. Therefore, if the purchaser has low 
bargaining power, efficient bargaining yields a lower utility for the purchaser than in price 
bargaining. This is a surprising result: we would expect the purchaser to be better off when 
she can bargain with more instruments, ie both prices and activity. But this holds true only 
if her bargaining power is high. If her bargaining power is low, having more instruments is 
counterproductive. The purchaser is better off when she cannot bargain on activity. 
Figure 1.3 below displays the solution under the two regimes. The solutions in effi- 
cient and price bargaining are depicted by line BC and AD respectively. An arrow indicates 
increasing bargaining power of the purchaser. As before, in efficient bargaining activity is 
constant, irrespective of the distribution of bargaining power, and the price decreases as the 
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bargaining power of the purchaser increases. In price bargaining, both prices and activity 
decrease as the bargaining power of the purchaser increases. 
It is useful to compare these results with those obtained in the previous section by 
assuming constant marginal benefit. When the bargaining power of the purchaser is low, the 
activity in efficient bargaining is lower than in price bargaining but with constant marginal 
benefit it is always higher. Furthen-nore, the prices under the two regimes differ, but are 
identical with constant marginal benefit. 
Decreasing marginal benefit and activity bargaining 
In this section we derive the solution in activity bargaining. For a given price, the 
optimal bargained activity is: 
Y, (P) = 
(L--I-c (a - p) + bpL+-') (ýý--2c (a - p) + bpill)2 - 2bcp (a - p) 
__ 
2222 
bc 
(1.12) 
See the appendix for the proof. The optimal price is given by the price which max- 
imises V= aya (p) _ 
kya (P)2 
- pya (p). Given the complexity of the solution, it is not 2 
possible to derive manageable expressions for price and activity. To compare the solu- 
tions for the three scenarios we resort to numerical simulations. Our strategy is to specify 
a grid of values for all the parameters of the model (a, b, c and -y), and compute the so- 
lution numerically. We fix a=1, and specify a grid for bE 10,0.5,1,1.5,..., 301, c= 
10,0.5,1,1.5,..., 301 and -y = 10,0.1, ..., 0.9,11. 
For example, supposing that abc=I and -y = 0.5, then ya (p) 1- 4 
92 ý(p 
- 1) 2, 'pp 
+79 
and V= (1 - p) 99 V (p - 1) 2p + TL -1 
(1 
- 
ý(p 
- 1) 2p +9 
9 (4 
24 T6 
+ T6ý- + TTý6- 
9 
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Fig. 1.3. Comparison of scenarios with decreasing marginal benefit 
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the solution of which is p' = 0.29 and y' = 0.36. Table 1.3 reports the solution for' 
1 and -y = 10,0.1,0.25,0.5,0.75,0.9,1}. The tables for the other values of b 
and c are reported in the appendix. 
Overall, the numerical simulations suggest that in activity bargaining prices are low- 
est, the purchaser's utility is highest and the provider's utility is lowest (note the similarity 
with proposition 1). Activity is lower than in efficient bargaining. It is lower than in pfice 
bargaining when the bargaining power of the purchaser is below a certain threshold, which 
is between 0.7 and 0.95 in our simulations. 
The solution in activity bargaining is displayed in Figure 1.3, on the line AC which 
was derived by plotting the numerical solution a thousand times. In contrast to the solution 
with constant marginal benefit, in activity bargaining the price is not fixed any longer. As 
the bargaining power of the purchaser increases, the price decreases and activity increases. 
As in the previous section, the solution in pi-ice bargaining with -y =1 coincides 
with activity bargaining when -y =0 (point A), and the solution in activity and efficient 
bargaining coincide when -y =1 (point Q. However, when -y =0 (points B and D) efficient 
and price bargaining yield different solutions. Finally, when both parties have the same 
bargaining power, the solutions in efficient bargaining and price bargaining coincide at the 
point where marginal cost equals marginal benefit. 
Finally, in price bargaining an increase in the bargaining power of the purchaser 
reduces prices and activity, but in activity bargaining it reduces prices but increases activity. 
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Table 1.3. Numerical simulation of equilibrium with decreasing marginal benefit 
Simulation based on the parameters a--I, b=l, c=l 
-V = 01 -v = 025 v= (1-h -v = 07.5 -Y = 0-9 
ye 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.50 
YP 0.67 0.63 0.58 0.50 0.42 0.37 0.33 
P" , 
0.33 0.32 0.31 0.29 0.27 0.25 0.25 
P 0.75 0.70 0.63 0.50 0.38 0.30 0.25 
vp 0.67 0.63 0.58 0.50 0.42 0.37 0.33 
I 
1.4 Adding quality and effort 
In this section we extend the model by introducing quality and cost containment effort, and 
we show that the results using this more general specification are qualitatively similar to 
the ones obtained above. We follow the approach suggested by Ma (1994) and Chalkley 
and Malcomson (1998b). Define q as the quality generated by the provider and e as the 
cost-containment effort. The cost ftinction of the provider is C(y, q, e) + ýp(y, q, e). C 
includes the monetary cost, which increases with quality and activity but decreases with 
effort: C(y, q, e), with Cy > 0, Cq >0 and C, < 0. V is the non-monetary cost, or 
disutility, which increases with activity, quality and effort: (p(y, q, e), with (py > 01 Wq ý> 0 
and ýp, > 0. 
We also assume that the demand for treatment depends positively on quality so that 
y= y(q) with yq > 0. Of course, this assumption is only valid in case quality is an 
observable variable. This assumption implies y= y(q) ý* q= q(y), qy > 0. Therefore by 
contracting activity the purchaser can implicitly contract the level of quality. The benefit 
function of the patients is B= B(y, q) with By >0 and Bq > 0. Since quality is a positive 
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J 
function of activity, we can also write B= B(y, q(y)) with ýýB- = ý2B- + ! LB-ýý- > 0. The 09Y 49Y o9q ay 
provider's utility is given by the surplus: U == py - C(y, q(y), e) - V(y, q(y), e). The 
purchaser's utility is V= B(y, q(y)) - py. 
1.4.1 Activity bargaining 
We assume that first, the purchaser sets the price; second, the purchaser and provider bar- 
gain on activity; third, the provider chooses effort. We solve by backward induction. For a 
given price and activity (stage three), the provider maximises the surplus U with respect to 
effort so that: 
U, (e*) =0: -C, (y, q (y), e*) = (p, (y, q (y), e*) 
The optimal effort for the provider e*(y) is such that the marginal benefit of lower 
cost is equal to the marginal disutility of effort. The indirect utility function of the provider 
is U(p, y, q(y), e*(y)) = py - C(y, q(y), e*(y)) - ý9(y, q(y), e*(y)). 
For a given price (stage two), the activity bargaining problem between purchaser and 
provider is: 
max [V(p, y, q(y)) - -V]'y [U(p, y, q(y), e*(y)) - y 
whose FOC is: 
a 
By + Bqqy -p= 
CY + ýoy + (Cq + ýoq) qy -p 
y: ly (i - -Y) (1.15) vu 
The volume of activity is such that the difference between the marginal benefit and 
the price (weighted by the relevant factors) equals the difference between the marginal cost 
and the price (also weighted by the relevant factors). The condition is analogous to Eq. (2). 
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However, the marginal benefit and marginal cost also include the additional benefit and cost 
from higher quality. The marginal cost includes both the monetary and non-monetary cost. 
In stage one the purchaser sets the price to maximise: 
max B (y'(p), q (y'(p))) - py" (p) 
p 
The FOC is: 
pa: Byyp + Bqqyyp =y+ pyp (1.17) 
The optimal price is such that the marginal benefit of higher activity and quality 
induced by a higher price is equal to the marginal cost. 
1.4.2 Price bargaining 
First the purchaser and the provider bargain on price, and then the provider chooses the 
level of activity and cost-containment effort. For a given price the provider maximises the 
surplus U with respect to activity and effort, so that: 
Uy(y*, e*)=O: P=CY+Vy+(Cq+Vq)qv 
Ue(y*le*)::,,: O: -C(! =ýOe (19) 
The provider chooses the level of activity which equates the price to the marginal 
monetary and non-monetary cost. The marginal cost also takes into account the indirect ef- 
fect of activity caused by increased quality, which is captured by the last term on the RHS. 
The optimal effort is such that the marginal benefit of lower cost is equal to the marginal 
disutility of effort. The indirect utility function of the provider is U(p, y*(p), q(y*(p)), e*(p))- 
->0 L-ý. Note that 
a. -- -ul, ý P- 
ulle 0 and 2-u == y* (by the envelope the- OP unuu, 'ý , OP uyyuýý-U4 OP 
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orem). The price bargaining problem is given by: 
Max 
B(y* (p), q(y* (p))) ]7[ py* (p) - C(y* (p), q(y* (p)), e* (p)) (1.20) 
PI -PY*(P) -V -ýo(y*(p), q(y*(p)), e*(p))-U 
The FOC is: 
pP (By + Bqqy) yp +Y (Y + PYP) (1.21) 
The optimal price is such that the weighted marginal benefit for the purchaser of 
higher activity and quality, plus the weighted marginal benefit for the provider in terms of 
higher surplus, is equal to the weighted marginal cost for the purchaser. 
1.4.3 Semi-efficient bargaining 
We now consider the scenario where the parties bargain on price and activity simultane- 
ously. This is called semi-efficient bargaining because the effort variable is not bargained, 
but chosen by the provider. First the purchaser and the provider bargain on price and ac- 
tivity, then the provider chooses the cost-containment effort. For a given activity and price 
the supplier maximises the surplus U with respect to effort, 
U'! (e*) =0: - Ce = ý0,! (1.22) 
which provides e* (y). The bargaining problem is: 
max [B(y, q(y)) - py - 
py - C(y, q(y) , e* 
(y)) 
(1.23) 
[ 
-(p(y, q(y), e* (y)) -U ply 
whose FOCs are: 
y': By + Bqqy = Cy + Wy + qy (Cq + (Pq) (1.24) 
eB-VC++ 
-U 
(1-7) + 'Y (1.25) 
yy 
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The price equals the weighted sum of the average benefit to the purchaser and the 
average cost to the provider, which includes the non-monetary cost. The optimal activity 
balances the purchaser's marginal benefit with the provider's marginal cost. 
I 
1.5 Conclusions 
Different countries have different institutional and bargaining settings for purchasers and 
providers. They usually follow one of three scenarios: the purchaser sets the price, but 
activity is bargained between purchaser and provider: activity bargaining; the price is bar- 
gained between purchaser and provider, but activity is chosen unilaterally by the provider: 
price bargaining; and price and activity are bargained simultaneously between purchaser 
and provider: efficient bargaining. We find that if the bargaining power of the purchaser 
is low, efficient bargaining leads to higher prices and provider's utility, and lower activity 
and purchaser's utility, compared to pi-ice bargaining. This result seems surprising, as one 
would expect the purchaser to be better off when she can bargain with more instruments, 
ie both price and activity. However, this intuition holds true only if the bargaining power 
of the purchaser is high. If her bargaining power is low, having more instruments is coun- 
terproductive. One policy implication is that purchasers with low bargaining power may 
be better off if restricted to bargaining on prices only, and not on price and activity. Fu- 
ture empirical work might quantify the bargaining power of the purchaser and the provider 
in health care markets. This might help governments to decide whether to encourage pur- 
chasers to bargain on prices only, or on price and activity simultaneously. 
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The analysis also confinns the intuition that if purchasers can set prices (activity 
bargaining), net consumer welfare (patient benefit, net of transfer to the provider) is highest. 
This result holds for any level of bargaining power of the purchaser. The analysis therefore 
supports policies such as "payment by results" in the UK, where prices are fixed by the 
purchaser or the regulator. 
One less intuitive result is that by shifting from efficient and price bargaining (as in 
"cost and volume" or "sophisticated" contracts) to activity bargaining (as in "payment by 
results"), the level of activity is likely to decrease. More precisely, this study predicts that 
moving from efficient to activity bargaining will certainly reduce activity. This is in contrast 
to what is normally thought, i. e. that "payment by results" will encourage activity. When 
moving from pi-ice to activity bargaining, activity will decrease (increase) if the bargaining 
power of the purchaser is low (high). Further empirical work might test whether policies 
such as "payment by results" in the UK are likely to increase or decrease activity compared 
to previous policies. 
Finally, most of the empirical work focuses on the effect of bargaining power on 
prices (Barros and Martinez-Giralt 2006). This study provides clear predictions of the 
effect of the bargaining power on activity as well as price. More precisely, underpfice bar- 
gaining a higher bargaining power of the purchaser reduces activity; under activity bargain- 
ing it increases activity; and under efficient bargaining it has no effect on activity. Further 
empirical work might test such predictions. 
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I. A. 1 Constant marginal benefit 
Activity bargaining. pa . a, ya =a 'Va =: 
q2 Ua= a2 
(I 
--Y) 
2 c(2--y) 2c(2--y) 2c(2--y)' 
33 
Proof. The rule determining activity is, for a given price: 7 '-P + P-cy = 0, (a p)y (P-iy)y 
from which y= 
2p 
. The FOC 
for price is: 
2a 
_ 
4p 
= 0, from which: pa =a (the c(2--y) c(2--y) c(2--y) 2 
SOC is _ 
4p 
< 0). The bargained activity is therefore: Ya .a. The utility of the c(2--y) c(2--y) 
purchaser and the provider are: V' (a - p) y= 
a2 
and Ua 
(P 
_ ýýY) y=a2 
(1--Y) 
2c(2--y) 2 ý-c(2 y-)-" 
E 
Price bargaining. pp = 
21-2-1), yP = ý-(2-2), VP = -va2(2--y), Up = a2(2--j)2 2 2c 4c 8C 
ProoL Since y P- with yp = -1, the FOC for the bargained price is: _y 
(a-p) 1-Z! 
CC 2E-t 
,+ 
CC 
-y) 0, which gives: (the SOC is -1 
((a 
- p)2 + p2) pp 2 --p ýa i)Fl; i 
C 2c 
22 a2(2 < 0). Hence yP --2), VP = (a - p) y=y -') and UP = (p - fy) y 2c 4c 2 
a2 (2 _, y)2 
8c 
Efficient bargaining. pe = 2ý(2-7), ye= 
a, Ve 
= 
-ya2, ue= a2(1-, y) 
2 ý-C 2c 
ProoL The FOC xv. r. t. price implies: p -y) a+ -yEy. The FOC Nv. r. t. activity 2 
implies: y' = ý!. ThereforepI = ý-(-2--') and Ve = (a - p) y= -y! -2- and 
Ue = 
(P 
_ ýýy) y c2 2c 2 
S2 
2c 
I. A. 2 Decreasing marginal benefit 
Price bargaining. pP = 
ac(2--y), yp = 1(2--y), Vp = 
-ya2(2--y), Up = a2c(2--y)2 b+2c b+2c 2(b+2c) 2(b+2C)2 
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(a-V-p 1-P- 
C 
)C 
C ProoL Since y with yp the FOC for the bargained price is: 7- p2) 
+ 
CC aP-ý, tP2 
(C 
C7- C 
P- (a-bý-p)-p 
I=0, which simplifies to -y +2 (1 - y) =0 or -y (a - bl! - p) - --F-T a- ýt Z! -p) C C 2c 
(2c 
. -yp +2 (1 - -y) (a - -Lp - p) = 0, giving: Pp - 
ac(2-') Hence yP = 
2-(-2-') 
, 
VP 
2c b+2c ' b+2c 
(a -ýy_ P) y= 
-ya2 (2--y) 
and UP = 
(p 
_ 
EY) y=a 
2c(2--y)2. 
2 2(6+2c) 2 2(b+2c)2 
pe a((1-7)b+(2--y)c) e=ae= -ya2 . a2(1--y) Efficient bargaining. 2(b+c) ,y b+c ,v 2(b+c) , 
Ue 
2(b+c) 
ProoL The FOC xv. r. t. price implies: pe = (1 - y) (a - ýy) + The FOC Nv. r. t. activity 22 
implies: y' Therefore Pe = 
a((I--Y)b+(2--y)c) 
and Ve = (a - ýy - p) y= -a 
2 
and 2(b+c) 2 2(b+c) 
Ue = 
(p 
_ 
EY) y a2(1--y). 2 2(b+c) 
Activity bargaining 
(a-by)-p 
Proof. From FOC w. r. t. y we have -y 2- 
(1 -Y) E2 ay-týy py 
P-'Y or -y (a - by - p) (p - ý2 y) 2 py-2y 2 
-y) (p - cy) (a - ýy - p) 0. Upon expanding, we obtain 
Ly'-y (cýý--2 (a - p) + bpL+---') + 2222 
4 L' (cy(a-p)+bp '+")-N/(c --! P(a-p)+bpl+'Y) 22 P(--P) 
p (a - p) = 0, with solution y2 bc -2 
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I. A. 3 Tables of simulations with decreasing marginal benefit 
1. a, = c=1, different b 
-Y =0 -Y =A 
Simulation with a=c 
y= .2 -y = .4 -y = .5 
13 b= 
=. 6 
0.5 
-Y=. 8 -Y=. 9 -T=l 
y 0.40 0.41 0.41 0.45 0.46 0.48 0.55 . 5-9 0.67 ye 0.67 0.67 0.67 0.67 0.67 0.67 0.67 0.67 0.67 
vp 0.80 0.76 0.72 0.64 0.60 0.56 0.48 0.44 
- 
0.40 
-- - - pa 0.40 0.39 0.38 0.37 0.36 0.35 0.34 0.33- 0 . 
33 
P, 0.83 0.78 0.73 0.63 0.58 0.53 0.43 0.38 0.33 
VP 0.80 0.76 0.72 0.64 0.60 0.56 0.48 0.44 0.40 
VE 0.00 0.03 0.07 0.13 0.17 0.20 0.27 0.30 0.33 
U, 0.33 0.30 0.27 0.20 0.17 0.13 0.07 0.03 0.00 
UP 0.32 0.29 0.26 0.20 0.18 0.16 0.12 0.10 0.08 
-Y =0 -Y = .1 
Simulation with a=c 
-Y = .2 -Y = .4y= .5- 
= 1, b= 
Y=. 6 
I 
-Y = .8 'Y = .9 -Y =1 0.33 0.33 0.34 0.36 0.36 0.37 0.41 0.4217- -T-5F 
ye 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.50 
vp 0.67 0.63 0.60 0.53 0.50 0.47 0.40 0.37 0.33 a p 0.33 0.32 0.31 0.30 0.29 0.28 0.26 0.25 . 25 pe 0.75 0.70 0.65 0.55 0.50 0.45 0.35 0.30 0.25 
'Op 0.67 0.63 0.60 0.53 0.50 0.47 0.40 0.37 0.33 
-.. I w.. I w.. I w.., w.. I w. -w -. -- -. -- Ve 0.00 0.03 0.05 0.10 0.13 0.15 0.20 0.23 0.25 
vp 0.00 0.03 0.06 0.11 0.13 0.14 0.16 0.17 0.17 
.1 
-Y =0 -y 1 
Simulation with a=c= 1) b=1.5 
-y = .2 -y = .4a= .5y= .6 -y = .8 -y = .9 -y =I 
ya 0.28 0.28 0.29 0.29 0.30 0.31 0.33 0.35 - OAU 
ye 0.40 0.40 0.40 0.40 0.40 0.40 0.40 0.40 0.40 
VP 0.57 0.54 0.51 0.46 0.43 0.40 0.34 0.31 0.29 
pa 0.28 0.28 0.27 0.25 0.24 0.24 0.22 0.21 0.20 
pe 0.7 0.65 0.60 0.50 0.45 0.40 0.30 0.25 0.20 
VP 0.57 0.54 0.51 0.46 0.43 0.40 0.34 0.31 0.29 
ve 0.00 0.02 0.04 0.08 0.10 0.12 0.16 0.18 0.2 
vp 0.00 0.03 0.05 0.09 0.11 0.12 0.14 0.14 0.14 
Ua 
U, 
0.04 
0.20 
0.04 
0.18 
0.04 
0.16 
0.03 
0.12 
0.03 
0.10 
0.03 
0.08 
0.02 
0.04 
0.01 
0.02 
0.00 
0.00 
UP 0.16 0.15 0.13 0.10 0.09 0.08 0.06 0.05 0.04 
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-Y =0 -Y = .1 
Simulation with a= 
-y = .2 -y = .4 -y = .5 
c=1, b= 
-y = .6 
2 
-Y = .8 -Y = .9 -Y =I 
ya 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.26 0.26 0.28 0.29 0.33 
ye 0.33 0.33 0.33 0.33 0.33 0.33 0.33 0.33 0.33 
YP '0.50 0.48 0.45 
- -- 
0.40 
- 
0.38 
- 
0.35 0.30 0.28 0.25 
P" 0.25 0.24 0 . 
23 a, 0 21 0.20 0.19 0.18 0.17 
pe 0.67 0.62 0.57 0.47 0.42 0.37 0.27 0.22 0.17 
PP 0.50 0.48 0.45 0.40 0.38 0.35 0.30 0.28 0.25 
ve 0.00 0.02 0.03 0.07 0.08 0.10 0.13 0.15 0.17 
vp 0.00 0.02 0.05 
- 
0. 
- 
08 0.09 0.11 0.12 0.12 0.13 
Ua 0 03 0 03 0 0: v 0 02 0 02 0 02 0 01 0 01 - --o oo 
u` . 0.17 . 0.15 . 0.13 . 0.10 . 0.08 . 0.07 . 0.03 . 0.02 . 0.00 
UP 0.13 0.11 0.10 0.08 0.07 0.06 0.05 0.04 0.03 
-Y =0 -Y = .1 
Simulation with a=c 
-y = .2 -y = .4 -y = .5 
= 1) b= 
-y = .6 
2.5 
-y = .8 -y = .9 -Y =1 
ya 0.22 0.22 0.22 0.22 0.22 0.23 -0.24 0.25 0.29 
ye 0.29 0.29 0.29 0.29 0.29 0.29 0.29 0.29 0.29 
YP 0.44 0.42 0.40 0.36 0.33 0.31 0.27 0.24 0.22 
PQ 0.22 0.21 0.21 0.20 0.19 0.18 0.16 0.15 0.14 
pe 0.64 0.59 0.54 0.44 0.39 0,34 0.24 0.19 0.14 
PP 0.44 0.42 0.40 0.36 0.33 0.31 0.27 0.24 0.22 
ve 0.00 0.01 0.03 0.06 0.07 0.09 0.11 0.13 0.14 
vp 0.00 0.02 0.04 0.07 0.08 0.09 0.11 0.11 0.11 
Ua 
U, 
0.02 
0.14 
0.02 
0.13 
0.02 
0.11 
0.02 
0.09 
0.02 
0.07 
0.02 
0.06 
0.01 
0.03 
0.01 
0.01 
0.00 
0.00 
UP 0.10 0.09 0.08 0.06 0.06 0.05 0.04 0.03 0.02 
-Y =0 -Y = .1 
Simulation with a=c 
-Y = .2 -Y = .4 -Y = .5 -Y 
= 1, b= 
= .6 
3 
-Y = .8 'Y = .9 -Y =1 
Y" 0.20 -OM. F 0.20 0.20 0.20 0-. 2-0-- 0.21 0.22 nT 
ye 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25 
yp 0.40 0.38 0.36 0.32 0.30 0.28 0.24 0.22 0.20 
P" 0.20 0.19 0.19 0.18 0.17 0.16 0.15 0.13 0 12 
pe 0.63 0.58 0.53 0.43 0.38 0.33 0.23 0.18 0.13 
PP 0.40 0.38 0.36 0.32 0.30 0.28 0.24 0.22 0.20 
ve 0.00 0.01 0.10 0.11 0.13 
0.10 0.10 0.10 
0.13 0.11 
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-Y =0 7= .1 
Simulation with a=c 
-y = .2 -y = .4 -Y = .5 -Y 
= 1, b= 
= .6 
5 
-y = .8 -Y = .9 'Y =1 
y - 0.14 0* -14 0.14 0.14 0.14 0.14 0.14 0.15 0.17 e y 0.17 0.17 0.17 0.17 0.17 0.17 0.17 0.17 0.17 
yp 0.29 0.27 0.26 0.23 0.21 0.20 0.17 0.16 0.14 
p 0.14 0.14 0.13 0.13 0.12 -0.12 0.10 0.09 0.08 
p 0.58 0.53 0.48 0.38 0.33 0.28 0.18 0.13 0.08 
PP 0.29 0.27 0.26 0.23 0.21 0.20 0.17 0.16 0.14 
ve 0.00 0.01 0.02 0.03 0.04 0.05 0.07 0.08 0.08 
vp 0.00 0.01 0.03 0.05 0.05 0.06 0.07 0.07 0.07 
Ue 0.08 0.08 0.07 0.05 0.04 0.03 0.02 0.01 0.00 
UP 0.04 0.04 0.03 0.03 0.02 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.01 
Simulation with a=c - 1, b 30 
-y =0 -y = .1 7= .2 y= .4 -y = .5 -y = .6 0ý = .8 -y = .9 7=1 
y' 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03 - 0* 03 0.03 0.03 0-. 03- 
ye 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03 
YP 0.06 0.06 0.06 0.05 0.05 0.04 0.04 0.03 0.03 a p 0.03 OT 03 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.02 0.02 0.02 
pe 0.52 0.47 0.42 0.32 0.27 0.22 0.12 0.07 0.02 
PP 0.06 0.06 0.06 0.05 0.05 0.04 0.04 0.03 0.03 Va 
Ve 
0.02 
0.00 
0.02 
0.00 
0.02 
0.00 
0.02 
0.01 
0.02 
0.01 
0.02 
0.01 
0.02 
0.01 
0.02 
0.01 
0.02 
0.02 
vp 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.02 0.02 
Ue 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 
up 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
2. a=b=1, different c 
-Y =0 y= .1 
Simulation with a=b=1, c= 
-y = .2 -y = .4 -y = .5y .6 
0.25 
-y = .8 y= .9 71 
ya 0.67 0.66 0.66 0.66 0.66 0.66 0.68- 0.71 0.80 
e y 0.80 0.80 0.80 0.80 0.80 0.80 0.80 0.80 0.80 
YP 1.33 1.27 1.20 1.07 1.00 0.93 0.80 0.73 0.67 
pa 0. -17 0.16 0.16 0.15 0.14 0.13 0.12 0.11 0.10 
e 0.60 0.55 0.50 0.40 0.35 0.30 0.20 0.15 0.10 
0.33 0.32 0.30 0.27 0.25 0.23 0.20 0.18 0.17 
0.24 0.32 0.36 0.40 
0.29 0.32 0.33 0.33 
. 32 
0.24 0.20 0.16 0.08 0.04 0.00 
. 18 0.14 0.13 0.11 0.08 
0.07 0.06 
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I 
-y =0 -y =. 1 
Simulation with a=b 
-y = .27= .4 -y = .5 
- 1, c= -y = .6 
0.5 
-y = .8 -y = .9 -Y =I 
y - 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.51 0.52 0.52 0.56 0.59 0.67 
y 0.67 0.67 0.67 0.67 0.67 0.67 0.67 0.67 0.67 
YP 1.00 0.95 0.90 0.80 0.75 0.70 0.60 0.55 0.50 
P, 0.25 0.24 0.23 0.22 0.21 0.20 0.19 -0.18 0.17 
pe 0.67 0.62 0.57 0.47 0.42 0* 37 0.27 0.22 0.17 
pp 0.50 0.48 0.45 0.40 0.38 0.35 0.30 0.28 0.25 
ve 0.00 0.03 0.07 0.13 0.17 0.20 0.27 0.30 0.33 
vp 0.00 0.05 0.09 0.16 0.19 0.21 0.24 0.25 0.25 
U, 0.33 0.30 0.27 0.20 0.17 0.13 0.07 0.03 0.00 
UP 0.25 0.23 0.20 0.16 0.14 0.12 0.09 0.08 0.06 
-Y 0 -y = .1 
Simulation with a=b 
-y = .2 -y = .4 -y = .5 
= 1, c= 
-y = .6 
0.75 
-y = .8 -Y = .9 -f =1 --- - 0.40 0.40 0.42 0.43 0.44 0.47 0.50 0.57 
ye 0.57 0.57 0.57 0.57 0.57 0.57 0.57 0.57 0.57 
yp 0.80 0.76 0.72 0.64 0.60 0.56 0.48 0.44 0.40 
- P" 0.30 0.29 0.28 0.27 0.26 0.25 0.23 0.22 O . 
2T 
pe 0.71 0.66 0.61 0.51 0.46 0.41 0.31 0.26 0.21 
PP 0.60 0.57 0.54 0.48 0.45 0.42 0.36 0.33 0.30 
0.00 0.03 0.06 0.11 0.14 0.17 0.23 0.2 
Ue 0.29 0.26 0.23 0.17 0.14 0.11 0.06 0.03 0.00 
UP 0.24 0.22 0.19 0.15 0.14 0.12 0.09 0.07 0.06 
-Y =0 -Y = .1 
Simulation with a=b 
y= .2 -y = .4 -Y = .5 
= 1, c= 
-y = .6 
1.25 
-y = .8 .9 -Y =I 
y - 0.28 0.29 0.29 0.31 0.32 0.33 0.37 0.39 0.44 
y 0.44 0.44 0.44 0.44 0.44 0.44 0.44 0.44 0.44 
yp 0.57 0.54 0.51 0.46 0.43 0.40 0.34 0.31 0.29 
pa 0.35 0.35 0.34 0.32 0.31 0 31 0.29 0.28 M. 
pe 0.78 0.73 0.68 0.58 0.53 0 48 0.38 0.33 0.28 
pp 0.71 0.68 0.64 0.57 0.54 0.50 0.43 0.39 0.36 
ve 0.00 0.02 0.04 0.09 0.11 0.13 0.18 0.20 0.22 
vp 0.00 0.03 0.05 0.09 0.11 0.12 0.14 0.14 0.14 
Ua 
U0 
0.05 
0.22 
0.05 
0.20 
'0.05 0.18 
0.04 
0.13 
0.04 
0.11 
0.03 
0.09 
0.02 
0.04 
0.01 
0.02 
0.00 
0.00 
UP 0.20 0.18 0.17 0.13 0.11 0.10 0.07 0.06 0.05 
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-Y =0 -Y = .1 
Simulation with a=b 
-y = .2y= .4 -y = .5 
-- 1, c= 
-y = .6 
1.5 
-y = .8 -Y = .9 -Y =1 
ya 
ye 
0.25 
0.40 
0.25 
0.40 
0.26 
0.40 
0.27 
0.40 
0.28 
0.40 
0.29 
0.40 
0.33 
0.40 
0.35 
0.40 
0.40 
0.40 
YP 0.50 0.48 0.45 0.40 0.38 0.35 0.30 0.28 0.25 - P" 
pe 
0.37 
0.80 
0.36 
0.75 
0.35 
0.70 
0.34 
0.60 
0.33 
0.55 
0.33 
0.50 
0.31 
0.40 
0.30 
0.35 
0.3u 
0.30 
? ýp 0.75 0.71 0.68 0.60 0.56 0.53 0.45 0.41 0.38 
Ve 0.00 0.02 0.04 0.08 0.10 0.12 0.16 0.18 0.20 
vp 0.00 0.02 0.05 0.08 0.09 0.11 0.12 0.12 0.13 
Ua 
U, 
0.05 
0.20 
0.04 
0.18 
0.04 
0.16 
0.04 
0.12 
0.03 
0.10 
0.03 
0.08 
0.02 
0.04 
0.01 
0.02 
0.00 
0.00 
up 0.19 0.17 0.15 0.12 0.11 0.09 0.07 0.06 0.05 
'Y =0 -Y = .1 
Simulation with a=b 
-y = .2 -y = .4 -y = .5 
= 1, c= 
-y = .6 
1.75 
-y = .8 -Y = .9 -Y =1 a y 
ye 
0.22 
0.36 
0.22 
0.36 
0.23 
0.36 
0.24 
0.36 
0.26 
0.36 
0.27 
0.36 
0.30 
0.36 
0.32 
0.36 
0.36 
0.36 
yp 0.44 0.42 0.40 0.36 0.33 0.31 0.27 0.24 0.22 
pa e 
0.38 
0.82 
0.38 
0.77 
0.37 
0.72 
0.35 
0.62 
0.35 
0.57 
0.34 
0.52 
0.33 
0.42 
0.32 
0.37 
0.31 
0.32 
0.78 0.74 0.70 0.62 0.58 0.54 0.47 0.43 0.39 
VC 0.00 0.02 0.04 0.07 0.09 0.11 0.15 0.16 0.18 
vp 0.00 0.02 0.04 0.07 0.08 0.09 0.11 0.11 0.11 
0.15 0.11 0. 
0.14 0.11 U . 
04 0.02 0.00 
. 06 
0.05 0.04 
-Y =0 -Y .1 
Simulation with a=b 
-y = .2 -y = .47= .5- 
= 1, c= 
y= .6 
2 
-y = .8 -y = .9 -Y =I 
Y, 
ye 
0.20 
0.33 0.33 
0.21 
0.33 
0.22 
0.33 
0.23 
0.33 
0.24 
0.33 
0.27 
0.33 
0.29 
0.33 
0.33 
0.33 
yp 0.40 0.38 0.36 0.32 0.30 0.28 0.24 0.22 0.20 
P, 
e 
0.40 
0.83 
0.39 
0.78 
0.38 
0.73 
0.37 
0.63 
0.36 
0.58 
0.35 
0.53 
0.34 
0.43 
0.33 
0.38 
0.33 
0.33 
0.80 0.76 0.72 0.64 0.60 0.56 0.48 0.44 0.40 
ve 0.00 0.02 0.03 0.07 0.08 0.10 0.13 0.15 0.17 
vp 0.00 0.02 0.04 0.06 0.08 0.08 0.10 0.10 0.10 
Ua 0 04 0 04 0 04 0 03 0 03 03 0 02 0 0.01 0.00 
Ue . 0.17 . 0.15 . 0.13 . 0.10 . 0.08 . 0.07 . 0.03 0.02 0.00 
UP 0.16 0.14 0.13 0.10 0.09 0.08 0.06 0.05 0.04 
LA Appendix 40 
-Y =0 -Y = .1 
Simulation with a= 
-y = .2 -y = .4 -y = .5 
b=1, 'c = 
-y = .6 
3 
-y = .8 -Y = .9 -Y =1 
y 0.14 0.15 0.15 0.16 0.17 0.18 0.20 0.22 U. 23 - 
y 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25 
YP 0.29 0.27 0.26 0.23 0.21 0.20 0.17 0.16 0.14 
p 0.42 0.42 0.42 0.40 0.40 0.39 0.38 0.38 0.37 
p 0.88 0.83 0.78 0.68 0.63 0.58 0.48 0.43 0.38 
PP 0.86 0.81 0.77 0.69 0.64 0.60 0.51 0.47 0.43 
VIO 0.00 0.01 0.03 0.05 0.06 0.08 0.10 0.11 0.13 
vp 0.00 0.01 0.03 0.05 0.05 0.06 0.07 0.07 0.07 
0.13 0.11 0.10 0.08 0.06 0.05 0.03 0.01 0.00 
0.12 0.11 0.10 0.08 0.07 0.06 0.04 0.04 0.03 
7=0 .1 
Simulation with a= 
y= .2 -y = .4 -y = .5 
b=1, c= 
-y = .6 
5 
-y =: .8 -y = .9 -Y =I 
ya 0.09 0.09 0.10 0.11 0.11 0.12 0.14 0.15 0.17 
yc 0.17 0.17 0.17 0.17 0.17 0.17 0.17 0.17 0.17 
yp 0.18 0.17 0.16 0.15 0.14 0.13 0.11 0.10 0.09 
P, 0.45 0.44 0.44 0.44 0.43 0.42 0.42 0.42 0.42 e 0.92 0.87 0.82 0.72 0.67 0.62 0.52 0.47 0.42 
0.91 0.86 0.82 0.73 0.68 0.64 0.55 0.50 0.45 
0.01 0.02 0.03 
Ue 0.08 0.08 0.07 0.05 0.04 0.03 0.02 0.01 0.00 
UP 0.08 0.07 0.07 0.05 0.05 0.04 0.03 0.03 0.02 
Simulation with a=b - 1, c 30 
-Y =0 71 y= .2 -y = .4 y= .5 -y = .6 -y = .8 y= .9 'Y =1 
Y, 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.03 0.03 0.03 
ye 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03 
YP 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 
pa 0.48 0.48 0.48 0.48 0.48 0.48 0.48 0.48 0.48 
pe 0.98 0.93 0.88 0.78 0.73 0.68 0.58 0.53 0.48 
PP 0.98 0.93 0.89 0.79 0.74 0.69 0.59 0.54 0.49 
Va 
Ve 
0.01 
0.00 
0.01 
0.00 
0.01 
0.00 
0.01 
0.01 
0.01 
0.01 
0.01 
0.01 
0.01 
0.01 
0.01 
0.01 
0.02 
0.02 
vp 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 
ue 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 
UP 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.00 
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3. a=1, different b and c 
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Simulation with a 1b = 0.5, c=0.25 
-Y =0 -Y = .1 -y = .2 -y = .47 .ý -Y = .6 -Y = .8 -Y = .9 If 1 
,a 1.00 1.00 0.99 1.01 1.03 - 1.04 1.11 1.17 1 
ve 1.33 1.33 1.33 1.33 1.33 1.33 1.33 1.33 1.33 
YP 2.00 1.90 1.80 1.60 1.50 1.40 1.20 1.10 1.00 
p . 25 0.24 0.23 0.22 0.21 0.20 0.19 0.18 0.17 pe 0.67 0.62 0.57 0.47 0.42 0.37 0.27 0.22 0.17 
PP 0.50 0.48 0.45 0.40 0.38 0.35 0.30 0.28 0.25 
Va 
Ve 
0.50 
0.00 
0.51 
0.07 
0.51 
0.13 
0.53 
0.27 
0.54 
0.33 
0.56 
0.40 
0.60 
0.53 
0.62 
0.60 
0.67 
0.67 
vp 0.00 0.10 0.18 0.32 0.38 0.42 0.48 0.50 0.50 
Ue 0.67 0.60 0.53 0.40 0.33 0.27 0.13 0.07 0.00 
UP 0.50 0.45 0.41 0.32 0.28 0.25 0.18 0.15 0.13 
Simulation with a= 1) bc= 0.5 
-Y =0 -y = .1 -y = .2 -y = .4 -y = .5 -y .6 -y = .8 -y = .9 -Y =I 
ya 0.67 0.67 0.68 0.71 0.73 0.75 0.81 --- 0-. 87 1.00 
ye 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 
YP 1.33 1.27 1.20 1.07 1.00 0.93 0.80 0.73 0.67 
pa 0.33 0.32 0.31 0.30 0.29 0.28 0.26 0.25 0.25 
pe 0.75 0.70 0.65 0.55 0.50 0.45 0.35 0.30 0.25 
PP 0.67 0.63 0.60 0.53 0.50 0.47 0.40 0.37 0.33 
Va 
V, 
0.33 
0.00 
0.34 
0.05 
0,35 
0.10 
0.37 
0.20 
0.38 
0.25 
0.40 
0.30 
0.44 
0.40 
0.46 
0.45 
0.50 
0.50 
VP 0.00 0.06 0.12 0.21 0.25 0.28 0.32 0.33 0.33 
ue 0.50 0.45 0.40 0.30 0.25 0.20 0.10 0.05 0.00 
UP 0.44 0.40 0.36 0.28 0.25 0.22 0.16 0.13 0.11 
-Y =0 -Y=. l 
Simulation with a= 
-y=. 2 -y=. 4 -f=. 5 
1) b=c= 
-y=. 6 
5 
-y=. 8 -y=. 9 -Y =1 
ya 0.07 0.07 0.07 0.07 0.07 0-. 07 0.08 0.09 0.10 
ye 0.10 0.10 0.10 0.10 0.10 0.10 0.10 0.10 0.10 
YP 0.13 0.13 0.12 0.11 0.10 0.09 0.08 0.07 0.07 
P, 0.33 0.32 0.31 0.30 0.29 0.28 0.26 0.25 0.25 
PC 0.75 0.70 0.65 0.55 0.50 0.45 0.35 0.30 0.25 
vp 0.67 0.63 0.60 0.53 0.50 0.47 0.40 0.37 0.33 
. 01 
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-Y =0 -y = .1 
Simulation with a= 
y= .2 -y = .4 -y = .5 
11 b=c= 
-y .6 
30 
y= .8 
y 
y 
0.01 
0.02 
0.01 
0.02 
0.01 
0.02 
0.01 
0.02 
0.01 
0.02 
0.01 
0.02 
0.01 
0.02 
0.01 
0.02 
0.02 
0.02 
yp 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.01 
pa 
pe 
0.33 
0.75 
0.32 
0.70 
0.31 
0.65 
0.30 
0.55 
0.29 
0.50 
0.28 
0.45 
0.26 
0.35 
0.25 
0.30 
0.25 
0.25 
VP 0.67 0.63 0.60 0.53 0.50 0.47 0.40 0.37 0.33 
Ve 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 
vp 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.01 
Ua 
Ue 
0.00 
0.01 
0.00 
0.01 
0.00 
0.01 
0.00 
0.01 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
up 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Chapter 2 
Do Waiting Times Reduce Hospital Costs? 
2.1 Introduction 
Waiting times are a major policy issue in many OECD countries. Average waiting times 
range between four and eight months for common procedures like cataract and hip replace- 
ment. 
There are normally two rationales for justifying the existence of waiting times. The 
first is that waiting times act as a rationing mechanism that helps to bring in equilibrium 
the demand and supply of health care (see Lindsay and Feigenbaum 1984, Martin and 
Smith 1999, Cullis, Jones and Propper 2000): in the absence of price rationing and if 
benefit from treatment is to some extent unobservable, waiting times may deter patients 
with small benefit from asking treatment. A second rationale is that waiting times reduce 
the cost of provision of elective surgery. When demand is stochastic, waiting times may 
reduce idle capacity, therefore inducing a more efficient use of resources (see Iversen 1993, 
Iversen 1997, Barros and Olivella 2005). 
Elaborating on this second aspect, Iversen (1993) argues that for low waiting times, 
hospital cost should reduce with waiting times, as a consequence of lower excess capacity. 
However, there is a point over which higher waiting times increase costs. This may be 
due for example to higher costs of managing the waiting list. Iversen (1993) also cites 
the increase of resources that are needed for repeated examination of patients (since their 
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status might change during the course of the waiting), and of treatment costs and average 
length of stay resulting from high cancellations rates typically found in hospitals with high 
capacity utilization. There is therefore, at least theoretically, a level of waiting time which 
minimises total costs. Above this optimal level, increasing waiting times should increase 
hospital cost. 
To date, most empirical studies have focused on the effect of waiting times on indi- 
vidual or patient costs. For instance, Globen-nan (1991) estimates the economic costs of 
waiting for different procedures in Canada. The calculations take account of direct and 
indirect (intangible costs such as pain and anxiety) costs for patients and suggest that in 
aggregate these are comparable to losses resulting from labour strikes and lockouts. 
More recently Hughes and McGuire (2003) have studied the effect of demand un- 
certainty on hospital cost structures via the accumulation of reserve capacity. The authors 
estimate that the marginal cost of elective admissions corresponds to 45% of emergency 
admissions. Moreover, they estimate that the holding of idle capacity adds 5% to the cost 
of emergency admissions. This is consistent with previous studies which have focused on 
the cost of excess bed capacity (e. g. Gaynor and Anderson 1995, Keeler and Ying 1996). 
The implication is that waiting times, by restraining excess capacity, should reduce hospital 
costs. 
The purpose of this paper is to empirically estimate the elasticity of hospital costs 
with respect to waiting times. Our primary objective is to test whether, as implied by 
Hughes and McGuire (2003), waiting times reduce hospital costs or whether, as proposed 
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by Iversen (1993), there is an optimal level of waiting beyond which costs might increase. 
We use a sample of 137 acute hospitals over the period 1998-2002 in the English NHS. 
The cross-sectional and panel data results suggest that waiting times have no signifi- 
cant effect on hospital costs. In most specifications the effect of waiting times is non-linear, 
suggesting a U-shaped relationship between hospital costs and waiting times, which is con- 
sistent with Iversen's (1993) model. However, the coefficients are generally not statistically 
significant. This suggests that, if anything, waiting times have no effect on hospital costs. 
The study is organised as follows. The next section presents the empirical specifi- 
cation and section 2.3 describes the data. The results are presented in section 2.4 and the 
conclusion in section 2.5. 
2.2 Econometric model 
We estimate three types of regressions: pooled OLS, panel fixed effects and panel random 
effects. The pooled OLS model is given by: 
I Yit -=': a+ Xito + Uit, 
where yit is the cost of hospital i at year t, xit is a vector of explanatory variables, a is the 
individual effect, 3 is a vector of parameters to be estimated and uit is the idyosincratic 
error. The crucial assumption of the pooled model is that the individual effects are constant 
over time and common to all observations in the sample. 
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An alternative approach is to assume that individual effects are specific to each ob- 
servation. This leads to the fixed effects model: 
I Yit :: -- Ozi + Xit + Cit. (2.2) 
The hospital-specific fixed-effects ai capture individual unobserved heterogeneity. If there 
are individual fixed-effects and these are correlated with the explanatory variables, then 
pooled OLS estimates would be biased (see Cameron and Trivedi 2005). Finally, we also 
estimate random-effects models: 
yit -,: -- ai + xit)3 -cit, 
2), 
ai - N(a, oc, 
N(o, 072). c 
(2.3) 
In this formulation the individual effects are randomly iid distributed over the popula- 
tion. We compare the fixed- and random-effects models using a Hausman test, which tests 
for systematic differences in coefficients between the two models. The rejection of the null 
hypothesis of no systematic difference in coefficients gives an indication of the existence 
of fixed-effects, and suggests that the random-effects estimates are biased. Otherwise, it is 
safe to assume the random-effects estimation. 
Model selection also uses a Breusch-Pagan test for testing the variance of the random- 
effects term. In this case, the null hypothesis var(ai) =0 suggests that there are no random 
effects, providing support for the pooled OLS regression. Rejecting the null, however, 
suggests the presence of individual effects, which might be modelled either by fixed- or 
random-effects. 
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It might be argued that the relationship between costs and waiting times is endoge- 
nous. If a hospital has high costs, it is more likely to have longer waiting times. There are 
several channels through which this may happen. 
First, more inefficient hospitals have higher costs, due for example to poor man- 
agement: if higher inefficiency also implies higher inefficiency in the management of the 
waiting list, then inefficient hospitals may have both higher costs and higher waiting times 
(a positive correlation). If the researcher has no access to variables correlated with ineffi- 
ciency, then the OLS estimates of Equation ((2.1)) will be biased upwards. We use at least 
two variables that might be correlated with inefficiency: length of stay and proportion of 
day cases. Keeping other factors constant, more inefficient providers have a higher length 
of stay and a smaller proportion of day cases. 
Second, hospitals with higher quality might have a higher cost, and at the same time 
attract a higher number of patients, which leads to a higher waiting time (again, a positive 
correlation). We use at least two variables that might be correlated with quality: length 
of stay and (age and gender adjusted) re-admission rates. Keeping other factors constant, 
providers with higher quality should have a higher length of stay and smaller readmission 
rates. 
If there is some residual unobserved efficiency and quality, the OLS might still be 
biased. However, by estimating a fixed effect model, all unobserved inefficiency and quality 
will be captured by the individual fixed effect, as long as quality and inefficiency are time 
invariant, which seems plausible over short intervals of time. 
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Moreover, we estimate regressions with both balanced and unbalanced samples. This 
is an important sensitivity analysis to demonstrate the robustness of the results and to con- 
trol for selection effects. 
2.3 Data 
The sample comprises 137 English NFIS acute hospitals observed annually between 1998/1999 
and 2001/2002, making an unbalanced panel with 440 observations. 
This study uses several indicators related to hospital perfon-nance, institutional frame- 
work and the population served. The data were collected from several sources, includ- 
ing the Department of Health (DoH), the Hospital Episode Statistics (HES), the National 
Health Service Information Authority (NHSIA) the Chartered Institute of Public Finance 
and Accountancy (CIPFA) and Dr Foster. All variables used in this paper are calculated in 
an annual basis. 
The DoH provides several statistics that are generally relevant for other government 
departments in the areas of healthcare, workforce, public health and social care. The depen- 
dent variable in this study uses the measure of total hospital cost that is calculated annually 
by the DoH based on the analysis of total expenditures at hospital level (TFR3). Other vari- 
ables provided by the DoH include the total number of outpatient attendances, the number 
of beds available and the rate of emergency readmission within 28 days. HES is the other 
major data source used in this study. HES is the data warehouse of the English NHS, rou- 
tinely collecting statistical infon-nation on episodes of patients admitted to hospital care 
by NHS hospitals in England (wxv, %v. hesonline. nhs. uk). HES provides several indicators of 
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hospital activity, including total inpatient spells, emergency admissions, day cases and av- 
erage length of stay. Moreover, the indicator of mean wait times, our explanatory variable 
of interest, also comes from the HES database. The HRG index that we use to control for 
patient casemix composition was provided by the NHSIA. This has now been discontin- 
ued and the corresponding information is available from the NHS Connecting for Health 
service. Dr Foster, an independent organization that provides infonnation on the quality of 
health services, provided infort-nation on the number of competitors within 20km radius for 
each hospital. 
Our dependent variable is the total hospital cost, measured in thousands of Pounds 
Sterling and excluding capital costs. It was compiled from the Department of Health and 
was transfonned into real values for 2002 using the GDP deflator provided by HM Treasury. 
Our measure of waiting times is the mean wait for elective admissions, which was provided 
by the HES. It measures the average number of days between the decision of being admitted 
to the waiting list and the actual admission for treatment. 
Table 2.1 provides a description of the variables employed in the analysis and cor- 
responding sources of data. We divide the explanatory variables in six groups. Hospital 
activity is measured by the total number of inpatient spells and the total number of outpa- 
tient attendances. Both variables are measured in 1,000 cases. A second group of variables 
captures the severity of cases treated by the hospital and the demand on resources. It in- 
cludes emergency admissions as a proportion of total spells and a HRG casemix index 
based on reference costs. 
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Hospital costs also depend on the efficiency on the use of resources. We control for 
the number of day cases as a proportion of elective surgeries and the average length of 
stay. More efficient hospitals are expected to have a higher proportion of surgeries carried 
out on a day case basis, and a lower average length of stay. As usual in the literature on 
hospital costs (e. g. Vita 1990, Vitaliano 1987), the capital stock is proxied by the number 
of available beds. 
The quality of services is proxied by the percentage of emergency readmissions 
within 28 days. Contrary to the severity indicators, both efficiency and quality indicators 
are to some extent under the control of the hospital. Finally, we also include the number of 
hospitals within a 20krn radius as a measure of the degree of competition in the geographi- 
cal market (see Siciliani and Martin 2007). 
We do not include salaries because infon-nation is not readily available. Also, salaries 
are nationally agreed and therefore there is no variations in salary across hospitals. 
2.3 Data 
Table 2.1. Description of variables 
name 
totcost- Total hospital cost (OoTr d fl 2002 l i 
DoH 
easury GDP ator) e rea values us ng 
(b) Mailing times 
( 
meanwait Mean wait in days HES 
(c) Measures of activity 
totspells Total inpatient spells (000) HES 
t(od)t Tas 
eiii ix 
Total outpatient attendances (000) DoH 
emergadm Number of emergency admissions as % of total inpatient spells HES 
hrgindrc HRG casemix index based on Reference Costs NHSIA 
(4 Efficiency oit use of resources 
daycase Number of day cases as % of electives HES 
alos Average length of stay HES 
(/) Capital Mpills 
avbecis Number of available beds DoH (g) Yzi ality of services 
. rea Dmisnpc Emerg. readm. % within 28 days, all ages, age sex std DoH 
(h) Com elition NM 
nhosp Number of hospitals within 20 kin radius 
(i) Dimuny varia bles 
acute Hospital is an acute only hospital CIPFA 
teachin, g Hospital is a teaching hospital CIPFA 
specialist Trust provides specialist services CIPFA 
london Trust is in London CIPFA 
* DoH: D artmcnt of Health, HES: Hospital Episode Statistics, NHSIA: National Health 
Service 
Mormation 
Authority, CIPFA: The Chartered Institute of Public Finance and Accountancy 
je 
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Table 2.2 presents some descriptive statistics. The average hospital in the sample 
has a total cost of just over F, 100 million per year and an average waiting time for elective 
surgery of 97 days. It provides around 51,200 inpatient spells and 206,200 oupatient at- 
tendances, and faces the competition of 5 other hospitals on a 20km radius. Around 34% 
of inpatient spells are originated as emergency attendances, and the average HRG casemix 
index is at 100. With respect to the efficiency of resource use, each hospital admits on av- 
erage 49% of the elective patients as day cases, with an average length of stay of 6.4 days. 
The proportion of emergency readmission within 28 days is around 6%. 
2.3 Data 
Table 2.2. Descriptive statistics 
Variable Ws --- - Mean Std. Dev. Min --Wa-x 
totcost 
Meanwait 
8U9 
809 
113,798.3 
96.8 
71,957.0 
35.9 
3,688.5 
2.0 
5-54,866.7 
457.0 
totspells 809 51.2 29.7 0.2 200.0 
totop 809 206.2 128.5 10.8 1,093.9 
emergadm 809 33.7 10.0 0 82.6 
hrgindrc 809 100.9 22.0 68.5 229.7 
daycase 804 48.6 11.2 0 95.5 
alos 809 6.4 4.7 0.6 46.2 
readmisnpc 612 5.9 1.1 3.7 18.4 
avbeds 809 678.2 365.3 4.0 2,838.1 
nhosp20km 617 5.3 5.4 1 20 
london 809 0.2 0.4 0 1 
y1998 809 0.3 0.4 0 1 
y1999 809 0.3 0.4 0 1 
y2000 809 0.2 0.4 0 1 
y2001 809 0.2 0.4 0 1 
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The data present some limitations in tenus of information availability, especially for 
the quality and competition indicators, which reduce significantly the sample. 
2.3.1 Skewness correction 
A common issue in this type of study is the high skewness usually found in cost and health 
expenditures data. Table 2.3 shows that the mean of total cost (L 113,798) is 23% higher 
than the median (f 94,824), the skewness statistic is 2.0 and the kurtosis is 8.9. This 
suggests that skewness is an issue especially for total cost, but less so for mean waiting 
times. The log transfon-nation reduces the extent of this problem, although not eliminating 
it completely. After the log. transfon-nation, the mean of total cost becomes equal to the 
median (11.5), the skewness statistic is reduced to -0.6 and the kurtosis to 5.0. 
2.4 Results 
Table 2.3. Additional descriptive statistics of selected variables (in levels and logs) 
Variable 
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Kurtosis 
meanwait 96.8 94.0 1.6 15.8 4.5 4.5 -2.1 13.4 totspells 51.2 47.5 1.1 6.0 3.7 3.9 -1.6 7.3 totop 206.2 183.9 1.7 9.1 5.1 5.2 -1.0 4.9 emergadm 33.7 35.2 -0.7 6.3 3.4 3.6 -3.6 20.7 hrgindrc 100.9 95.0 3.1 13.4 4.6 4.6 2.3 9.3 
daycase 48.6 49.1 -0.9 7.5 3.8 3.9 -7.3 77.7 
alos 6.4 5.6 4.9 32.8 1.7 1.7 1.1 8.0 
readmisnpe 5.9 5.8 3.0 32.7 1.8 1.8 0.6 6.5 
avbeds 678.2 627.0 1.4 8.0 6.4 6.4 - 1.5 8.3 nhosp20km 5.3 3.0 1.4 4.1 1.2 1.1 0.3 1.8 
With the exception of emergency admissions, readmissions and day cases, all the 
other continuous variables are included in the log scale, which reduces skewness and allows 
the interpretation of coefficients as elasticities. Emergency admissions, readmissions and 
day cases, however, are kept in levels. Since they are measured as percentages, the log 
transfonnation would greatly increase both skewness and kurtosis. 
2.4 Results 
The results of the regression analysis for pooled OLS and fixed effects are reported in 
tables 2.4 and 2.5. The dependent variable in both regressions is the log of total hospital 
cost (Intotcost) in real values of 2002. Most variables are in logs, so coefficients can be 
interpreted as elasticities. 
In each set of results there are seven different specifications', which add regressors 
progressively in order to test the stability of results. The basic regression (column (1) of 
9 However, there are only six specifications for panel regressions because the competition indicator is time- 
invariant, which prevents fixed effects estimation. Similarly, notice that the HRG index and the London 
dummy are not included in the panel regressions for the same reason. 
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each table) includes mean waiting times (linear and quadratic effect)" and activity indica- 
tors (inpatient spells and outpatient attendances), and controls for the HRG index, London 
dummy and year. We then progressively add controls for capital stock (available beds (2)), 
demand on resources (emergency admissions (3)), efficiency on use of resources (daycases 
(4) and average length of stay (5)), quality of service (emergency readmissions (6)) and 
competition (number of competitors in a 20 km radius (7)). Given the limited coverage of 
our sample, the inclusion of the quality and competition indicators reduces significantly the 
number of observations. 
We also estimated the regressions using a trans-log specification, which is a second- 
order Taylor approximation adding square terms for the activity indicators. However, since 
the square terms were not significant in this specification, we decided to exclude them. 
The cross-section regressions were estimated using standard errors robust to both 
heteroscedasticity and the serial correlation among observations of the same hospital over 
the years. Thus the tables report both the total number of observations (N) and the number 
of independent observations or clusters (N chisters). 
Table 2.4 reports pooled cross-section estimates using unbalanced samples. As addi- 
tional regressors are added the sample size decreases, failing from 440 observations in the 
basic regression to 319 observations in the regression with all independent variables. 
" The quadratic effect is entered as In meanwait2/2. Therefore, the elasticity of total cost with respect 
to waiting times can be calculated as ec ý aCitIO locr Wit ý 81 + 62 In meanwait. 31 is the estimated 
coefficient for the linear component and 32 for the quadratic. Waiting times are computed at the sample 
mean. 
2.4 Results 
Table 2.4. Unbalanced pooled OLS regressions of total hospital cost 
endent variable: lop-(totcost): Robust standard errors 
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1.1tv 
0.29 
-. 7j - 
. 21 * 
-. 7j - 
. 21** 
-. IU 
. 17* 
-. 1-1 - 
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- V. LO 
0.07 
- V. /-O 
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Intotspells . 55*** . 3*** . 27*** . 28*** . 34*** . 62*** . 65*** Intotop . 38*** . 28*** . 28*** . 28*** . 29*** . 23*** . 24*** lnhrýindrc 1.2*** . 81*** . 83*** . 8*** . 77*** . 73*** . 72*** InaVbeds . 4*** . 43*** . 42*** . 35*** 0.14 0.10 cmergadm -3.10E-03 -3. OOE-03 -3. OOE-03 -2.10E-03 -1.10E-03 daycase -2.20E-03 -. 0027* -. 0037** -. 0034* Inalos 0.08 . 25*** . 26** readmisnpe 1.70E-03 4.1 OE-03 
Innhosp2Okm -2.1 OE-03 Iondon . 19*** . 18*** . 17*** . 16*** . 16*** . 15*** . 15** Y1999 . 13*** . 13*** . 13*** . 13*** . 13*** . 14*** . 15*** y2000 . 19*** . 17*** . 17*** . 17*** . 21*** . 28*** . 28*** y2001 . 14*** . 14*** . 15*** . 15*** . 15*** . 15*** . 14*** cons 4.7** 4.5*** 4.4*** 4.3*** 4.4*** 3.9*** 3.9*** R2 0.86 0.89 0.89 0.89 0.89 0.9 0.89 
RESET 0.1 0.5 0.5 1 1.2 2 1.8 
Joint sianificancet 1.4 2 2.1 1.7 1.6 0.3 0.6 
Legend: * p<. I; ** p<. 05; *** p<. Ol; T Test forjoint significance of Inmeanwait and Inmeanwait 
All the regressions have been estimated with both linear and quadratic effects for 
waiting times, which allows us to control for nonlinearities in the hospital cost response to 
waiting times. Two reasons guided the choice of this functional form. 
First, it gives a direct test of Iversen's (1993) suggestion of a nonlinear effect of 
waiting times. More specifically, according to Iversen (1993), waiting times reduce total 
cost to begin with, but then due to management and repeated examinations problems, the 
effect is reversed, and total costs start to increase. According to this hypothesis, we should 
expect to find a negative coefficient for the level of waiting times and a positive coefficient 
for the quadratic component. 
The second reason for the inclusion of a quadratic effect of waiting times is to make 
sure that there are no misspecification problems. In all cases the RESET test is not signif- 
icant, which suggests that the functional form is correctly specified and that there are no 
omitted variables. 
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Let us now focus on the coefficients estimated by the regressions, starting with wait- 
ing times. The cross-sectional results suggest that waiting times have no significant effect 
on hospital costs. In all cross-section regressions the estimated effect of waiting times is not 
statistically significant, either jointly or separately. However, in all regressions the effect 
of waiting times is non-linear, suggesting a U-shaped relationship between hospital costs 
and waiting times, which is consistent with Iversen's (1993) model. The coefficient for 
the linear component is negative, while the quadratic component is positive. As discussed 
above, this implies that waiting times have an initial negative impact on costs. However, 
after some point the trend is reversed and waiting times start to increase costs. Therefore, 
in principle there is an optimal level of waiting times that minimises total costs. 
Although the effect of waiting times in the basic regression (column (1) of Table 2.4) 
is not statistically significant, its estimated magnitude is substantial. Using the formula 
Ewý ":::::: )31 + 02 In meanwait, the elasticity of hospital cost with respect to waiting times 
at the sample average of waiting times is estimated at -0.07. Therefore, when taken at the 
sample average waiting times are expected to reduce hospital cost. However, this effect 
is expected to vanish if waiting times are increased. In fact, we can calculate the level of 
waiting times where the elasticity turns from negative to positive. This is the waiting times 
level that solves: 131 + 
02 1n meanwait = 0, which yields 125 days. That is, after a median 
waiting time of 125 days waiting times would start to increase hospital costs, which agrees 
with Iversen's (1993) model. 
Other control variables display significant effects. As expected both inpatient and 
outpatient activity increase cost, as does the HRG index. On average, hospitals costs in 
2.4 Results 57 
London are approximately 20% higher than in the rest of the country. Real costs increased 
significantly between 1998 and 1999, possibly due to nation-wide salary increase from 
1999/2000 onwards. 
Adding available beds (column (2)) affects the results, causing the coefficients of 
waiting times to become significant. However, the separate effects of waiting times are 
significant only at 10% and the joint effect is not statistically significant. The effect of 
available beds, our proxy for capital, is itself positive in most regressions where it is in- 
cluded. 
The introduction of emergency admissions or day cases does not affect the results 
significantly (see columns 3 and 4). Emergency admissions have no effect on hospital 
costs. Day cases have a negative and significant coefficient, suggesting that hospitals with 
a higher proportion of elective admissions treated as day cases have lower costs. In column 
(5), we add average length of stay, which has a positive and significant effect on hospitals' 
costs, as expected. The effect of waiting times is not altered and the RESET test is still not 
significant. 
Next we include readmission rates (column (6)), which impose a positive, but very 
small and not statistically significant effect on hospital cost. However, there is another im- 
portant consequence. In sharp contrast with previous specifications, the effects of waiting 
times and available beds cease to be significant. This might be due to an omitted variable 
bias or to selection in the sample of hospitals with readmission information. Notice that 
readmission rates cause a sizable reduction in the sample. The RESET test is not signifi- 
cant, suggesting that there are no omitted variables. 
2.4 Results 
Table 2.5. Unbalanced fixed effects regressions of total hospital cost 
endent variable: log(totcost); Robust standard errors 
Inmeanwait2 0.06 0.06 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.04 
Intotspells . 16* 0.13 . 18** . 18** . 19** 0.02 Intotop . 12* . 11* . 11* . 11* . 11* 0.10 Inavbeds . 24*** . 17** . 17** . 15** . 23*** emergadm . 0068** . 0065* . 0061* 3,0011-03 daycase -8.20E-04 -1.0013-03 -1.10E-03 Inalos 0.05 0.05 
readmisnpe -0.01 
Y1999 . 13*** . 13*** . 13*** . 13*** . 13*** . 13*** y2000 . 15*** . 14*** . 14*** . 14*** . 16*** . 17*** y2001 . 21*** . 2*** . 19*** . 19*** . 19*** . 2*** cons 10*** 9*** 8.9*** 9*** 9*** 9.5*** 
0.67 0.68 0.69 0.69 0.69 0.69 
R2 between 0.71 0.82 0.77 0.77 0.78 0.86 
R2 overall 0.68 0.81 0.77 0.77 0.78 0.76 
corr(ai, Xb) 0.64 0.69 0.63 0.65 0.66 0.71 
or 0.3 0.24 0.25 0.25 0.26 0.27 
cru 0.29 0.23 0.25 0.24 0.25 0.27 
or, 0.065 0.063 0.063 0.063 0.063 0.063 
fi 0.95 0.93 0.94 0.94 0.94 0.95 
ausman 68.5*** 56*** 62*** 60.5*** 59.5*** 72.6*** Breusch-Pagan 234.2*** 260.4*** 249.5*** 243.3*** 236.7*** 241.2*** 
Joint significancet 5.6*** 2.7* 1.9 1.7 1.5 0.5 
Legend: * p<. I; ** p<. 05; *** p<. Ol; T Test for-joint significance of Inmeanwait and 
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Finally we evaluate the effect of local competition from other hospitals (column (7)). 
The estimated effect of competition is negative, although not significant. 
In addition to the pooled cross-sectional analysis we also estimate fixed- and random- 
effects panel regressions. Results from the fixed-effects estimations are reported in Table 
2.5. Notice that the time-invariant regressors (namely, hospital type dummies, London 
dummy and number of competitors) are excluded from the fixed-effect regressions. Also, 
the two regressions where the samples reduce to just only one wave cannot be estimated 
either by fixed- or random effects. Therefore, there are only 6 fixed- and random-effects 
regressions. 
The effect of waiting times estimated by fixed-effects is similar to the pooled OLS 
case, with negative sign for the linear component and positive for the quadratic. As ex- 
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pected, both total inpatient spells and outpatient attendances increase total hospital costs. 
Average beds and emergency admissions also increase costs and are statistically signifi- 
cant. Although not statistically significant, treating more elective surgeries as day cases 
and a higher readmission rate both reduce hospital costs, whilst higher average length of 
stay has the opposite effect. 
Moreover, there are some interesting results from the comparison of the models. In 
all cases the Breusch-Pagan test rejects the hypothesis of null variance of the individual- 
effects, suggesting that pooled OLS estimates are biased. There are also indications that 
random-effects estimation is not appropriate. Individual-specific effects are much corre- 
lated with independent variables and in all cases the Hausman test rejects random effects 
model. 
The fixed effects and the pooled OLS estimates have many similarities, especially 
in tenns of the patterns of significance. The fixed effects coefficients tend to be of IoNver 
magnitude. 
Table 2.6 reports the results of random effects estimations. We notice that in some of 
the random effects estimations the effect of waiting times is significant and in accordance 
with the hypothesis proposed by Iversen (1993). The linear coefficient of waiting times 
is negative, but the quadratic is positive, suggesting that increasing waiting times up to a 
certain level decreases costs, but past this level the effect is reversed. 
However, the effects are significant at relatively low levels (10%). Tests for joint 
significance are also are also significant, but at low level. Moreover, as mentioned above, 
the Hausman test rejects the random effects specification in all cases. Therefore, although 
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the results from table 2.6 are indicative of a nonlinear effect of waiting times on cost, we 
cannot rule out that the true effect is as depicted by table 2.5. 
Table 2.6. Unbalanced random effects regressions of total hospital cost 
variable: lo2(totcost): Robust standard errors 
Inmeanwait2 0.17 . 13** . 13** . 12** . 11** 0.06 Intotspells . 36*** . 18*** . 19*** . 21*** . 24*** . 35*** Intotop . 31 *** . 22*** . 22*** . 23*** . 24*** . 23*** Inavbeds . 45*** . 45*** . 43*** . 39*** . 35*** emergadm 4.6013-04 -6.90E-05 -5. OOE-04 -1.70E-03 daycasc -. 0024* -. 0028** -. 0041*** Inalos 0.08 . 11** readmisnpc -0.01 
Y1999 . 13*** . 13*** . 12*** . 13*** . 13*** . 14*** y2000 . 14*** . 13*** . 13*** . 14*** . 17*** . 19*** y2001 . 18*** . 18*** . 18*** . 19*** . 18*** . 18*** cons 9.8*** 7.7*** 7.7*** 7.8*** 7.6*** 7*** 
R' within 0.62 0.66 0.66 0.66 0.66 0. 
R2 between 0.77 0.85 0.85 0.86 0.86 0.9 
R2 overall 0.8 0.86 0.85 0.86 0.87 0.88 
or U. I zS U. 10 U. I() U. I -ý U. ID U. Ii au 0.17 0.14 0.14 0.14 0.14 0.11 
a, 0.065 0.063 0.063 0.063 0.063 0.063 
p 0.87 0.84 0.84 0.83 0.83 0.75 
Joint significancet 9.2** 6.4** 6.2** 5.1 * 4.6* 3.8 
N 
N clusters 
440 
137 
440 
137 
440 
137 
439 
137 
439 
137 
384 
109 
Legend: * p<. 1; ** p<. 05; *** p<. Ol; T Test forjoint significance of Inmeanwait and Inmeanwait 
2.4.1 Regressions with balanced sample 
The results above are based on the progressive inclusion of additional explanatory variables. 
In some cases this affects the statistical significance of the coefficient of waiting times. As 
noted in the discussion of the results, there are two possible explanations: a) it might be the 
case that the regressions with a limited number of regressors suffer from omitted variable 
bias, or b) the inclusion of regressors leads to selection in the sample of observations. 
In order to ftirther explore this issue we re-estimate the regressions using a balanced 
sample. That is, all regressions in Table 2.7 are estimated using only the sample of 88 hos- 
2.4 Results 
Table 2.7. Balanced pooled OLS regressions of total hospital cost 
variable: loe(totcost): Robust standard errors 
61 
IIULIUCIIINValL 
lnmeanwait2 
- V.., 7 
0.07 
V. 4-) 
0.11 
V. " 
0.11 
U. Itj 
0.11 
U.. l. I 
0.07 
- U. LO 
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Intotspells . 67*** . 45*** . 43*** . 43*** . 65*** . 65*** . 65*** Intotop . 28*** . 23*** . 24*** . 24*** . 24*** . 24*** . 24*** lnhrýindrc 1.1*** . 81*** . 81*** . 78*** . 72*** . 73*** . 72*** Inavoeds . 3*** . 32*** . 32*** 0.10 0.10 0.10 emergadm -1.30E-03 -1.50E-03 -6. OOE-04 -1.20E-03 -1.10E-03 daycase -1.90E-03 -. 0034* -. 0033* -. 0034* Inalos . 26** . 25** . 26** readmisnSc 4.10E-03 4.1 OE-03 
Innhosp2 km -2.10E-03 london . 2*** . 19*** . 18*** . 17*** . 15*** . 15*** . 15** Y1999 . 14*** . 15*** . 15*** . 15*** . 15*** . 15*** . 15*** y2OOO . 18*** . 17*** . 17*** . 18*** . 28*** . 28*** . 28*** y2001 . 13*** . 14*** . 14*** . 15*** . 14*** . 14*** . 14*** cons 2.9** 3.6*** 3.6*** 3.9*** 3.9*** 3.9*** 3.9*** R2 0.88 0.89 0.89 0.89 0.89 0.89 0.89 
RESET 0.7 0.8 0.8 1.4 1.9 1.8 1.8 
Joint sip-nificancet 0.4 1.1 1.1 1 0.7 0.7 0.6 
Legend: * p<. I; ** p<. 05; *** p<. Ol; T Test forjoint significance of Inmeanwait and 
pitals that we obtain when all regressors are included (column (7) of Table 2.4). Similarly, 
all regressions in Table 2.8 use the sample of column (6) of Table 2.5 and all regressions 
in Table 2.9 use the sample of column (6) of Table 2.6. Moreover, the balanced panel data 
regressions (Tables 2.8 and 2.9) include only hospitals with observations for all four years. 
This explains why the sample sizes are slightly smaller. 
The regression results with balanced sample are qualitatively similar to the unbal- 
anced. The main difference is that now the effect of waiting times ceases to be significant 
throughout. 
2.4 Results 
Table 2.8. Balanced fixed effects regressions of total hospital cost 
variable: lop-(totcost); Robust standard errors 
Inmeanwait2 -0.13 -0.08 -0.07 -0.07 -0.06 -0.06 Intotspells -0.01 -0.08 -0.05 -0.02 -0.00 -0.00 Intotop . 11* 0.10 0.11 0.11 . 11* . 11* Inavbeds . 3*** . 26*** . 25*** . 22*** . 22*** emergadm 2.9013-03 2.5013-03 2.2013-03 2.6013-03 
daycase -1.10E-03 -1.50E-03 -1.5013-03 Inalos 0.06 0.06 
readmisnpc -3.5013-03 
Y1999 . 14*** . 14*** . 13*** . 14*** . 14*** . 14*** y2000 . 16*** . 15*** . 15*** . 15*** . 18*** . 18*** y2001 . 22*** . 21*** . 21*** . 21*** . 21*** . 21*** cons 9.1*** 8.2*** 8.3*** 8.3*** 8.5*** 8.5*** 
R' within 0.65 0.68 0.68 0.68 0.68 0. 
*2 between 0.49 0.83 0.82 0.84 0.84 0.83 
*2 overall 0.27 0.68 0.69 0.71 0.7 0.69 
corr(ai, Xb) 0.3 0.64 0.64 0.66 0.65 0.65 
u 0.32 0.26 0.26 0.25 0.26 0.26 
uu 0.31 0.25 0.25 0.24 0.25 0.25 
or, 0.07 0.067 0.067 0.067 0.067 0.067 
ý 0.95 0.93 0.93 0.93 0.93 0.93 
ausrnan 185.4*** 171.5*** 51.3*** 170.5*** 181.8*** 195*** Breusch-Pagan 216.5*** 215.7*** 213.8*** 213.9*** 186*** 183.6*** 
Joint siRnificancet 3.9** 1.2 0.9 0.8 0.6 0.6 
Legend: * p<. 1; ** p<. 05; *** p<. O I; T Test for joint significance of Inmeanwait and 
Table 2.9. Balanced random effects regressions of total hospital cost 
Robust standard errors 
Inmeanwait2 0.09 0.12 0.12 0.11 0.12 0.12 
Intotspells 
. 
49*** 
. 
22*** . 
23*** 
. 29*** . 
37*** 
. 
37*** 
Intotop 
. 29*** . 
23*** . 
23*** 
. 
22*** . 
23*** 
. 
23*** 
Inavbeds 
. 
44*** . 
42*** 
. 
4*** 
. 
32*** 
. 
32*** 
emergadm 1.60E-03 5.4011-04 3.7013-04 -6.10E-05 daycase -. 0035* -. 0043** -. 0043** Inalos 0.12 0.12 
rcadmisnpe 3.50E-03 
Y1999 . 
13*** 
. 13*** . 
13*** 
. 
13*** . 
14*** . 14*** y2OOO . 13*** . 14*** . 
13*** 
. 
14*** 
. 
19*** 
. 
19*** 
y2001 . 18*** . 
18*** 
. 
18*** 
. 
19*** . 19*** . 
19*** 
cons 8.5*** 7.4*** 7.5*** 7.6*** 7.7*** 
F-within 0.59 0.65 0.65 0.65 0.65 0.65 
R2 between 0.84 0.88 0.87 0.88 0.89 0.89 
R2 overall 0.81 0.85 0.85 0.86 0.87 0.87 
Oru 
O'e 
p 
Joint 
Legend: *p<. 1; **p<. 05; P<. Ol; 
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0.13 0.12 0.12 0.12 0.11 0.11 
0.07 0.067 0.067 0.067 0.067 0.067 
0.77 0.75 0.75 0.75 0.72 0.72 
2.5 Conclusions 
2.5 Conclusions 
63 
This chapter addresses an important question: What is the effect of waiting times on hos- 
pital costs? The motivation for this study comes from the theoretical literature on hospital 
regulation, where one can identify two different views. On the one hand, some authors (e. g. 
Gaynor and Anderson 1995, Keeler and Ying 1996, Hughes and McGuire 2003) argue that 
hospitals use waiting times to regulate excess capacity and that consequently waiting times 
should reduce hospital costs. On the other hand, Iversen (1993) argues that this negative 
effect exists only to a certain extent. Beyond a given point, however, the management of 
the waiting list and repeated examinations become too costly, and then waiting times start 
to increase total hospital costs. 
In our view this is essentially an empirical question, which remains open until now. 
To answer this question we use a sample of 259 acute hospitals from the English NHS 
observed in the fours years between 1998 and 200 1. Our primary purpose is to estimate the 
elasticity of hospital costs with respect to waiting times. 
We estimated pooled OLS, fixed effects and random effects models for total hospital 
cost. In each case waiting times are entered in the regression in both linear and quadratic 
tenns, which should assist in identifying the curvature of the cost function. The signs of 
the estimated coefficients are consistent with Iversen's (1993) model: the coefficient is 
negative for the linear effect and positive for the quadratic effect, suggesting a U-shaped 
relationship between hospital costs and waiting times. However, the coefficients are gen- 
erally not statistically significant. It is possible to argue that to a certain extent the results 
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give some support for Iversen's (1993) model: although the coefficients are not significant, 
the signs are correctly estimated. 
The results suggest that waiting times have no impact on hospital costs. This casts 
some doubt on the effectiveness of waiting times as a tool to control hospital costs. In the 
future more research would be desirable in order to further understand this issue. 
Chapter 3 
Preventive Care in Competitive Health 
Insurance Markets with Adverse Selection 
3.1 Introduction 
Economists have long acknowledged the importance of infon-national asymmetries in in- 
fluencing individual behaviour. In a classic paper, Rothschild and Stiglitz (1976) describe 
how imperfect information, in the form of adverse selection, leads to distortions of in- 
surance contracts. In particular, they show that, if individuals in an insurance market are 
heterogeneous with respect to unobservable risk, an equilibrium may fail to exist; if the 
equilibrium exists, it will necessarily separate the individuals according to risk type. In this 
case, low-risk individuals will be worse-off, while high-risk are no better-off, implying that 
a symmetric information equilibrium would be welfare-improving. 
In the case of health insurance, most applications have focused on how insurers dis- 
tort the provision of curative care in order to sort patients according to risk type. By con- 
trast, preventive health services have received less attention. With the increase in pre-paid 
or prospective health insurance, however, this situation tends to change. Receiving a fixed 
premium per patient, insurers face increased incentives for cost-efficiency. That might lead 
to greater emphasis in prevention, contributing to reduce the need for future curative care 
(see Herring 2002, Miceli and Heffley 2002). This paper aims to extend the conventional 
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analysis of health insurance markets in order to consider the incentives for the provision of 
preventive care. 
Following the distinction proposed by Ehrlich and Becker (1972), most authors (e. g. 
Phelps 1978, Kenkel 1994, Kenkel 2000, Barigozzi 2004, Welch 2004) separate preven- 
tive care into primary and secondary prevention. " The first category, also denoted self- 
protection by Ehrlich and Becker (1972), refers to activities that aim to reduce the prob- 
ability of illness. Examples include the regular practice of physical exercises and vacci- 
nation campaigns. On the other hand, secondary prevention or self-insurance consists on 
efforts to attenuate the consequences of illness, without necessarily affecting the probabil- 
ity of occurrence. Examples related to health include screening for early cancer, high blood 
pressure, heart disease and dental plaque. 
Phelps (1978) argues that the demand for prevention depends on its effect on the 
likely out-of-pocket medical expenditures, the work-loss associated with illness and, more 
importantly, on the potential health damage that can be avoided. However, as remarked by 
Breyer (1982), none of these effects can be accurately anticipated by the consumer or the 
insurer. 
Ehrlich and Becker (1972) were the first to provide a formal model for prevention in 
the presence of market insurance. They show that market insurance decreases secondary 
prevention, in the sense that they can be seen as substitutes to redistribute income between 
alternative states-of-the-world. On the other hand, market insurance has two opposite ef- 
fects on primary prevention: although primary prevention is discouraged by a lower mar- 
" Kenkel (2000) also discusses tertiary prevention, which would aim to reduce the disability associated with 
a chronic illness. 
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ginal gain in the reduction of the difference of incomes between states, it is encouraged if 
the insurance premium is negatively affected by the reduction in the probability of loss. The 
authors argue that in general primary prevention can be considered a complement to mar- 
ket insurance. In particular, with quadratic utility function and probability of loss higher 
than 1/2, market insurance unambiguously increases optimal primary prevention. 
Courbage and de Coulon (2004) and Courbage and Rey (2006) study the effect of 
prudence and risk aversion in the demand for prevention. Courbage and de Coulon (2004) 
conclude that private health insurance does not lead to less prevention (probability of exer- 
cising, regular check-ups and smoking) in the UK, although they employ only one cross- 
section of data. 
The argument above implicitly assumes that the premium is actuarially fair, depend- 
ing on the amount of effort to reduce the probability of loss. Other authors (e. g. Zweifel and 
Breyer 1997, Kenkel 2000, de Ven and Ellis 2000, Zweifel and Manning 2000, Newhouse 
2002) have pointed out that unfair premiums, by breaking the link between self-protection 
and premium reduction, give rise to ex-ante moral hazard, that is reduction in the demand 
for self-protection. If the regulator cannot observe the self-protective effort, ex-ante moral 
hazard imposes an externality on other individuals, who need to pay higher premiums in 
order to compensate for the increase in the propensity to loss. However, as Kenkel (2000) 
points out, as long as curative care is unable to completely restore health, individuals have 
incentives to prevention, even with complete financial coverage and fair premiums. 
Bond and Crocker (1991) describe the use of risk classification to inhibit the ex ante 
moral hazard. In their model individuals consume some goods that are correlated with the 
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propensity to loss, like smoking. If the consumption of the hazardous good is observable, 
risk rated premiums are shown to mitigate the ex ante moral hazard, and the first best can be 
achieved, even if the underlying propensity to loss is unobservable. Shavell (1979) reaches 
a similar conclusion, showing that full coverage is preferable if prevention is observable. 
However, if the insurer observes preventive effort imprecisely, full coverage is not optimal, 
and that introduces an additional risk for the insured. 
Focusing on the US context, Heffley (1982) and Miceli and Heffley (2002) analyse 
the claim that Health Maintenance Organizations (HMOs) have a presumable "preventive 
orientation", that is, "because of the contractual obligation to provide medical care for a 
fixed premium, prepaid groups may have a stronger obligation to deliver preventive ser- 
vices that reduce the need for future treatment" (Miceli and Heffley 2002, p. 429). They 
compare consumer demand for prevention and provider's investment on capacity under 
three alternative systems: pure retrospective (fee-for-service), mixed and pure prospective 
(pre-paid). They show that the first two systems induce optimal prevention, whilst under 
pure capitation consumers either over or under consume prevention, and providers manip- 
ulate the level of capacity investment in order to control demand. A similar argument has 
been put forward by Herring (2002), who argues that enrolee turnover reduces the ben- 
efit from investments in prevention from the health plan's perspective. Using data from 
employer-sponsored health plans, Herring (2002) shows that employment-induced insurer 
turnover results in under-investment in prevention as measured by mammography utiliza- 
tion. 
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In recent years, a topic related to prevention that has been receiving a lot of interest is 
the study of screening, more precisely of genetic testing (see Tabarrok 1994, Strohmenger 
and Warnbach 2000, Fagart and Fornbaron 2003, Hoel and Iversen 2002, Hoel, Iversen, 
Nilssen and Vislic 2006, Hoy and Polbom 2000, Hoy, Orsi, Eisinger and Moatti 2003, 
Polborn, Hoy and Sadanand 2006). The successful sequencing of the human genome has 
brought renewed optimism for the treatment of the most diverse ailments, from cancer to 
countless genetic related disorders. It is believed that in the future doctors will be able 
to prescribe specially tailored treatments and medicines based on the examination of the 
genetic endowment of patients. 
One of the earliest analyses in this area was provided by Tabarrok (1994), who ar- 
gues that the increasing availability of genetic tests produces both benefits and costs. As 
mentioned above, genetic testing improves the ability to detect diseases at early stages, fa- 
cilitating the targeting of treatments and potentially contributing to improve health. On the 
other hand, that creates additional classification risk. Those individuals that are identified 
with high risk of developing genetic diseases might end up virtually uninsurable, given the 
high premiums that would be charged. Several authors have explored the potential welfare 
effects of genetic testing, with particular focus on whether insurers should be allowed to use 
test results in insurance contracts. There is no general consensus about the optimal policy, 
since results depend on the informational and institutional framework of each application. 
Some authors suggest that it is preferable to allow insurers to use infon-nation from ge- 
netic tests (e. g. Hoel and Iversen 2002, Hoel et al. 2006), whilst others sustain that genetic 
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testing should be banned in order to improve social welfare (e. g. Hoy et al. 2003, Polbom 
et al. 2006). 
Although focusing on a different context, Sappington and Lewis (1999) extend the 
implications of partially observable prevention by considering screening costs. They model 
the provision of health care when the likely treatment costs per patient cannot be perfectly 
anticipated. However, the health care provider can perform tests which increase the level 
of infon-nation, but also imply a positive cost. For a relatively high screening cost the 
purchaser is able to implement conventional risk adjustment. However, if the screening cost 
is low, it is likely that providers would engage in inefficient selection of patients (dumping). 
In the latter case the authors propose a system of subjective risk adjustment. 
Two recent papers analyse how different payment systems affect investments on pre- 
vention. In Barros and Martinez-Giralt's (2003) model, prevention determines the refer- 
ral rates between primary and secondary treatments centres. They show that under cost- 
reimbursement there is no incentive for prevention, neither by the primary care centre nor 
the hospital. However, integrated management of the two units of service, combined with 
prospective payments are shown to stimulate prevention, which in turn decreases referral 
rates, and increases the efficiency in the provision of services. Barigozzi (2004) explores 
the optimal reimbursement rule in two opposite cases, with prevention being either a com- 
plement or a substitute to curative care. The author cites the prevention and treatment of 
HIV/AIDS as examples of complementary goods, since in general the early detection im- 
plies higher costs of treatment. Conversely, screening for certain types of breast cancer can 
be considered a substitute to treatment, because early detection prevents the development 
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of more serious conditions. Barigozzi (2004) shows that the optimal rule will always en- 
courage investments in treatment. On the other hand, prevention will be promoted if it is a 
substitute to curative care, but will be discouraged if the two types of care are complements. 
Cropper (1977) discusses the effect of age on the demand for preventive services in 
a human capital framework (see Grossman 1972, Grossman 2000). The author shows that, 
if longevity is fixed, the incentives for prevention decrease as the individual ages, because 
the period for pay-off of investment decreases. However, if death is endogenous and the 
depreciation of capital stock increases with age, then prevention will also increase with age. 
In an empirical application, Kenkel (1994) estimates the determinants of breast and cervical 
cancer screening, showing that, although the risk of cancer increases with age, women use 
less preventive services as they get older. The author recognises the possibility of other 
explanations for this pattern, but sustains that it provides evidence for the first alternative 
of the relationship between age and prevention. 
Byrne and Thompson's (2001) model explores inconsistencies in the intertemporal 
evaluation of screening and prevention. Their results suggest that patients are unlikely to 
comply with appropriate recommendations because they have myopic expectations with 
respect to the benefits. In an empirical study, Wu (2003) also shows that health status 
affects the demand for different types of preventive services. Individuals with poor health 
are more likely to be screened for relatively simple conditions, like cholesterol checks, but 
less likely to test for several types of cancer. The author suggests this difference is due to 
higher levels of anxiety among sicker patients, which prevents them from testing for serious 
illnesses. 
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The present paper focuses on the incentives for the provision of prevention in com- 
petitive health insurance markets. The insurer receives a fixed premium per patient, and 
in turn provides both curative care, which restores the health of sick patients, and preven- 
tive care, which decreases of probability of falling ill. Examples of preventive services 
include screening for asymptornatic diseases, vaccination campaigns and programs to pro- 
mote lifestyle changes (e. g. increasing physical activities and smoking cessation). On the 
other hand, patients are divided into two classes, which are heterogeneous with respect to 
the probability illness and the efficiency of prevention in reducing it. 
We analyse two cases, the first-best, when the patient type is observable, and the un- 
regulated competitive market equilibrium with adverse selection. Following established 
results in the literature (e. g. Rothschild and Stiglitz 1976, Glazer and McGuire 2000), we 
show that under imperfect information low-risk patients are separated by receiving less 
than optimal curative care. Moreover, the main contribution of the paper is to demonstrate 
that the level of preventive care is also distorted, with the direction of distortion depend- 
ing on the relative efficiency of prevention for each risk type. Low-risk patients receive 
lower (higher) marginal benefit from preventive care if prevention is relatively more (less) 
efficient for them. 
The paper is organized as follows. The next section presents the basic model, de- 
scribing the patient utility, the insurer objective, the social welfare function and the effect 
of prevention on the probability of illness. Section 3.3 characterises the first best, which 
corresponds to the equilibrium when the patient type is observable, while section 3.4 analy- 
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ses the unregulated market equilibrium, when only the average proportion of each risk type 
is observable. Section 3.5 concludes. 
3.2 The model 
There are two types of individuals, L and H, distinguished according to the probability 
of illness p', iE IL, H}. The probability of illness is strictly positive, and H-types are 
assumed to face a higher risk than L-types: 
pH >PL (3.1) 
Let Oi, i=H, L, with OH + OL = 1, denote the proportion of type i individuals 
in the population. The probability of illness is private information of the patient, so it is 
not observed by the insurer. However, the insurer knows the distribution of each type of 
individuals. It is then possible to calculate the average probability of illness p: 
0HL HP + OLP (3.2) 
For each enrolled patient the plan receives a premium r. In return the plan provides 
preventive care 0 and, if the individual gets sick, delivers curative care m. In this specifica- 
tion 0 and m indicate the monetary value of health care. The costs of providing preventive 
and curative care are denoted by g(O) and h(m), respectively. The insurance contract then 
takes the fonn C(o, m, r). 
Patients do not make any other payment beyond the premium, and we assume that 
all individuals in the population take part into the contract. Additionally, we assume that 
"each plan can offer only one contract, and that each consumer chooses only one contract" 
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(Glazer and McGuire 2000, p. 1059). Initially suppose the regulator charges the same 
premium r>0 for all individuals, regardless of their risk level. 
3.2.1 Patient's utility 
Following Glazer and McGuire (2000), the utility of a healthy individual is normalised to 
zero: Uh = 0, where the subscript refers to the health status (h stands for healthy and s for 
sick). If the individual becomes ill, there is a utility loss D associated with the discomfort 
of the disease in terms of pain and suffering, and with the reduced ability to perform the 
non-nal activities. 
On the other hand, receiving medical care m increases utility by v= v(m), with 
v. >0 and v,,,, < 0. We assume that, although the insurance contract provides coverage 
for the monetary loss, there is typically a significant health effect which cannot be fully 
recovered through treatment (see Kenkel 2000). That is, curative care at best restores the 
original level of health of the patient, which implies: 
U, = v(m) -D<0, Vm. (3.3) 
The expected utility the individual receives from a contract C(O, m, r) is given by: 
V(C) --` 
(1-P(O))Uh+P(O)Us (3.4) 
V(C) = p(o) (v(m) - D) - r, 
where the simplification is due to the normalisation of the utility when healthy. 
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The effect of prevention 
Individuals do not accrue any direct utility from preventive care. Instead, they value 
preventive care only for its effect on the probability of illness. Prevention can be dis- 
tinguished into two categories, according to its particular effect on health (Ehrlich and 
Becker 1972): 
1. Primary prevention or self-protection, which reduces the probability of illness 
occurrence, and 
Secondary prevention or self-insurance, which reduces the health consequences of the 
disease, conditional on its occurrence. 
Our model focuses on the first type of prevention and assumes that preventive care 
does not affect the level of curative care that is needed in case of illness. Consequently, the 
utility from curative care can be considered the same for both H-types and L-types. Exam- 
ples of primary prevention include both public provided interventions such as vaccination 
and also lifestyle decisions related to diet, exercise and smoking. One important aspect 
of primary prevention is that it might be not observable by the insurer and the regulator 
(Barigozzi 2004). 
The principal assumption of the model is that receiving preventive care 0 decreases 
the probability of becoming ill p(o): 
with p (0) :51, po < 0, po (0) =- oo, poý5 > 0, (3.5) 
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where subscripts denote partial derivatives. The probability of illness is strictly con- 
vex and restricted to the interval 0<p<1. The last assumption guarantees that an interior 
solution for optimal prevention exists. 
The model implicitly assumes that the probability of illness is monotonically de- 
creasing on prevention. This is made for computational convenience. However, other 
assumptions could also be conceived. For instance, consider the example of vaccination 
campaigns. It might be argued that, from a population point-of-view, the first unit of vac- 
cination has no effect on the probability of illness. This probability only starts to decrease 
after a minimal critical number of people is immunised. However, provided that the proba- 
bility of illness is bounded between 0 and 1, the main results of the model are independent 
of this assumption. 
Prevention can have different effects on the probability of illness, according to the 
individual risk type. It is possible to assume that either preventive care is at least as efficient 
for L-types as it is for H-types (_ L> _pH) or that it is more efficient for H-types (-p, ' < Pý -0, 
-pOH). " In the former case, for a given amount of prevention the reduction in the probability 
of illness is larger for the L-types than for H-types. The intution for this assumption is 
that L-types tend to be healthier, and would consequently have a better response to the 
provision of prevention. For example, assume the risk level is primarily determined by 
age, with older people being exposed to higher probability of illness. In this case, it is 
12 Another possible assumption would be to consider that the distribution of preventive care efficiency does 
not follow strictly the risk classes. This could be modelled, for example, by assuming a random distribution 
of preventive efficiency. Each risk type would then face an exogenous probability of having either high or 
low efficiency of prevention. However, the main result of the paper, namely that the direction of distortion 
depends on the relative efficiency of prevention would still come through. Therefore, we focus on the more 
restrictive but simpler assumption that the efficiency of prevention follows risk classes. 
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reasonable to suppose that the demand for prevention would reduce with age, either because 
of the lower effectiveness of prevention, or because of a smaller period for pay-off of health 
investment (see Cropper 1977, Kenkel 1994). This example is not in compliance with 
the model assumptions, however, because age is an observable characteristic. A more 
appropriate example relates to the unobservable probability of developing a certain type of 
cancer. It might be argued that individuals with higher genetic propensity to developing the 
disease might also be less responsive to interventions aimed at reducing the probability of 
illness. In this case, the efficiency of prevention depends on an unobservable characteristic 
that is also related to risk class. 
The second assumption, although less intuitive, is also possible. An example is the 
impact of smoking cessation on the overall health of young and old individuals. Kenkel 
(2000) argues that the gain of quitting for a young individual can be considered relatively 
small compared to an older individual. The young individual is likely to have smoked for 
a shorter period of time, and consequently to have imposed less harm over his/her health. 
Therefore, the benefit from stop smoking may be higher for the older individual (high risk). 
3.2.2 Insurer's profit 
Let g(O) (with go > 0, goo > 0) and h(m) (with lz,,, > 0, h,,,, > 0) denote the cost 
of providing preventive and curative care, respectively. The insurer's expected profit per 
patient is given by the difference behveen the total amount collected in premiums and the 
expected cost of treatment. Thus, the expected profit of contract C(O, m, r) is given by: 
II(C) =r- g(O) - p(O)h(m). (3.6) 
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3.2.3 Social welfare 
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Assume a utilitarian regulator which gives the same importance for the welfare of patients 
and insurers alike. The welfare of the society can be seen as the weighted sum of the welfare 
of patients and the profits of insurers, where the weights are given by the proportion of each 
type of patient in the population: 
H 
E Oi Ivi (Ci) + Ili (Ci)] 
i=L 
= OH 
[p H (OH) (V(7nH) 
-D- 11(7nH)) - g(OH)l + 
OL [p L (OL) (V(ML) -D- II(TnL)) - g(OL)l - (3.7) 
Note that for each type of contract the insurance premium is simply a transfer from patients 
to the insurer. Therefore, it does not affect the social welfare. 
3.3 The first-best 
Let us first assume the patient type is publicly observed by the procurer and the provider. 
Therefore the procurer can set both preventive and curative care at the optimal levels. This 
defines the first-best or complete information setting. 
The procurer objective is to maximize the social welfare, by choosing the optimal 
levels of preventive and curative care for each patient type: 
H 
max W=X: Oi[Vi(Ci)+Ili(Ci)] MH, 7nL, OH, OL 
i=L 
= 011 
[PII(OH) (V(TnH) 
-D- h(mjj)) - g(OH)l 
OL [p L (OL) (V(7nL) -D- h(ML)) - g(OL)l - (3.8) 
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The first order conditions are given by: 
m H Vm If /I,,, (M* H (3.9) 
M L* Vm L h,,, (m*) L (3.10) 
0* : PH (0* H H) 
(v(Tn* D 
HH 
0* : PL(O*) (V(M*) LL-D- h(m*)) L 
where the superscript * denotes the first best. Recall that the expected utility terms v(m! ) - 2 
D- h(mj), i=H, L, are negative, given the assumption of incomplete recovery from 
health losses. 
ProoL The first order conditions are given by: 
MH : ollp H (OH) (Vm(MH) - Ilm(MH» ý-- 0 
ML : OLP L (OL) (Vm(ML) - Ilm(ML)) 
OH : ON [P. Hý(OIA (V(MH) -D- h(MH)) - 90(OH)l ":: ý 
OL : OL [p L (OL) (V(ML) -D- h(TnL» - 90(OL)] : -z 01 0 
which may re-arranged in order to get the expressions ((3.9))-((3.12)). 
The second order conditions for the H-types' contract are: 
OHP H(0* ) (Vmm (7, n* I, Tnm 
(7, n* HH li 
OH [p"" (0* ) (v(m* )-D- h(m* »- goo (0* )] <0 00 H 
Oj, pll(Oý) (v .... 
(mý) - h, (mý» 011 [p1, (oý) (v(mý) -D- h(mý HH 00 HH H» - gý50(0*H)] 
hn(m* ))] 
2 
H 
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Note that, according to ((3.9)), the right-hand side of the last equation is equal to zero. 
Hence the second order conditions for H-types are always satisfied. Similarly the second 
order conditions for L-types are: 
OLP L(O*) (VTnTn(rn* hT,,, n 
(m * )) 
LLL 
OL [p L (0*) (v(m*) -D- h( 00 LL M*L» - 900(0*L)] < 
() 
OLPL (0* ) (V .... (M*) -h..... (m*)) OL 
[p L (0*) (v(m*) -D- h(m*)) - goo(O*)] LLL 00 LLLL 
p4L [OL (OL - hn(M*L 
D (Vm(TnL 
A similar argument holds in this case to guarantee that the second order conditions for 
L-types are also always satisfied. N 
According to (3.9) and (3.10), the optimal level of curative care equalizes the mar- 
ginal utility to the marginal cost. Since both types of patients enjoy the same benefit from 
curative care, they receive the same amount of treatment m* = m* = HL 
On the other hand, according to (3.11) and (3.12), the optimal level of preventive 
care for each type of patient is achieved when the social welfare gain equals the cost of 
prevention. Although prevention is provided at the same cost for both types of patients, 
their capacity to benefit is different. Consequently, each risk type receives a different level 
of prevention. L-types receive more preventive care if they enjoy greater benefits in terms 
L> 
-PH =ý, of reduction in the probability of illness (-p. - 
0ý ý: 0; ), whilst the opposite is 0L II 
true if H-types are more benefited (_pH > _pL =ý, 0* > 0*). 00 H- L 
The main features of the optimal arrangement can be described as: 
3.4 The unregulated market equilibrium 81 
Proposition 3 Under peifect information about individual risk types, the optimal 
menit of competitive contracts is characterized as a separating equilibrium. 
Both types ofpatients receive the efficient level of curative care (m, * = rnL* = m*) H 
2. Theprovision ofpreventive care depends on the efficiency ofpreventionfor each type. 
L-types receive more (less) care than H-types (0* ý! Oý) ifprevention is relatively L 
more (less) efficientfor their type (_pL > -p,, H,, ). That is, 0* ý: 0* if _pL > -P II 0-LH0-0, 
*> 0* if _ 11 > _pL but OH -L po ol 
3.4 The unregulated market equilibrium 
We now turn to the unregulated market equilibrium when the regulator and the plan can- 
not observe the individual type, but they know the average proportion of risk types in the 
population (0j, i=H, L). Each plan decides which contract to offer and each individual 
chooses his preferred plan. 
In the resulting separating equilibrium high risk individuals are offered their first-best 
contract given by: 
MaX VII (OH i MH j rH) ý PH 
(OH) (V (MH) 
- D) - ril (3.13) 
H, 011 
Subj ect to IIH (OH , MH, rH) = rH -9 
(OH) 
_ PH 
(OII)11(7nH) ýý 01 (3.14) 
where (3.14) is the zero-profit constraint, which guarantees that the total amount collected 
in premiums is enough to cover the expenses in both preventive and curative care. The 
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corresponding first-order conditions are: 
MH : Vm HH (3.15) 
Oý : (v(ml', ) -D- h(mW)) = go(OW), (3.16) HHH 
where the superscript m denotes the outcome of the unregulated market equilibrium. 
Proof. In a competitive market the constraint ((3.14)) is binding in equilibrium. Hence 
substituting rH ý 9(OH) - PII(OH)h(TnH) into ((3.13)) allows us to write the objective 
function of this maximisation problem as: 
max £=p H(O. ) (v(mH) -D- h(mH» - g(OH), rnH, OH 
with the corresponding first-order conditions: 
mH MH P (OH)(Vm(TnH)-h, (TnH)): --O 
Pý5l(OH) MMH) -D- h(mjl» - 
These equations are re-arranged in order to get expressions ((3.15)) and ((3.16)). 0 
Comparing these conditions with (3.9) and (3.11) shows that the H-types' contract is 
equivalent to the first best, and may be characterised by C; 7 = (0* , m*,, r* 
). The optimal HH 
level of curative care equalizes the marginal utility to the marginal cost, while optimal 
prevention is determined when the marginal reduction in the probability of illness for H- 
types times the expected utility equals the marginal cost of prevention. Therefore, the 
market contract for this risk category does not distort any type of care. H-types receive the 
first best levels of both preventive and curative care, and are charged the actuarially fair 
premium r* = g(o* )+ pH(O* )h(m* ). HHHH 
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Let us now consider the contract for L-types. The insurer wants to separate this 
category of patients, and therefore offers a contract that is different from the first-best 
contract purchased by the H-types. In effect, the L-types contract maximises their utility 
provided that H-types are not attracted to it. This contract solves the following problem: 
max VL(OL, ML, rL) = PL (OL) (V(ML) - D) - rL 
L, OL 
Subject to rIL(OL, ML, rL) = rL - _q(OL) _ PL 
(OL)h(7nL) > 01 (3.18) 
Vii (0* 
, m*, r* 
H (0*) (v(m*) - D) - r* > and H H) 
=P H- (3.19) VH (OL 
i ML, rL) = pH (OL) (V (ML) - D) - rL 
where (3.18) is the zero-profit constraint and (3.19) is the self-selecting constraint, which 
guarantees that the contract CL = (OL, ML, rL) does not attract H-types. The first-order 
conditions are: 
, rn 
m 
V, (ML 
m H( )_pL(om) (M1, n) (3.20) L+AP0 ML L Vrn L hn, (m'L 1-A pLL 
om 0 (OTL) (V (M-) -D-h (m-» = 
L 
pL (3.21) L: 'n) +X (pH (orn) _ pL (OTn» gOWL (v(m') - D) 1 -, \ 0L0LL 
where A is the Lagrange multiplier associated with the incentive compatibility constraint 
(3.19). 
Proof. Here we solve the maximization problem of the unregulated market equilibrium 
for L-type individuals. The Lagrangean for this maximization problem is given by: 
r= L(O, ) (V(M, ) -D- h(m'» - g(O') + L 
,\ 
[p H(o* H (0m) (V (Mm) 
H) (v(m*) - D) - r* -p- D) + PL (0') h (m') + (O'n) ]. HLLLLL 
The first-order condition with respect to curative care is: 
rn L (0m) (Vm (Mrn) ML :P-h, (m'» _\ 
(PII (0, ) Vn (M, ) _ PL 
(0, ) ll'n (M, » = LLLLLLL 
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Adding and subtracting p' (0')v,, (m') to the tenn in parenthesis allow us to rewrite: LL 
pL(O, ) (V .. 
(M, L) -h .. (mL» - L (pL(0-)V 
m 
(Mm) _ pL (orn ')v. (7nm) - p'(0')vm(m-» =0 LL) hm (m') + P" (OL LLLL 
A(pff(o') _ PL(0, )) V,,, (Mrn) LL 
H (om L(om) 
v. (m') == h .. (m') + -\ 
PL)PL 
Vm (Mm). LL L(OM) L 1-APL 
On the other hand, the first-order condition with respect to preventive care is: 
om poL 
(OL') (v (m') -D-h (m'» - gý5 (0') + LLL 
LA [-p'(0') (v(m') - D) + pL(om)II(Mm) + go(orn)] ý5 LL0LLL 
L(Om) (V(, tnm) - D) to the tenn in square brackets Similarly, adding and subtracting PO LL 
yields: 
MML -D- h(m)) - go Pý KLL 
(pL (0m) _ pH (om 
pL 
0L0 L» MMVL) - D) 
0 (0') (v (m') -D-h (m'» + go (0') LLLL1= 
(I - A) [pL(O') (v(m') go(O')] LL 
,X 
(PL (0, ) _ plI (0, » (v (m) - D) = 0L0LL 
H h(Tn')) (Po W L+- 
h T) - Pý I-A 
The corresponding fair premium for the unregulated contract for L-types is r' =g (0') LL 
p'(O')ll (m-). Z 
According to equation (3.20), the marginal utility of curative care for L-types is 
higher than the marginal cost. Therefore, the level of curative care provided to L-types 
in the market equilibrium is below the first-best. This conclusion is similar to Rothschild 
and Stiglitz's (1976), and is necessary to prevent that H-types choose the contract designed 
for L-types. Similarly, according to (3.21), the level preventive care for L-types is also 
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distorted in the market equilibrium. In this case, however, the direction of distortion is 
determined by the relative efficiency of prevention, as explained below. 
Comparing the contracts for the two risk types, we conclude: 
Proposition 4 The unregulated market equilibrium, if it exists, is characterized as a 
separating equilibrium. 
1. Under the contract C; ý = (O*H, m*, r*) H-types receive thefirst-best marginal benefit 
fivin both types of services, and are charged the corresponding actuariallyfair 
premium. 
2. L-types, on Ihe other hand, are offered the contract CLm = (o', l, rln). Compared LLL 
to Ihefirst best, this contract provides higher marginal benefit of ci(rative care: 
vm(m-) > V,, (M*) L 
3. L-types receive lower marginal benefiffi-onz preventive care ifprevention is relatively 
L> 
-pH more efliCientfor them (-p. -ý), 
but higher marginal benefitfrom preventive 
L< 
_pH care ifprevention is relatively more efficientfor H-types (-p. 0). 
These results are in line with Glazer and McGuire (2000) and reflect the standard 
Rothschild-Stiglitz separating equilibrium. L-type individuals are separated from the H- 
types by receiving less than the efficient levels of curative care (mL < m'lj = m*). 
On the other hand, when prevention is more efficient for L-types, under nonnal cir- 
cumstances they can be expected to receive more preventive care than socially desired 
(0' > 0*). This outcome is justified by two reasons. First note that L-types receive less LL 
3.4 The unregulated market equilibrium 86 
than the optimal level of curative care. Consequently, they would prefer to reduce the prob- 
ability of illness to avoid utility losses. Therefore, the excess provision of preventive care 
will make them better off because it will increase their expected utility by reducing the 
probability of illness. H-types are not attracted by this contract because preventive care 
is relatively inefficient for them. Consequently, they prefer a contract that supplies less 
preventive care (OW = Oý) but, at the same time, charges a relatively lower premium. HH 
Conversely, when prevention is relatively less efficient for L-types, under non-nal 
circumstances they can be expected to receive less preventive care than socially desired 
(0' < 0* ). In this case, L-types are offered lower provision of both types of services. LL 
Nevertheless, they are not attracted by the H-types' contract because that would imply a 
higher premium. 
It remains to show formally that the omitted incentive compatibility constraint for L- 
types is satisfied, that is, to check that L-types have indeed no incentives to mimic H-types. 
First, note that the incentive constraint of H-types is binding: 
V 
H 
VH (O*H 
7 M* i rH*) j rm) L ML L 
PH(O; PH(o, L)(V(M, (v(m*) D) - r; L) - D) rL' H ii LLL 
pH(O')(v(m') - D) _ PH 
(0* ) (v(m*) - D) = r' - r* (3.22) LLHL H* 
Now consider the incentive constraint of L-types: 
mm VLK 
7 ML , T') LH 
r' > PL(O* ) (v(m*) - D) - L-H 
PL(O, )(V(M, ) _ PL(0* LL- D) ) (v(m*) - D) ý! r' - r* (3.23) 11 L H' 
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Hence, from (3.22) and (3.23), the incentive constraint for L-types is satisfied if- 
PL (g) (V (M, ) _ PL(0* LL D) ) (v(m*) - D) pH(O')(v(m') HLL 
pl, (O, *, ) (v(m*) - 
(PH (0* )_ PL (0* (PH pL (0, )) H H)) (v(m*) D) ý! (v(m') LLL 
Taking into account that curative care never fully recovers the patient health (v(m) -D 
0, VTn), this implies: 
H(o* )- pL(o* ) pHH v(m-) -D 
H (orn) - pL (orn) 
<L (3.24) 
pLL v(m*) -D* 
Since rn* maximises the patient utility (0 > v(Tn*) -D> v(rn') - D), the right hand L 
side of this expression is always equal or greater than one (v(mT)-D v(m*)-D 
Figure 3.1 below shows the two alternative assumptions on the effect of prevention 
and compares the effect of prevention in the first-best and in the market equilibrium. Panel 
a shows the case where prevention is relatively more efficient for L-types (_pL > -pH). 0-0 
As prevention increases, the distance between the curves also increases, suggesting that the 
reduction in the probability of illness is bigger for L-types. Conversely, Panel b depicts the 
case where prevention is more efficient for H-types (_pL < -p,, ý'). The distance between 0 
the curves decreases as prevention increases. For all levels of prevention, we assume the 
probability of illness for H-types is always higher than for L-types, therefore the curves 
never cross. 
The ratio on the left hand side of equation (3.24) depends on the relative efficiency of 
prevention. When prevention is more efficient for L-types the market distortion will imply 
higher prevention for L-types compared to the first best (0' > 0* ). As depicted by Panel a LH 
3.4 The unregulated market equilibrium 88 
in Figure 3.1 below, in this case the difference between the probabilities of illness increases 
pH(Oý)-pL(, ý; 4) 1 
with prevention, therefore clearly we have PH(, -)-pL(, -) 
< 
LL 
Conversely, if prevention is more efficient for H-types the market equilibrium will 
provide L-types with lower prevention than socially optimal (OL' < Oý). Since the dif- H 
ference between the probabilities of illness decreases with prevention, in this case we will 
also have ' (0; 1)_pL(O; ýj <1 (Panel b). P"(OL-)-PL(OLm) - 
f1p) 
p. 1p "j 
P, ep) 
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Fig. 3.1. Comparison of prevention in the first-best and the market equilibrium 
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Hence, the incentive compatibility constraint for L-types is always satisfied, regard- 
less of the assumption about the relative efficiency of prevention, since ' 
(mL)-D >I> 
v(m*)-D - 
P"(O; ý)-P, OW 
3.5 Conclusions 
This Paper has analysed the incentives for provision of curative and preventive care in a 
competitive health insurance market with adverse selection. Patients belong to two classes, 
which differ with respect to the probability illness and the efficiency of prevention in reduc- 
ing it. We have analysed two informational frameworks: the first-best and the unregulated 
market with adverse selection, when patient type is unobservable. 
Following established results in the literature (e. g. Rothschild and Stiglitz 1976, 
Glazer and McGuire 2000), under imperfect infonnation low-risk patients are separated 
by receiving less than optimal curative care. Moreover, the main contribution of the paper 
is to demonstrate that the level of preventive care is also distorted, and that the direction 
of distortion depends on the relative efficiency of prevention for each risk type. Low-risk 
patients receive lower (respectively, higher) marginal benefit from preventive care if pre- 
vention is relatively more (less) efficient for them. 
This result might have implications for the implementation of risk adjustment, in 
particular for the method of optimal risk adjustment proposed by Glazer and McGuire (see 
Glazer and McGuire 2000, Glazer and McGuire 2006). According to this method, the best 
way to avoid health plans distorting the amount and quality of services under capitation sys- 
tems is to over- and underpay based on observable characteristics of individual enrolees. 
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However, this applies to curative care only. As the results of this analysis suggested, health 
plans face different incentives for the provision of curative and preventive care. It is desir- 
able that optimal risk adjustment policies take this into account. Otherwise, the incentives 
for the provision of preventive care might in fact become even more distorted. 
A potential empirical extension of this analysis might focus on policies that are cur- 
rently in place among private health insurance regarding the access to preventive care. 
There are currently several examples of plans that provide financial benefits for enrolees 
that adopt healthy lifestyles. It would be interesting to test to what extent employers are 
taking that into account when providing the choice of health plans to employees and to 
measure the potential economic benefits that might be accrued from this. 
Chapter 4 
Socioeconomic inequalities in the burden of 
chronic diseases 
4.1 Introduction 
Recent publications from the World Health Organisation (WHO) and other international 
organizations (see Epping-Jordan et al. 2005, WHO 2005, World Bank 2005) highlight the 
increasing epidemiological burden and negative socioeconomic impact of chronic diseases 
worldwide. These publications indicate that contrary to widely held notions, chronic dis- 
eases affect the poor and are prevalent in low- and middle-income countries. 
There are also suggestions that poverty predisposes individuals to chronic diseases. 
If these were so, chronic diseases may worsen socioeconomic inequality, and cause or ag- 
gravate poverty in individuals or households (Wagstaff 2002). Policy makers have been 
particularly targeted in the advocacies for intervention, as there are often elements of eq- 
uity, poverty alleviation and social justice in many countries' political stewardship and 
health agenda. Wagstaff (2002) noted the increasing tendency for international agencies 
and countries to define intervention goals in terms of poverty reduction (Department for 
International Development 1997) as well as a broadening interpretation of the tenu poverty 
(World Bank 2001). One common trend among these reports is the lack of empirical evi- 
dence which clearly demonstrates a) the existence of socioeconomic inequality in the bur- 
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den of chronic diseases and b) that chronic diseases contribute to worsening socioeconomic 
inequality. This tends to weaken the evidence base for advocacy and intervention planning. 
In this paper, we present an estimate of the socioeconomic related inequality in 
chronic diseases at the household level in Russia and Brazil, decomposing the estimated 
inequality into its contributing determinants. In addition, we show how the estimated in- 
equalities have changed with changing prevalence of chronic diseases in the two countries 
over the period considered. 
We show that in both countries poorer households face considerably higher proba- 
bility of being affected by chronic diseases, and that socioeconomic inequality in chronic 
diseases has increased significantly in Russia during the period, but less so in Brazil. The 
concentration index in Russia starts at -0.021 in 2000, peaks at -0.046 in 2003, and is equal 
to -0.035 in 2004. In Brazil the concentration changes from -0.028 in 1998 to 0.003 in 
2003. 
The health inequity index, calculated by standardising the effect of demographic vari- 
ables, is around -0.01 in Russia (with rising trend) and -0.06 in Brazil. Due to their indirect 
association with socioeconomic status, the standardising variables have opposite effects 
in each country, reducing the level of observed health inequality in Brazil, but increasing 
in Russia. This points out to the differential impact of recent economic changes on the 
socioeconomic inequality among demographic groups in each country. 
The decomposition analysis highlights the importance of socioeconomic status, co- 
morbidities and education to explain worsening health inequalities over the time. Moreover, 
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the bulk of this effect is due to changes in elasticities with respect to the detenninants of 
chronic diseases, rather than changes in the concentration of such detenninants. 
The remainder of the paper is organised as follows. Section 4.2 reviews some of the 
evidence on the relation between health inequalities and socioeconomic status, emphasiz- 
ing the role of chronic diseases risk factors (smoking, alcohol, high blood pressure, high 
cholesterol, low fruit and vegetable intake, overweight and physical inactivity). It also 
introduces the univariate and bivariate approaches to estimating health inequalities. Sec- 
tion 4.3 gives a detailed description of the methods to measure socioeconomic inequalities, 
focusing on the computation of concentration indices, the indirect standardisation using 
non-linear regression and the decomposition of changes in inequality. While the data is 
described in section 4.4, section 4.5 presents the results of the regression analysis, the in- 
dices for total inequality, the decomposition analysis and the decomposition of changes in 
inequalities (using both the Oaxaca decomposition and the total differential decomposition 
proposed by Wagstaff, van Doorslaer and Watanabe (2003)). Section 4.6 concludes. 
4.2 Health inequalities and the poor 
Much of the methodological and empirical work on measuring inequality in health has 
been carried out in Europe, and shows that inequalities in health (ill-health and access to 
care) almost always disfavour the poor. Overall, these studies suggest that health inequal- 
ities seem to be widening rather than narrowing (Wagstaff 2002) in both developing (see 
Victora, Vaughan, Barros, Silva and Tomasi 2000, Wagstaff et al. 2003) and developed 
countries (see Mackenbach and Kunst 1997, Mackenbach, Kunst, Cavelaars, Groenhof and 
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Geurts 1997, Pappas, Queen, Hadden and Fisher 1993, Schalick, Hadden, Pamuk, Navarro 
and Pappas 2000, Vega, Hollstein, Delgado, Perez, Carrasco and Marshall 2001, Houwel- 
ing, Kunst, Borsboom and Mackenbach 2006). This situation may also be related to the 
skewed distribution of the proximate deten-ninants which influence health outcomes at in- 
dividual, household or community levels to disfavour the poor. These factors also vary 
widely between households (Wagstaff 2002) and among socioeconomic groups. 
There are reasons to assume that this health inequality scenario is also relevant to 
chronic diseases. Risk factors associated with high incidence of chronic diseases tend to be 
concentrated among the poor and increasing in incidence in poor countries. For instance 
smoking and poor diet, tend to be concentrated among the lower socioeconomic groups in 
the United States of America and northern Europe. Incidence of chronic diseases and out- 
comes such as mortality rates are higher in the lower socioeconomic groups than the well- 
off which usually have better access to care than the poor in many societies (Wagstaff 2002). 
Higher income is associated with higher utilization of health services in developing coun- 
tries (Castro-Leal, Demery and Mehra 1999). Human assets such as knowledge, literacy 
and education which influence the exposure to and the impact of chronic diseases, tend to 
be lower among the poor. These factors also reflect on the healthcare seeking behaviour of 
the less well off in the population. Perhaps the two most striking factors that might worsen 
inequality are the catastrophic health expenditure shocks and the tendency for missed in- 
come opportunities that follow a chronic disease. Calling to mind that chronic diseases 
present long ten-n implications by nature, all these will tend to worsen existing socioeco- 
nomic and health inequalities. Decomposing the estimates of the inequality by the relative 
4.2 Health inequalities and the poor 95 
contribution of these factors provides additional illumination to this process. This could 
be of relevance to planning interventions for chronic disease and evaluating such interven- 
tions 
There are two distinct approaches to estimating health inequality in the literature. 
First, the univariate approach (Wolfson and Rowe 2001) estimates the overall inequality in 
health (see Gakidou, Murray and Frenk 2000, Grand 1987). All inequality is measured ir- 
respective of the characteristics of the units involved. This is typically done by constructing 
the Lorenz curve (Wagstaff and van Doorslaer 2004) which plots the cumulative proportion 
of individuals ranked by health on the x-axis against the cumulative proportion of health on 
the y-axis. Twice the area between it and the diagonal (equality line) and the curve equals 
the Gini coefficient, G. 
The second approach (bivariate, according to Wolfson and Rowe (2001)) looks at 
a subset of health inequalities for instance occurring across the distribution of socioeco- 
nomic status (SES) (see Pamuk 1985, Schalick et al. 2000, Vagero and Erikson 1997, van 
Doorslaer et al. 1997, Wagstaff and van Doorslaer 2004) in contrast to ranking by health sta- 
tus. There is much debate around normative and ethical issues on which approach captures 
policyrnaker' or societal concerns and attempts have been made to bring these approaches 
together in a unifying methodology (Wagstaff and van Doorslaer 2004). Though this uni- 
fication may help to better clarify the normative issues involved, our primary purpose is 
to explore empirical evidence of, and changes in socioeconomic inequality in chronic dis- 
eases. In doing so, we aim to explore evidence of the relationship between chronic diseases 
and poverty and social justice which are of interest to policy makers. In addition, we 
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aim to explore the determinants of SES inequality and how changes in these determinants 
are associated with the changes in inequality. We have therefore proceeded with the see- 
ond approach because it directly link estimated inequality to socioeconomic status such as 
household income or consumption which levels could be indicative of poverty states. 
4.3 Methods 
4.3.1 Measuring SES inequalities in chronic disease 
There are a number of ways in which relative inequalities in chronic diseases could be 
estimated. We use the concentration index (CI) approach which has been extensively ap- 
plied in relevant literature (see Wagstaff, Paci and van Doorslaer 1991, van Doorslaer et 
al. 1997). The CI has been argued to be more appropriate than inequality indices derived 
from social welfare function if equity is defined with the social justice approach (Bommier 
and Stecklov 2002). Assuming we have a cardinal measure of health (utility) yi, (and every 
one is ranked by a socioeconomic variable e. g. household consumption beginning from 
the lowest) a health concentration curve plots the cumulative proportion of the population 
against the cumulative proportion of health. Everyone enjoys the same health if the plot co- 
incides with the diagonal. If it lies below the diagonal, inequalities in health exist in favour 
of the richer members of the society, proportionately to the degree that it lays away from 
the diagonal. The health concentration index, C, is defined as twice the area between the 
concentration curve and the diagonal, taking a value of zero if the curve coincides with the 
diagonal and positive (negative) values when it lies below (above) the diagonal. 
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C can be computed as (see Kakwani, Wagstaff and van Doorslaer 1997, Wagstaff 
et al. 199 1): 
c yjRj - 1, (4.1) P 
where 1-i is the mean health of the sample, N is the sample size, and 1ý- is the relative 
fractional rank of the ith individual in the SES distribution. Kakwani et al. (1997) showed 
that C might be computed by estimating 0 in the following convenient regression: 
2 
[yi 
20'R a2 +, 6A + Ui) (4.2) 
where ul is the variance of Iý- and the estimator of 0 equals to: R 
2N 
P 
(Yi - t') 
(Ri 
-2 (4.3) 
As has been demonstrated by Wagstaff et al. (2003), the linear regression model is a 
straightforward way of decomposing inequalities to the contributions of various determi- 
nants of health: 
yj = a+ 
Y: ßkXki + Ei - (4.4) 
k 
Estimates from this regression model can then be used to decompose the concentra. - 
tion index as: 
(4.5) k! 
) 
Ck 
where p is the mean of y, Jrk the mean Of X6 Ck. the concentration index for Xk and GC, 
and is the generalized concentration index for Ej. This shows that C can be viewed as being 
made of two components. The first being the deterministic or explained component is equal 
to the weighted sum of the concentration indices of the regressors where weights are simply 
the elasticities of y with respect to -Tk. The second component (which can be computed 
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as a residual) is the unexplained component, which reflects the inequality in health that 
cannot be explained by systematic variation in the Xk across consumption groups. It is also 
regarded as a generalised concentration index for Ej defined as: 
2n 
GC, EiRi, 
which is analogous to the Gini coefficient corresponding to the generalised Lorenz curve 
(Shorrocks 1983). This decomposition shows how each of the determinant's separate con- 
tribution to the explained consumption-related health inequity can be decomposed to its 
health elasticity and its consumption-related inequity (Ck. ), allowing further decomposition 
of each factor's contribution into these two tenns (van Doorslaer and Jones 2003). 
4.3.2 Indirect standardisation approach 
A common problem with the computation of the concentration index refers to the presence 
of other factors, such as age and gender, which are likely to be associated with both SES 
and health. Although such standardising variables influence the distribution of health, in 
general their effect is not amenable to policy intervention. Therefore, their effect has to 
be neutralised in order to obtain 4 measure of the potentially avoidable health inequality. 
The relevant measure in this case is the inequity in the distribution of chronic diseases, 
which corresponds to the difference between the observed inequality and the inequality 
that one would observe if the standardising variables were proportionally distributed in 
the population. It is crucial to standardise the prevalence of chronic diseases since failing 
to account for this effect will cause the concentration index to "overstate the extent of 
avoidable or policy relevant income related inequality in health" (Gravelle 2003). 
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There are two possible methods for standardisation, direct and indirect. Following 
Wagstaff and van Doorslaer (2000) and O'Donnell, van Doorslaer, Wagstaff and Lindelow 
(2007), we choose to use the indirect standardisation approach. In this context, the indi- 
rect standardisation approach is preferable because it controls for non-confounding vari- 
ables (non-standardising) which nonetheless are correlated with the confounding variables. 
Moreover, the indirect standardisation does not require the use of grouped data. This is 
more appropriate in this case because we want to keep the focus on households. If the di- 
rect standardisation approach were used instead, we would have to take into account the 
effect at the level of groups defined over the distribution of the socio-econornic status in- 
dicator (O'Donnell et al. 2007, p. 61). Examples of other studies that also rely on the 
indirect standardisation method include Kakwani et al. (1997), van Doorslaer et al. (2000), 
van Doorslaer and Koolman (2004) and van Doorslaer, Koolman and Jones (2004). 
Once we obtain the indirect standardised health indicator ýj, it is possible to calculate 
its concentration index (ý and its standard error using the convenient regression method, in 
a similar way to observed health (see van Doorslaer et al. 2000, Wagstaff and van Doorslaer 
2000). That is done through equations analogous to equations (4.2) and (4.3), where yj is 
replaced by &. 
Finally, following Wagstaff and van Doorslaer (2000), the measure of health inequity 
or potentially avoidable health inequality HIjsv is given by the difference between the 
concentration indices for observed and standardised health indicators: 
Hllt, v =C-0 (4.6) 
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Wagstaff and van Doorslaer (2000) argue that obtaining an estimate for the standard 
error for HIjvv is not trivial since C and 0 are not independently distributed. However, 
following Kakwani et al. (1997), they show the standard error for HIt, v can be estimated 
using the following convenient regression: 
2cr 2 
[yi fl 
= a3 +, 33Ri + ui, (4.7) 
where ýj and A stand for the indirectly standardised health indicator and its sample mean, 
respectively. As before, HIjvv and its standard error are given by the OLS estimation of 03- 
Ultimately, that is the relevant measure of inequity in the prevalence of chronic diseases. 
4.3.3 Non-linear regression models 
In essence, the indirect standardised health indicator corresponds to the predicted values 
from a health equation. Early studies would include only the standardising variables among 
the controls, and then compute the fitted values from the regression. This approach, how- 
ever, has been criticized on the basis that if there are other non-standardising variables rel- 
evant to explain health, the failure to control for them would give rise to omitted variables 
bias (Schokkaert and van de Voorde 2004). 
Following Gravelle (2003), van Doorslaer and Koolman (2004) and van Doorslaer 
et al. (2004), we avoid this problem by distinguishing the explanatory variables in equation 
(4.4) into three groups x= (xr, xs, xP): the SES indicator x', the standardising variables 
(vector x') and the non-standardising, policy relevant variables (vector xP). The indirectly 
standardised health indicator is then obtained as the fitted values of a regression of health 
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against these three groups, with the SES indicator and the policy relevant variables fixed at 
their sample means (Y and x; -P respectively). 
Frequently, categorical variables measure health, in our case the incidence of chronic 
diseases is proxied by a binary indicator of whether at least one adult in the household re- 
ported chronic disease. The intrinsic nonlinear nature of the health regression implied in 
this case prevents estimation by OLS and calls for a linear approximation in the decompo- 
sition of the concentration index. Assuming a general nonlinear function G describes the 
health function, equation (4.4) can be restated as: 
E(yilxi) = G(a + 
E, 3kXki)- (4.8) 
k 
The indirectly standardised health indicatory^ is computed as the fitted values of this re- 
gression, setting SES and policy relevant variables at their sample means: 
yj = G(a + 1] 0,, Z +. t' + EOptPi). (4.9) 2iz 
sp 
The fact that we estimate a non-linear regression model has some implications for the de- 
composition of the concentration index, compared to the linear case given in equation (4.5). 
We follow van Doorslaer et al. (2004), who have proposed the use of a linear approxima- 
tion to the decomposition in equation (4.5) based on the partial effects estimated from the 
non-linear model (4.9). The partial effects representation of the linear approximation is 
given by: 
mXki + Uii (4.10) yi =a+ EX 
k 
where )3' are the partial effects from the non-linear model. " k 
13 Partial effects are computed as the sample means of individual partial effects. For binary variables that is 
equivalent to the sample average of individual 8' for observations reporting that attribute. For continuous k 
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According to van Doorslaer et al. (2004), some particular aspects should be taken 
into account when interpreting the results from the partial effects representation. First, re- 
call the partial effect from a particular covariate estimated by a non-linear model is not 
constant over the range of the variable. Therefore, the standardisation procedure might not 
comPletely neutralise the effect of the standardising variables. In addition, contrary to the 
linear case, the linear approximation will not obtain an exact decomposition of the concen- 
tration index. That will be captured by the term ui, which includes any approximation error 
from the partial effects representation. 
4.3.4 Decomposing changes in inequalities 
In explaining how the causes of changes in inequality are affected by changes in the deter- 
minants, we follow the approach put forward by Wagstaff et al. (2003). Using an Oaxaca- 
type decomposition method and denoting the elasticity of y with respect to -1k at time t by 
? Ikt, the change in inequality (AC) over time can be computed as: 
GC, t 71kt-1 (ck't - Ckt-1) +E Ck (71kt - 71kt-1) + 2ýk 
I-It kk 
This approach allows disentangling the source of changes in health inequalities (C). It is 
possible to assess the "extent to which changes in health inequality are due to changes in in- I 
equality in the detenninants of health, rather than to changes in their elasticities"(Wagstaff 
et al. 2003, p. 213). 
variables, we calculate the individual partial effect as the change in the linear prediction of ý around the 
observed value, holding other variables constant. 
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However, using the Oaxaca decomposition (4.11) it is not possible to disentangle the 
changes occurring within the elasticity (77kt), whose components may change in different 
directions possibly having offsetting effects. For instance, a change in 71k may be due more 
to a change in Ok rather than a change in Xk or vice versa. In certain circumstances such as 
the evaluation of a programme, this offsetting effect may introduce errors in understanding 
the changes that have occurred. 
As proposed by Wagstaff et al. (2003), a more detailed decomposition can be achieved 
by taking the total differential of equation (4.5) and allowing changes in the a, the Oki the 
'I'k and the Ck. to affect C directly and indirectly through p. The change in C (AC), is 
approximated by (see appendix of Wagstaff et al. (2003) for proof): 
dC Xk k (Ck, 
- C) d dC doz +- 
(ck* 
- C) dok +A+ 
Lk-lk 
dCk + dýý-CL da /-I PA 
(4.12) 
This equation shows that change in the various components will produce different changes 
in the estimated inequality. For instance, since the probability of having at least one adult 
in the household with chronic diseases, being our y variable, is increasing in household ill- 
health, the average value is positive and C takes a negative value (that is, chronic disease 
is higher amongst the poor). In this case the first term in equation (4.12) ! 12 > 0, so that da 
a reduction in the prevalence of chronic diseases in the population results in C becoming 
more negative (worsening inequality). This indicate that a given reduction in the prevalence 
of chronic diseases represents a bigger proportional reduction for the better-off. 
Compared to (4.11), (4.12) allows us to further decompose the changes in inequal- 
ities over time. For instance, as explained above it is possible to consider the effect on 
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inequalities in chronic diseases of changes in the prevalence of chronic diseases. More- 
over, it is possible to determine whether changes in inequalities that result from changes in 
the elasticity of a particular explanatory variable are due either to: a) changes in the effect 
of that variable (Ok or the second tenn in (4.12)) or b) to changes in the average level of 
the variable M or the third term in (4.12)). As with the Oaxaca decomposition, the total 
differential approach (4.12) also allows the evaluation of the impact of changes in the con- 
centration index of explanatory variables and the residuals (fourth and fifth tenns in (4.12), 
respectively). 
4.4 Model, data and variable definitions 
Our data consist of the latest five panels of the Russian Living Standards Measurement Sur- 
veys (LSMS) from 2000 to 2004, and the Brazilian National Household Survey (PNAD) 
for 1998 and 2003. Earlier panels of the Russian LSMS are somewhat inconsistent in the 
definition of some of the variables of interest. The focus is on inequalities in the proba- 
bility of at least one individual reporting chronic disease (heart disease, hypertension and 
diabetes). 
We have chosen to model this variable using a probit model as function of a vector of 
household variables (Xi), standardising variables (X2) and fixed effects at the level of the 
community 3- 
The household variables (Xi vector) include controls for educational level of adults 
(average years of schooling among adults and proportion of adults with secondary and 
higher education), occupational status (employed, unemployed, economically inactive), 
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civil status of head of household", insurance status of household, number of ovenveighs, 
number of smokers and indicators of alcohol consumption among adults (risk factors asso- 
ciated with chronic diseases), and, in Brazil, the proportion of adults self-declared white. 
We also control for general health status, including the proportion of adults reporting non 
chronic (acute) illness in the period prior the interview, the proportion of adults with bad or 
very bad self-assessed health, and, in Brazil, the proportion of adults with at least one in- 
patient stay in the last 12 months and the proportion of adults with difficulty to perform at 
least one activity of daily life. 
Our standardising variables (vector X2) include essentially the age and gender com- 
position of the household, which reflect the dependency ratio and ratio of male to female 
in household. Variables used include the proportion of men between 18 and 65 years, the 
proportion of women between 18 and 65 years, the proportion of men above 65 years, the 
proportion of women above 65 years and the average age of adults in the household. As 
explained above, the estimates of this non-linear regression are used to predict the stan- 
dardised indicator of chronic diseases prevalence. 
Finally, the community-level variables (vector X3) included are dummies for urban- 
rural location and regional dummies. Regional dummies are an important control because 
the regions have markedly different levels of economic development. In both countries 
the reference category (excluded) is the richest region of the country, namely Moscow for 
Russia and the South-East region (where Sao Paulo and Rio de Janeiro are located) for 
14 The civil status of the household head is included to control for the fact that single-parent families can be 
expected to have a more fragile economic situation in many cases. 
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Brazil. Table 4.1 presents a detailed description of variables, including the codification of 
the regional dummies. 
Table 4.1. Descriptive statistics 
ses Log of household consumption (Russia) M -3.9 6 6.01 6.09 6.10 5.61 5.62 
or income (Brazil) per equivalent adult 
chronic Dumm %= I ifat least one adult reported suffering from onic disease (heart disease, hypertension or diabetes) 
0.58 0.65 0.67 0.65 0.65 0.38 0.40 
nonchronic % adults reporting non chronic illness 0.43 0.44 0.43 0.43 0.42 0.07 0.08 in the 30 days (Russia) or 2 weeks (Brazil) prior to the interview 
ýad % adults with bad or very bad self assessed health 0.20 0.19 0.18 0.19 0.18 0.05 0.05 
inpatient % adults with at least one inpatient stay in the last 12 months 0.08 0.08 
adl % adults with difficulty to perform at least one activity ofdaily life 0.16 0.16 
overweight % overweight or obese adults 0.48 0.48 0.50 0.50 0.50 
smoke % smoker adults 0.28 0.30 0.30 0.30 0.30 
alcohol Average daily intake ofalcohol among adults (in grams) 13.78 13.78 14.55 13.58 12.16 kids % children (below 18 years) 0.18 0.17 0.17 0.17 0.17 0.24 0.22 
men % men between 18 and 65 years 0.23 0.24 0.24 0.25 0.25 0.32 0 33 
women % women between 18 and 65 years 0.27 0.27 0.27 0.28 0.28 0.34 . 0.35 
oldmen % men above 65 years 0.09 0.09 0.09 0.08 0.07 0.04 0.04 
oldwomen % women above 65 years 0.23 0.23 0.23 0.23 0.23 0.05 0.06 
age Average age of adults in the household 47.22 47.25 47.25 46.95 46.94 40.14 40.63 
secondary % adults with secondary or higher education 0.63 0.65 0.66 0.67 0.68 0.33 0.41 
education Average years of schooling among adults 8.77 8.89 8.95 9.00 9.04 5.99 6.63 insured % adults covered by private health insurance 0.72 0.77 0.78 0.78 0.79 0.20 0.20 inactive % economically inactive adults 0.49 0.49 0.48 0.48 0.47 0.24 0.23 
unemployed % unemployed adults 0.04 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.08 0.09 
white % self-declared white adults 1.27 1.17 headmale Gender ofhead ofhouschold 0.73 0.73 0.72 0.72 0.73 0.76 0.73 headsingle Civil status of head of household 0.24 0.25 0.26 0.25 0.25 0.29 0.32 
urbim Dummy= I for urban household 0.72 0.74 0.74 0.74 0.75 0.83 0.87 
reg! onl Dummy =I for Siberia (Russia) or Noah region (Brazil) 0.20 0.18 0.17 0.19 0.19 0.07 0.10 
reg! on2 Dummy =I for Central (Russia) or North-East region (Brazil) 0.21 0.19 0.19 0.19 0.19 0.29 0.30 
reg! on3 Dummy =I for Volga (Russia) or South region (Brazil) 0.20 0.18 0.18 0.18 0.18 0.18 0.17 
reg! on4 Dummy =I for Caucasus (Russia) or Centre-West region (Brazil) 0.13 0.12 0.12 0.12 0.12 0.08 0.09 
region5 Dummy =I for Ural (Russia) or Brasilia DF (Brazil) 0.15 0.14 0.14 0.14 0.14 0.03 0.03 
region6 Dummy =I for Moscow (Russia) 0.05 0.13 0.14 0.12 0.12 0.35 0.31 
or South-East region (Brazil) - Reference region 
Two variables are used as the key ranking indicator of socioeconomic status: house- 
hold consumption in Russia and household income in Brazil. Of these two, household 
consumption has been argued to represent a better measure of living standards (Wagstaff 
and van Doorslaer 2004). Income ranking is problematic particularly for our data as a sub- 
stantial part of income are not obtained in the formal sector and are difficult to clearly 
record. Income was self-reported in the LSMS surveys. According to O'Donnell et al. 
(2007) "income is an inferior measure, not only because of measurement challenges, but 
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also because for most households the fluctuation in income over time does not imply com- 
mensurate changes in living standards. In other words, if a household suffers a temporary 
negative income shock due to illness, but is able to maintain consumption through savings 
or insurance, it may be misleading to rank the household based on income or to express 
out-of-pocket payments as a share of income" (O'Donnell et al. 2007, p. 80). 
This suggests that consumption is a more reliable indicator of socio-economic status 
and therefore should be a preferred choice over income. However, for the Brazilian survey 
we needed to use income as SES ranking variable since there was no information on expen- 
ditures. In both countries, the effect of inflation has been taken into account and monetary 
variables have been converted into international dollars of 2000. 
The statistics presented in Table 4.1 provide some interesting insights into the recent 
evolution of the prevalence of chronic diseases and its deten-ninants in Russia and Brazil. 
In both countries, it is possible to discern a tendency of increasing rates of chronic disease 
prevalence. 
The average probability of having at least one individual reporting chronic in the 
household is considerably higher in Russia than in Brazil, as is the average proportion of 
individuals with bad or very bad self assessed health. A number of factors might contribute 
to explain this, including differences in health literacy, health seeking behaviours and ac- 
cess to diagnosis information. However, this was not further explored because the paper 
focuses mainly on inequalities in chronic diseases and not on explaining the differences in 
prevalence across the two countries. 
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Related to this point is the fact that on average the Russian sample is older. In Brazil 
children below 18 years form the third more populous group and the average age among 
adults is 40 years, whilst in Russia this position is occupied by the group of old women and 
the average age among adults is 47 years. 
The Russian data provides a richer description of the evolution of risk factors associ- 
ated with chronic diseases. Looking at the daily intake of alcohol among adults, we notice 
a tendency for decrease, in particular from 2002 onwards. The proportion of overweight 
and smokers initially increased, and then remained relatively stable, around 50% and 30% 
respectively. 
Educational levels in Russia are markedly higher than in Brazil, with higher average 
years of schooling among adults, and higher proportion of adults with secondary and higher 
education. Although the proportion of inactive individuals in Russia has been falling, it 
remains significantly higher than in Brazil. Finally, the Brazilian sample is clearly more 
urban than the Russian. Also, notice that although the Brazilian capital (Brasilia) is located 
in the Centre-West region, we enter it as a separate dummy because its socio-demographic 
profile is markedly distinct from the rest of the region. 
4.5 Results 
We proceed our analysis by first computing the static household inequality for chronic 
diseases and its determinants for each of the years in the panels. We use the convenient 
regression method, which allows us to estimate the standard error for the concentration in- 
dices (equation (4.2)). Second, we decompose the estimates of the concentration index for 
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chronic diseases into the contributions of the determinants (equation (4.5)) and compare 
these yearly estimates with the corresponding estimate of "prevalence of chronic diseases". 
We also compute the degree of health inequity, which compares the overall inequality in 
chronic with the inequality in standardised prevalence, according to equation ((4.6)). Fi- 
nally, we compute the changes in inequality over the time for each country, decomposing 
it into the contribution of changes in the elasticities and changes in inequality of the deter- 
minants (equation (4.12)). 
4.5.1 Regression analysis 
As usual with health inequality studies (e. g. Wagstaff et al. 2003, van Doorslaer and Koolman 
2004, van Doorslaer et al. 2004), the regression results presented here do not provide a be- 
havioural description of the decision process deten-nining the prevalence of chronic dis- 
eases. Since each equation uses only one year of data, we cannot rule out the possibility 
of unobserved heterogeneity and reverse causation between chronic diseases and the ex- 
planatory variables. This precludes any causal interpretation of the estimated parameters, 
which should be interpreted as simply reduced form equations for the deten-nination of the 
probability of at least one individual with chronic diseases in the household. 
This approach is valid since our main interest is to calculate a measure of the static 
inequality in each year. For our purposes, the most important result is the evidence of 
a clear negative relationship between the level of household income and the probability 
of chronic disease. The coefficient for socio-economic status is negative and statistically 
significant in all regressions, except for Brazil in 2003. Together with Figure 4.1, this 
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finding suggests households of lower SES tend to have a higher probability of chronic 
diseases. The regression result, however, is more robust in the sense that it controls for the 
potentially confounding effect of other covariates. 
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Fig. 4.1. Average probability of chronic diseases over SES quintiles 
All the other variables have the expected effect. In particular, the morbidity indi- 
cators, such as the proportion of individuals reporting non-chronic illness, inpatient stays, 
ADL limitations and with bad or very bad health, all increase the probability of chronic 
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diseases. At least in Russia, where information was available, the effect of chronic disease 
risk factors is also apparent. The proportion of ovenveight individuals and the average in- 
take of alcohol both tend to increase the probability of chronic diseases. The proportion of 
smokers, however, does not come out significant. This is possibly related to the fact that 
smoking has a cumulative hanuful effect, which will only impact on individual health over 
longer periods of time than considered here. In order to obtain a more complete descrip- 
tion of the effect of smoking on the probability of chronic diseases it would be necessary 
either to control households over a longer period of time or at least to take into account the 
length of time individuals have smoked (infon-nation not available). 
Table 4.2. Probit regressions 
Russia Brazil 
ses 
ses2 
nonchronic bad 
inpatient 
a 
overweight 
smoke 
alcohol 
men 
women 
oldmen 
oldwomen 
age 
age2 
secondary 
education 
education2 insured 
inactive 
unemployed 
white headmale 
headsingle 
urban 
regionl 
region2 
region3 
region4 
region5 
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)62*** . 054*** . 043*** . 056*** 
. 81*** . 73*** . 83*** . 75*** 
. 46*** . 6*** . 57*** . 61*** 
. Ul -. V 1-7 
)51*** 0 
. 46*** . 47*** . 51*** . 57*** . 55*** 
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-. 24* -0.13 -0.03 0.07 0.05 0.11 . 27*** . 14* . 3*** . 25*** 0 -. 013** -0.01 -. 017*** -. 015*** 0.01 . 25** . 22* . 23* -0.05 0.05 -0.02 -0.03 -0.11 0.04 0.28 0.23 0.07 -0.2 -0.12 
0.03 
-0.13 0.01 
-. 18** 
-. 22** 
-0.12 1 '7*** 
-0.05 
-. 27** 0.02 
-0.04 0.07 
-0.02 
-0.13 0 
1 '7*** 
- 27** 
-. 
fl*** 
-0.01 0.01 
-0.05 
-. 15** 
-. 17** 0 
-1.5*** 21.00% 
-. 3** 
-. 38*** 
-0.02 
. 
2*** 
. 21*** 0.09 
0.02 
0.12 
-. 25* 
-. 36*** 
-0.01 0.11 
. 
23*** 
0.03 
0.07 
. 
15* 
PseuTo R 22.00% 20.00% 
N 3,754 4,126 
Prob. of at least one adult suffering from chronic disease in the Legend: * p<. I; ** p<. 05; *** p<. Ol 
-1.1 ý1*0 
23.00% 23.00' , 4,382 4,34 
disease, hypertension or diabetes); 
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57*** 
. 53*** 
. 95*** 
. 
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-. 0011*** 
. 
38*** 
. 
026*** 
-. 0063*** 
. 089*** 
. 49*** 
. 42*** 
. 
067*** 
-. 27*** 
-. 34*** 
. 
093*** 
0.03 
-0.01 
-. 026* 
-0.02 
. 
12*** 
. 37*** 
. 51 *** 
. 56*** 
. 96*** 
. 86*** 
. 13*** 
-. 0011 
. 41*** 
. 027*** 
-. 0062*** 
. 11*** 
. 47*** 
. 37*** 
. 077*** -. 26*** 
-. 34*** 
. 067*** -. I *** 
-. 032*** 
-. 064*** 0 
0.01 
-4*** 18.00% 
103.746 
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4.5.2 Indices for total inequality 
Let us now focus on the concentration indices for chronic diseases and the other explana- 
tory variables. Theses indices were computed using the convenient regression method 
according to equation (4.2). In each case, the relevant variable is transformed using its 
own sample mean and the variance of the SES fractional rank; the resulting variable is then 
regressed against the SES fractional rank, which allows us to recover the estimate of the 
concentration index and its standard error. Table 4.3 and Figures 4.2 and 4.3 report the 
results. 
Table 4.3. Concentration indices of dependent and independent variables 
2004 
ses 0.0784 0.0768 0.0765 0.0752 0.0743 0.1023 0.0993 
ses2 0.1334 0.1314 0.129 0.128 0.1269 0.2015 0.1945 
nonchronic -0.0381 -0.0262 -0.0424 -0.0358 -0.0312 -0.0841 -0.0609 bad -0.1414 -0.1723 -0.1789 -0.2079 -0.1798 -0.238 -0.1944 inyatient -0.0585 -0.0178 
a -0.0986 -0.0504 overweight 0.0204 0.0102 0.006 -0.0017 -0.0002 
smoke 0.0265 0.0197 0.0295 0.0369 0.0404 
alcohol 0.0375 0.0562 0.0159 0.0316 -0.0076 men 0.0361 0.046 0.0472 0.0506 0.0574 0.0485 0.0418 
women 0.0727 0.074 0.0805 0.0879 0.0886 0.0409 0.0323 
oldmen -0.1103 -0.1296 -0.1406 -0.152 -0.201 0.0291 0.1329 oldwomen -0.1475 -0.1643 -0.1655 -0.173 -0.1679 0.0589 0.1694 
age -0.034 -0.0389 -0.0425 -0.0427 -0.045 0.0124 0.0295 
age2 -0.0672 -0.0769 -0.0841 -0.084 -0.0879 0.0222 0.0591 
secondary 0.0743 0.0694 0.0755 0.0731 0.0659 0.3759 0.2788 
education 0.0292 0.0275 0.03 0.0286 0.026 0.2416 0.1975 
education2 0.0471 0.0452 0.0492 0.0474 0.0434 0.3914 0.331 insured -0.0123 -0.0155 -0.0147 -0.0142 -0.0164 0.5068 0.5185 inactive -0.104 -0.1023 -0.1256 -0.1285 -0.1382 -0.054 -0.0675 
unemPloyed -0.0429 -0.1211 -0.1272 -0.089 -0.1229 -0.2128 -0.2769 
white 0.154 0.1644 headmale 0.0117 0.0151 0.0122 0.012 0.0121 0.0001 -0.0027 headsingle 0.0191 0.0011 0.0124 0.0123 0.0049 0.03 0.0571 
urban 0.0483 0.055 0.0647 0.0674 0.0686 0.0815 0.0543 
regionI 0.053 0.0413 0.0315 0.0153 0.0307 -0.095 -0.1024 
region2 -0.0082 -0.0403 -0.0191 -0.0161 -0.0044 -0.2681 -0.2691 
region3 -0.1162 -0.1013 -0.1368 -0.1311 -0.1198 0.159 0.2103 
region4 0.0525 -0.0101 -0.0537 -0.0434 -0.1234 -0.017 0.0231 
reQion5 -0.0831 -0.0986 -0.095 -0.1262 -0.0788 0.3137 0.2731 
ote: matisticany signiticant indices in bold typelace (at P<U. U. ) 
C 
0 
-0 
-0 
-0. 
-0. 
-0 
4.5 Results 113 
Fig. 4.2. Concentration indices for selected variables - Russia 2000-2004 
W Russia 2000 r3 Russia 200 1 [3 Russia 2002 r3 Russia 2003 
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Fig. 4.3. Concentration indices for selected variables - Brazil 1998-2003 
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In all years, except in Brazil 2003, the concentration index for the probability of 
chronic diseases is negative and statistically significant, varying between -0.0214 (Russia 
2000) and -0.0450 (Russia 2003). In Brazil 1998 it is about -0.0276. This general pattern of 
negative concentration indices suggests the probability of chronic diseases is significantly 
concentrated among households of lower SES. Importantly, there is also a tendency for 
increased concentration in Russia over the period analysed. 
Before we proceed to the decomposition analysis, it is important to consider the gen- 
eral trends on the concentration indices of the main determinants of chronic diseases. In 
both countries, there is indisputable evidence of pro-rich concentration in the distribution 
of the SES indicator. Associated to that, human capital indicators, such as educational lev- 
els and the proportion of unemployed/inactive individuals, also exhibit significant pro-rich 
concentration. 
There is also evidence of important regional dynamics. Recall the omitted categories 
in the regional dummies are Moscow in Russia and Southeast in Brazil, which are rela- 
tively well-off regions. Compared to them, most of the other regions tend to have higher 
concentration of poorer households. Similarly, urban areas are characterised by higher con- 
centration of richer households. 
All the morbidity indicators report negative and significant concentration indices, in- 
dicating concentration among households of lower SES. In the case of the proportion of 
individuals with bad or very bad self-reported health, the concentration indices are esti- 
mated at a considerably high level, around -0.20. With respect to risk factors, only the 
proportion of smokers has significant and positive concentration index. 
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The concentration index for health insurance is positive and considerably high in 
Brazil, but, somewhat surprisingly, negative in Russia. A possible explanation for this 
difference might be that the health insurance variable includes both mandatory and com- 
plementary coverage in Russia, but only complementary in Brazil. 
Finally, there is an interesting difference about the effect of the standardising vari- 
ables. In Brazil, household SES shows a tendency to increase with age. This fact suggests 
a probable indirect effect of income on the probability of chronic diseases through the 
positive association between income and average household age . In Russia, on the con- 
trary, household SES presents a markedly negative association with the average age in the 
household. Thus, income is likely to exert an indirect negative effect on the probability of 
chronic diseases since richer households are disproportionately made up by younger indi- 
viduals. Nevertheless, as noted above, the direct effect of SES on the probability of chronic 
diseases is negative in both countries. 
4.5.3 Decomposition analysis 
In this section, we discuss the results of the decomposition of the concentration index of 
chronic diseases, highlighting the most important factors to explain it. Due to the non-linear 
nature of the model explaining the probability of chronic diseases, the decomposition pre- 
sented in Table 4.4 is a linear approximation based on a marginal effects representation 
(Equation (4.10)). That is, contrary to Wagstaff et al. (2003) and van Doorslaer and Kool- 
man (2004), which decompose inequality using the elasticities recovered from linear re- 
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gressions, our analysis in based on marginal effects derived from the Probit model. Table 
4.4 and Figure 4.4 present the results of the decomposition. 
Table 4.4. Decomposition of inequality in the probability of chronic diseases 
0.0211 
-0.0021 
-0.0057 
-0.0012 
-0.0098 
-0.0171 
-0.0013 
-0.0036 
-0.0003 
-0.0044 overweight 0.0024 0.0012 0.0007 -0.0002 0.0001 
smoke -0.0002 -0.0001 0 -0.0003 -0.0006 alcohol 0.0001 0.0005 0 0 0 
men 0.0009 -0.0005 0.0017 0.0016 0.0025 0.0073 0.0056 women 0.005 0.0016 0.0028 0.0014 0.0047 0.0061 0.005 
oldmcn -0.0029 0.0007 -0.0032 -0.0006 -0.0019 0.0008 0.0039 oldwomen -0.016 -0.0071 -0.0111 -0.0073 -0.0124 0.0022 0.0066 age -0.0537 -0.045 -0.0506 -0.0379 -0.0584 0.0494 0.1194 
agc2 0.0378 0.0283 0.0398 0.0171 0.0401 -0.0355 -0.094 
secondary -0.0054 -0.0027 -0.0003 0.0011 0.0011 0.0379 0.0363 
education 0.0147 0.0296 0.0168 0.0328 0.0247 0.0312 0.0283 
education2 -0.0016 -0.0211 -0.0108 -0.0269 -0.0233 -0.1028 -0.0969 insured 0.0001 -0.0014 -0.0011 -0.0008 0 0.0074 0.0093 inactive -0.0013 0.0001 0.001 0.003 -0.001 -0.0051 -0.0057 unemployed -0.0002 -0.0004 -0.0001 0.0002 0.0001 -0.0058 -0.007 
white 0.0107 0.0116 headmale -0.0005 -0.0003 -0.001 -0.0011 -0.001 0 0.0004 headsingle -0.001 0 -0.0006 -0.0005 -0.0002 -0.0023 -0.0047 
urban 0.0005 0.0004 -0.0001 -0.0005 -0.0001 0.0051 0.0025 regionI -0.0007 -0.0001 0 0.0002 0.0002 -0.0002 0.0008 
region2 0 -0.0002 0.0001 -0.0003 -0.0001 0.0006 0.0021 
region3 0.0023 0.0002 0.0016 -0.0008 -0.0003 -0.0006 -0.0018 
region4 -0.0008 0.0001 0.0004 0 -0.0004 0 0 
re6on5 0.0008 -0.0001 0.0001 -0.0008 -0.0007 0.0008 0 
ote: Decomposition based on linear approximation using marginal ellects trom probit regression. 
Significant contributions in bold tYPeface (at P<0.05) 
The first thing to notice in Table 4.4 is that the marginal effects representation is at 
best an approximation, which intrinsically generates a residual. Therefore, the concentra- 
tion index calculated using the convenient regression (C(actual), in the first line of Table 
4.4) is necessarily different from the sum of the individual components of the decomposi- 
tion (C(predicted)). The difference between the two is captured by the generalised concen- 
C (predicted) -0.0246 -0.0246 -0.0271 -0.0439 -0.0338 -0.0249 0.0052 GC (resid) 0.0032 -0.004 -0.002 -0.0023 -0.0011 -0.0027 -0.0024 
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tration index of the residual (GC(resid)), which comprises both an estimation error and an 
approximation error (cf van Doorslaer et al. 2004). In studies based on the linear decom- 
position, such as van Doorslaer and Koolman (2004) and Wagstaff et al. (2003), the actual 
and predicted concentration indices are exactly equal. 
In almost all cases, the SES indicator contributes to a substantial increase in the pro- 
poor inequality in the probability of chronic diseases. However, in order to estimate the 
total effect of SES we also need to take into account the variable SES2, which measures 
the square of SES. The estimated coefficients from the Probit regressions are negative for 
SES and positive for SES2, suggesting the probability of chronic diseases decreases with 
SES at decreasing rate. Looking at the joint effect of both SES and SES2, we obtain a much 
more modest net effect of SES on the inequality in the probability of chronic diseases. As 
can be seen in Figure 4.5, this influence is negative in Brazil and in Russia in 2003, but 
positive for the other years in Russia. 
Now consider the effects of the standardisation procedure. As remarked above, Brazil 
and Russia display a fundamental distinction with respect to the relationship between SES 
and the demographic composition of the households. In Brazil, household SES tends to 
increase with the average age among adults, whilst in Russia it tends to decrease. Conse- 
quently, when we look at the effect of standardising variables on the inequalities on chronic 
diseases, we find a significant positive contribution in Brazil, but a negative contribution in 
Russia. 
The interpretation is that in Russia the richer households are also, in average, made up 
by younger individuals, which are less likely to be affected chronic disease relative to older 
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Fig. 4.5. Inequity indices for the probability of at least one adult with chronic illness (with 
95% confidence intervals) 
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individuals. Therefore, relatively older households are associated with worsened inequality 
in the probability of chronic diseases. In Brazil, on the contrary, there is an offsetting effect 
resulting from the less clear-cut association between SES and demographic profile. 
The fourth line in Table 4.4 reports the estimate of the inequity in the probability of 
chronic diseases (HIII, v) calculated according to the method proposed by Wagstaff and 
van Doorslaer (2000). This index measures the degree of socio-economic inequality in the 
probability of chronic diseases that would be observed if the standardising variables were 
unifonnly distributed across the population. In other words, it gives the health inequity 
purged of age and gender influences, and potentially avoidable through policy interven- 
tion. Figure 4.5 gives a graphical representation of H. [, I, v, together with its standard error. 
Clearly, there is a significant degree of health inequity in all the years analysed in both 
countries, with households from lower SES having a disproportionate higher tendency to 
be affected by chronic illness. What is more, at least in Russia, health inequity displays a 
tendency to be worsening over time in the period considered. 
Co-morbidities also exert a significant effect on inequalities in chronic diseases. In 
all cases, the decomposition analysis indicates negative and highly significant coefficients, 
which imply the current distribution of the burden of co-morbidities contributes to wors- 
ened pro-poor inequality in the probability of chronic diseases. Apart from the group of 
standardising variables, co-morbidities answer for the biggest share in explaining inequal- 
ities in the probabilities of chronic diseases. This infon-nation is very relevant for policy 
makers, since it gives indication of where efforts should be primarily concentrated in order 
to reduce inequalities in chronic diseases. 
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Risk factors have very limited influence in explaining inequalities in chronic dis- 
eases, and in most cases, their contribution is not statistically significant. Of the other non- 
standardising, policy relevant variables the most important are education (which reduces 
pro-poor inequality) and regional dummies. In Russia, in particular, there is evidence that 
the Central region, compared to Moscow, presents higher concentration of chronic diseases 
among households of lower SES, whilst the opposite is true for the Caucasus. In addi- 
tion, in both countries the fact that the head of the household is single contributes to higher 
concentration of chronic diseases among poorer households. 
4.5.4 Decomposition of changes in inequality 
One of the most interesting applications of the method proposed by Wagstaff et al. (2003) 
is the ability to assess the relative importance of the different factors in explaining the 
evolution of inequality in the probability of chronic diseases over the time. Following 
Wagstaff et al. (2003), in this section we present the results of the analysis using both 
the Oaxaca decomposition (equation (4.11)) and the total differential approach (equation 
(4.12)) 
Our aim is to unravel the main drivers of the changes in the concentration index of 
chronic diseases over the time in each country. Recall from Table 4.4 the concentration 
index in Russia starts around -0.021 in 2000, peaks at -0.046 in 2003 and in 2004 it is equal 
to -0.035, clearly describing a rising trend. In Brazil the concentration changes from -0.028 
in 1998 to 0.003 in 2003. 
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Let us consider first the results from the Oaxaca decomposition. This method of 
decomposition consists on essentially separating the effect of each determinant into two 
components: changes in the elasticity of chronic disease with respect to the regressor, and 
changes in the sample means of the regressor itself. Table 4.5 presents the results. 
Table 4.5. Oaxaca decomposition of changes in CI of probability of chronic diseases 
Russia 
ses U. UUZ() U. Uj/-D U. U iD I U. UUU / U. UjzzS U. U-i-it) U. UU/(j -U. U469 -U. U4Oj ses2 -0-0018 -0.0383 -0.0401 -0.0023 -0.0345 -0.0368 -0.0011 0.0383 0.0372 
nonchronic 0.0019 0.0014 0.0033 -0.0025 -0.0001 -0.0026 0.0011 0.0004 0.0015 W. -0-0016 -0.0003 -0.0019 -0-0002 0.0014 0.0012 -0.0014 -0.0013 -0.0027 
in atient 
al 
overweight -0.001 -0.0002 -0.0012 -0.0005 0 -0.0005 -0.001 0.0001 -0.0009 
smoke 0 0.0001 0.0001 0 0.0001 0.0001 -0-0001 -0.0003 -0.0004 alcohol 0.0002 0.0003 0.0004 0 -0.0005 -0.0005 000 men -0.0001 -0.0013 -0.0014 0 0.0022 0.0022 0.0001 -0.0003 -0.0001 women 0 -0.0034 -0.0034 0.0002 0.0009 0.0012 0.0001 -0.0015 -0.0014 oldmen 0.0001 0.0035 0.0036 -0.0003 -0.0036 -0.0039 0 0.0027 0.0027 oldwomen -0.0007 0.0097 0.009 0 -0.004 -0.004 -0.0003 0.0041 0.0038 age -0.0056 0.0143 0.0087 -0.0042 -0.0014 -0.0056 -0.0005 0.0132 0.0127 
agc2 0.0035 -0.013 -0.0094 0.0034 0.0081 0.0115 0.0001 -0.0228 -0.0227 
secondary 0.0002 0.0026 0.0027 0 0.0024 0.0023 0 0.0015 0.0015 
education -0.0015 0.0163 0.0148 0.0013 -0.0141 -0.0128 -0.0015 0.0176 0.016 education2 0.0007 -0.0201 -0.0194 -0.0008 0.0111 0.0103 0.001 -0.0171 -0.0161 insured -0.0003 -0.0011 -0.0014 0.0001 0.0001 0.0002 0 0.0002 0.0003 inactive 0 0.0014 0.0014 0.0002 0.0007 0.0009 0.0001 0.0019 0.002 
unemployed -0.0003 0.0001 -0.0002 0 0.0003 0.0003 -0.0001 0.0005 0.0004 
white headmale -0.0001 0.0003 0.0002 0.0002 -0.0009 -0.0007 0 -0.0001 -0.0001 headsingle 0.0006 0.0004 0.001 -0.0006 0 -0.0006 0 0.0002 0.0001 
urban 0 -0.0001 -0.0001 0 -0.0005 -0.0005 0 -0.0003 -0.0003 regionl 0 0.0005 0.0005 0 0.0001 0.0001 -0.0003 0.0005 0.0002 
region2 -0.0002 0 -0.0002 -0.0001 0.0004 0.0003 0 -0.0003 -0.0003 
region3 0 -0.0021 -0.0021 0.0004 0.001 0.0014 0 -0.0024 -0.0024 
regjon4 0.0005 0.0004 0.0009 0.0004 0 0.0004 0 -0.0005 -0.0005 
region5 0 -0.0008 -0.0008 0 0.0002 0.0002 -0.0002 -0.0007 -0.0009 
resid 0.0317 0.4507 -1.562 
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tin 
AC. U 
- 
Aý-C Total AC. U AU-C Total 
ses U .MI :ý U. U22-9 U. U24.3 -U. UUU3 U. U449 U. U440 ses2 -0.0011 -0.0117 -0.0128 0.0006 -0.0388 -0.0382 nonchronic 0.0007 -0.0003 0.0004 0.0005 0.0002 0.0007 bad 0.0009 0.0035 0.0044 0.0008 0.0014 0.0022 
in atient 0.0008 0 0.0008 y 
1 at 1 0.0043 0.0011 0.0053 
overweight 0.0003 0 0.0003 
smoke 0 -0.0002 -0.0002 alcohol 0 0 0 
men 0.0004 0.0005 0.0009 -0.0009 -0.0008 -0.0017 
women 0 0.0033 0.0033 -0-0013 0.0002 -0.0011 oldmen -0.0004 -0.0009 -0.0013 0.0031 0 0.0031 oldwomen 0.0004 -0.0054 -0.0051 0.0043 0.0001 0.0045 age -0.0022 -0.0183 -0.0205 0.0692 0.0008 0.0701 
age2 0.0014 0.0216 0.023 -0.0587 0.0001 -0.0585 
secondary -0.0001 0.0001 0 -0.0126 0.011 -0.0016 
education -0.0025 -0.0056 -0.0081 -0.0063 0.0034 -0.0029 education2 0.0021 0.0015 0.0036 0.0177 -0.0117 0.006 insured 0 0.0009 0.0009 0.0002 0.0017 0.0019 
inactive -0.0001 -0.0039 -0.004 -0.0011 0.0005 -0.0006 unemployed 0 -0.0001 -0.0001 -0.0016 0.0005 -0.0011 
white 0.0007 0.0002 0.0009 headmale -0.0001 0.0001 0 0.0004 0 0.0004 headsingle 0.0003 0 0.0003 -0.0022 -0.0001 -0.0023 
urban 0 0.0003 0.0003 -0.0012 -0.0014 -0.0026 
regionl 0.0001 -0.0001 0 0.0001 0.0009 0.001 
region2 0.0002 0 0.0002 0 0.0014 0.0014 
region3 0 0.0005 0.0005 -0.0004 -0.0008 -0.0012 
region4 -0.0003 -0.0001 -0.0004 0 0 0 
region5 0.0004 -0.0003 0.0001 0 -0.0008 -0.0008 
resid -53.965 -1.9052 
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Considering the net contribution of SES (that is, taking into account both SES and 
SES2), we see it is has been an important contributor to worsened inequality in chronic 
diseases in Russia. In addition, education had a discernible impact to increase inequality in 
chronic diseases 
In Brazil, SES and the standardising variables were the two most important factors 
to explain the decrease in pro-poor inequality. Nevertheless, the effect of the standardising 
variables was considerably more important, accounting for approximately half of the total 
change. This suggests that, if the impact of demographic composition had remained con- 
stant, the overall variation of inequality in the probability of chronic diseases would have 
been much less significant in Brazil. 
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Finally, we notice that in both countries the driving force behind these effects were 
changes in the elasticity of chronic diseases with respect to SES, since the concentration 
indices did not change substantially during the period. Although the concentration indices 
of both SES and education were approximately stable, the elasticities varied considerably. 
The total differential method allows us to uncover one additional layer of the process, 
by decomposing the effect of changes in elasticities into changes in partial effects and 
changes in the means of the regressor, as displayed in Table 4.6. With respect to SES and 
education, the main changes have clearly affected the partial effects, not the sample means, 
which have been stable. 
Table 4.6. Total differential decomposition of changes in CI of probability of chronic dis 
eases 
q's 
2001 
Means of x's Cl's 
ii, ussia 
Total q's 
2002 
Means of x's Cl's Total 
ses U. 0234 -O. UU5 O. OU26 0.021 O. U41 1 -0.0013 0.0007 0.0405 scs2 -0.0305 0.0076 -0.0018 -0.0247 -0.0389 0.0019 -0.0023 -0.0393 nonchronic 0 0 0.0019 0.0019 -0.0002 0 -0.0025 -0.0027 W -0.0015 0.0005 -0.0016 -0.0026 0.0008 0.0002 -0.0002 0.0007 innatient 
adi -' 
overweight 0 0 -0.001 -0.0009 0.0001 0.0001 -0.0005 -0.0003 
smoke 0.0002 0 0 0.0002 0.0003 0 0 0.0004 
alcohol 0.0006 0 0.0002 0.0008 -0.0004 0 0 -0.0004 men -0.0024 0 -0.0001 -0.0025 0.0036 0 0 0.0036 women -0.004 0 0 -0.004 0.0015 0 0.0002 0.0017 oldmen 0.0029 0 0.0001 0.003 -0.0031 0.0001 -0.0003 -0.0033 
oldwomen 0.0075 0 -0.0007 0.0068 -0.0034 -0.0001 0 -0.0035 age 0.0029 0 -0.0056 -0.0027 -0.0009 0 -0.0042 -0.0052 
age2 -0.0066 0 0.0035 -0.003 0.0064 0 0.0034 0.0098 
secondary 0.0028 -0.0001 0.0002 0.0029 0.0035 0 0 0.0034 
education 0.0336 0.0008 -0.0015 0.0329 -0.0284 0.0002 0.0013 -0.0269 cducation2 -0.0315 -0.0007 0.0007 -0.0315 0.0183 -0.0001 -0.0008 0.0173 insured 0.001 0.0001 -0.0003 0.0008 -0.0001 0 0.0001 0.0001 inactive 0.0009 0 0 0.0009 0.0007 0 0.0002 0.0009 
unemployed 0 0.0001 -0.0003 -0.0002 0.0003 0 0 0.0003 
white headmale 0.0008 0 -0.0001 0.0007 -0.0025 0 0.0002 -0.0023 headsingle 0.0004 0 0.0006 0.001 -0.0011 0 -0.0006 -0.0017 
urban -0.0002 0 0 -0.0001 -0.0009 0 0 -0.0009 regionl 0.0005 0 0 0.0005 0.0002 0 0 0.0002 
region2 -0.0001 0 -0.0002 -0.0002 -0.0001 0 -0.0001 -0.0002 
region3 -0.0011 0 0 -0.0011 0.0011 0 0.0004 0.0015 
region4 0.0001 0 0.0005 0.0006 0 0 0.0004 0.0004 
region5 -0.0006 0 0 -0.0006 0.0001 0 0 0.0001 
resid 0.0317 0.4507 
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Table 4.6 (continued 
g's 
2003 
Means of x's Ci's 
Kussia 
Total q's 
- 
2004 
Means of x's CI'S Total 
ses 
scs2 
-U. U713 0.0447 -0.0031 0.0043 
0.0026 
-0.0011 
-0.0717 0.0479 
0.0333 
-0.0154 
-U. UUU3 0.0007 
0.0015 
-0.0011 
0.0344 
-0.0158 
nonchronic -0.0002 0 0.0011 0.0009 0 0 0.0007 0.0008 bad -0.0008 -0.0002 -0.0014 -0.0024 0.0023 0.0001 0.0009 0.0033 
, 
Satient n 
a 
overweight 0.0005 0 -0.001 -0.0005 0 0.0001 0.0003 0.0003 
smoke -0.0009 0 -0.0001 -0.001 -0.0003 0 0 -0.0004 
alcohol 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
men -0.0008 0.0001 0.0001 -0.0005 0.0009 0.0001 0.0004 0.0014 
women -0.0028 0 0.0001 -0.0027 0.0046 0 0 0.0046 
oldmen 0.0019 0 0 0.0019 -0.001 0.0001 -0.0004 -0.0013 
oldwomen 0.0032 0.0001 -0.0003 0.003 -0.0041 -0.0001 0.0004 Annn -0.0039 A Anlfý 
age -U. UUI-) U -U. UUVI -U. UUIO -V. VVI+O V -V. VULIZ -U. UVU I 
age2 -0.0104 -0.0001 0.0001 -0.0104 0.0137 0 0.0014 0.0151 
secondary 0.0024 0 0 0.0024 0.0002 0 -0.0001 0.0001 
education 0.043 0.0005 -0.0015 0.0419 -0.0121 0.0003 -0.0025 -0.0143 
education2 -0.0321 -0.0005 0.001 -0.0317 0.0028 -0.0003 0.0021 0.0046 insured -0.0007 0 0 -0.0006 -0.0011 0 0 -0.0011 inactive 0.0012 0 0.0001 0.0013 -0.0031 0 -0.0001 -0.0032 
unemployed 0.0001 0 -0.0001 0 -0.0002 0 0 -0.0001 
white headmale -0.0003 0 0 -0.0002 0.0004 0 -0.0001 0.0003 headsingle 0.0011 0 0 0.0011 0 0 0.0003 0.0002 
urban -0.0006 0 0 -0.0006 0.0005 0 0 0.0005 
regionl 0.0009 0.0001 -0.0003 0.0008 -0.0004 0 0.0001 -0.0003 
region2 0.0007 0 0 0.0007 0 0 0.0002 0.0002 
region3 -0.0015 0 0 -0.0015 0.0003 0 0 0.0004 
region4 0 0 0 0 -0.0002 0 -0.0003 -0.0005 
region5 -0.0006 0 -0.0002 -0.0007 -0.0001 0 0.0004 0.0003 
resid -1.562 -53.965 
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Table 4.6 (continued 
g's 
tirazu 2003 
Means of x's CFS Total - ses U. U413 0 -0.0003 O. DTF 
ses2 -0.0363 0 0.0006 -0.0357 
nonchronic 0.0002 -0.0001 0.0005 0.0006 bad 0.0004 0.0005 0.0008 0.0017 
in atient 0 0 0.0008 0.0008 y 
at 1 0.0004 0 0.0043 0.0047 
overweight 
smoke 
alcohol 
men -0.0006 0.0002 -0.0009 -0.0014 women 0.0002 0.0001 -0.0013 -0.001 
oldmen 0 0.0003 0.0031 0.0034 
oldwomen 0.0002 0.0004 0.0043 0.005 
age 0.0041 0.0013 0.0692 0.0747 
age2 -0.0004 -0.0023 -0.0587 -0.0614 
secondary 0.0025 0.007 -0.0126 -0.0031 
education 0.001 0.0027 -0.0063 -0.0026 education2 0.001 -0.0136 0.0177 0.0051 insured 0.0018 0.0002 0.0002 0.0022 
inactive 0.0002 0.0002 -0.0011 -0.0007 
unemployed 0.0009 -0.0004 -0.0016 -0.0012 
white 0.0014 -0.001 0.0007 0.0012 headmale 0 0 0.0004 0.0003 
headsingle 0.0001 -0.0004 -0.0022 -0.0025 
urban -0.0009 0.0001 -0.0012 -0.002 
regionl 0.0011 0.0003 0.0001 0.0014 
regjon2 0.0014 0.0001 0 0.0015 
reg! on3 -0.0011 0.0001 -0.0004 -0.0014 
reg! on4 0 0 0 0 
region5 -0.0007 0 0 -0.0007 
resid -1.9052 
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In this paper, we use data from the LSMS (2000-2004) and the PNAD (1998 and 2003) to 
quantify and analyse the determinants of the inequalities in chronic diseases in households 
in Russia and Brazil. 
We focus our attention on three specific diseases: heart disease, hypertension and 
diabetes. Using the household as the unit of analysis, we estimate a Probit model for 
the probability of observing at least one adult suffering from one of these diseases. The 
results indicate SES measures play a significant role, and decrease, at decreasing rates, the 
probability of observing chronic illness in the household. That is, controlling for household 
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and community-level attributes, we show that chronic diseases are more likely to affect 
households from lower SES. 
This initial finding is corroborated by the computation of inequality indices following 
the method proposed by Kakwani et al. (1997). We show that inequality in chronic diseases 
has risen in Russia during the period, with the poor bearing a disproportionately high share 
of the chronic diseases burden. Our estimates indicate the concentration index for chronic 
diseases in Russia starts around -0.021 in 2000, peaks at -0.046 in 2003 and in 2004 it is 
equal to -0.035, clearly describing a rising trend. In Brazil the concentration changes from 
-0.028 in 1998 to 0.003 in 2003. 
The figures above, however, refer to the total SES inequality in chronic diseases, 
which includes the effect of standardising variables. However, the relevant measure of 
health equity should include only the fraction that can be modified through policy inter- 
vention. In order to estimate this policy amenable measure we neutralize the effect of 
standardising variables. We show that the inequity concentration index is negative in both 
countries, but considerably higher in Brazil. Additionally, in line with the overall concen- 
tration index, it has been rising in Russia. 
The decomposition analysis (Wagstaff et al. 2003) reveals the important elements to 
explain inequality in chronic diseases. Taking into account that we use a non-linear re- 
gression model, our decomposition analysis implements a linear approximation based on 
a marginal effects representation (van Doorslaer et al. 2004). We find SES, co-morbidities 
and education make a significant contribution to worsening inequalities in chronic diseases. 
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Standardising variables have opposite effects in each country, increasing pro-poor inequal- 
ities in Russia, while decreasing them in Brazil. 
Finally, we implement both the Oaxaca decomposition and the total differential de- 
composition, proposed by Wagstaff et al. (2003), in order to study the determinants of the 
evolution of inequality over the time. In line with van Doorslaer and Koolman (2004), the 
results in this case indicate that changes in inequality have been driven mainly by changes 
in the elasticities, rather than changes in the sample means of the determinants. 
This analysis confirms the existence of significant levels of SES inequality in chronic 
diseases in Russia and Brazil. In both countries, poorer households face considerably 
higher probability of being affected by chronic diseases. The paper also provides evidence 
that inequalities in education and co-morbidities contribute to worse this scenario. This ev- 
idence suggests that efforts to relieve the burden of chronic diseases from poor households 
should aim to maximise the impact of externalities from other related policy areas. In that 
sense, policy makers should consider income redistribution as one instrument to be used in 
combination with others. 
Chapter 5 
The Economic Impact of Chronic Diseases: 
Evidence from Brazil, India and Russia 
5.1 Introduction 
Evidence suggests that the burden of chronic diseases and their risk factors is increas- 
ing worldwide. Recent projections from the WHO indicate that in 2005,35 of the 58 
million expected deaths worldwide will have been from chronic noncommunicable dis- 
eases (see Strong, Mathers, Leeder and Beaglehole 2005, WHO 2005). A projected 388 
million people will die from chronic diseases in the next ten years and the majority of 
these deaths will occur in the most productive (economically active) age group if noth- 
ing is done (WHO 2005). An estimated 80% of predicted deaths will occur in the low- 
and middle-income countries. The economic impact of this pandemic of chronic diseases 
on countries, households and individuals is increasingly becoming a subject of consider- 
able interest. Based on the WHO projections, countries stand to lose billions of dollars 
in national income over the next 10 years due to the impact of deaths from chronic dis- 
cases on labour supplies and national savings and poorer countries are relatively worse 
off (WHO 2005). Indications are that chronic disease burden may expose individuals and 
household to poverty just as poverty exposes people to greater risks of chronic diseases. 
This is despite a common misconception that chronic diseases affect mostly the wealthy 
and affluent. Emerging data from various sources indicate that the poor could be more 
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vulnerable to chronic diseases (eg. Bartley, Sacker, Firth and Fitzpatrick 1999, Bartley, 
Fitzpatrick, Firth and Mannot 2000, Chaturvedi, Jarrett, Shipley and Fuller 1998, Stronks, 
van de Mheen and Mackenbach 1998, White 2000, World Bank 2005) a situation that could 
worsen existing socio-economic inequalities in access to care in many countries. 
The literature on the macroeconomic impact of disease discusses possible socio- 
economic channels through which chronic diseases may affect the individuals' house- 
hold or national economic well being. However, empirical evidence is scarce and the 
mechanisms by which chronic diseases impact on the economy are not entirely clear at 
present. For instance, there is very little information on household or individuals' cop- 
ing mechanisms in the face of expenditure from chronic diseases especially in low- and 
middle-income economies although the economies of such countries are typically volatile 
and health systems are frequently poorly developed in addition to inadequate social se- 
curity or formal insurance systems. Therefore, it would be expected that the ability of 
households to respond to catastrophic healthcare expenditure (idiosyncratic) shocks (see 
Cochrane 199 1, Kochar 1995, Morduch 1995) or to maintain non-health consumption lev- 
els over periods of economic challenge from chronic disease is likely to be limited given 
these conditions. Coping processes could be particularly consequential when household 
heads or breadwinners are affected. 
This paper partly addresses a gap in infonuation relating to how chronic diseases im- 
pact on the economy of and the coping mechanisms adopted by households. We focus our 
analysis on Brazil and India (being developing countries) and the Russian Federation where 
chronic diseases are projected to increase in prevalence (WHO 2005). These countries en- 
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joy relatively higher incomes than other but comparable countries and are experiencing 
epidemiological and economic transition, increased urbanization and/or changes in tradi- 
tional lifestyles (Greenberg, Raymond and Leeder 2005). We use micro data from the 
Living Standards Measurement Study (LSMS) previously conducted by the World Bank in 
these countries for our analysis. 
The results of the two-part model indicate that chronic diseases are significantly as- 
sociated with increased demand for health care and reduced labour earnings in the Russia 
federation, Brazil and India. Each additional case of chronic disease in the household gen- 
erate a conditional increase on health expenditures of 21%, 120% and 14% in Brazil, India, 
and Russia, respectively. 
Since the potential to work is affected by chronic diseases, labour income reduces by 
7.9% in Brazil and 4.3% in Russia. The analyses indicate that remittances to households 
increased by 3.1 % in Brazil and 8.7% in Russia, and this may have provided some insurance 
against the expected reduction in non-health consumption, and partly against the increased 
household health expenditure. In Brazil, the net effect on non-health consumption is an 
increase of 3.9%, suggesting that households are able to insure non-health consumption 
against chronic diseases, possibly from remittances. In Russia, however, where unobserved 
heterogeneity is accounted for, there is a net reduction of non-health consumption of 3.2%, 
suggesting that chronic diseases in fact reduce household overall welfare. 
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. The next section reviews the 
literature on the economic consequences of diseases and describes the possible association 
between economic development, risk factors and chronic diseases. A brief description of 
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the health systems in Brazil, India and Russia, is then provided, emphasizing the growing 
importance of chronic diseases. Section 5.3 explains the methodology and the econometric 
models employed for this investigation, and Section 5.4 describes the data. Section 5.5 
presents the results and Section 5.6 concludes. The Appendix 5. A provides an extension 
using Generalized Linear Models. 
5.2 Evidence of economic consequences of illness 
In recent times, there has been an increasing interest among health policy makers in the 
linkages between health and economic growth (see Howitt 2005, L6pez-Casasnovas, Rivera 
and Currais 2005, van Zon and Muysken 2005). However, many of the empirical macro- 
economic studies on the links between health, diseases and the economy have focused on 
HIV/AIDS (eg. Anand, Pandav and Nath 1999, Bloom and Mahal 1997, Cuddington 1993, 
Cuddington and Hancock 1994, Hanson 1992), malaria (eg. Gallup and Sachs 2001, Sachs 
and Malaney 2002) and other communicable diseases. There is however very little explo- 
ration in contemporary literature of the impact of chronic disease on economic wellbeing 
and growth. Recent studies by Bhargava, Jamison, Lau and Murray (200 1) and Gyimah- 
Brempong and Wilson (2001) merely provide anecdotal evidence of the indirect link be- 
tween chronic diseases and economic well-being since the working-age segment of popu- 
lations are most at risk of chronic diseases. These studies demonstrate the positive effect 
of adult survival rates, stock of and investment in, health human capital on GDP growth 
rates and per capita income growth rates. It may be that these linkages take root from the 
unit of economic production - at both individual and the household level. Economic pro- 
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duction in households frequently faces different risks, like job loss, weather uncertainty 
and crop failure and sudden debilitating chronic diseases may be among the most impor- 
tant risks for both rural and urban households (see AsfaNv and von Braun 2004, Dercon and 
Krishnan 2000, Gertler and Gruber 2002, Sauerborn, Adams and Hein 1996, Schultz and 
Tansel 1997, Wagstaff 2005). 
Individuals or households challenged by chronic diseases may inevitably face the 
double jeopardy of increased healthcare and self-care expenditure on one hand, and di- 
minished productivity on the other. It is often left to the affected to invent private cop- 
ing mechanisms (Sauerborn. et al. 1996) especially where social security coverage is lim- 
ited. As a means of coping, households may be compelled to increase supply of labour 
(though compromised) to markets, decrease consumption of other goods (intrahousehold 
compensation), or obtain transfers such as gifts, donations and other forms of remittances 
from other community members (interhousehold compensation). Using data from the 1997 
LSMS in Me d1voire and Ghana, Schultz and Tansel (1997) showed that the number of 
days away from work resulting from illness reduce wages by at least 10%. Gertler and 
Gruber (2002) also showed that the level of consumption insurance enjoyed by Indonesian 
households is affected by the magnitude of the health shock. Wagstaff (2005) estimates 
the economic consequences of health shocks in Vietnam during the period 1993-1998 us- 
ing a similar model as Gertler and Gruber's (2002), concluding that adverse health shocks 
(reduction in Body Mass Index (BMI)) decrease income earned from work and increase 
medical expenditure. In addition, although there is possibly an increase in unearned (trans- 
fer income) remittances, gifts and goods from relatives and friends, there is an undisputed 
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reduction in both food and non-food consumption, in which case consumption insurance 
failed. Shocks due to chronic disease may worsen inequalities in household-welfare dis- 
tribution. For example, using data on adult nutrition in Ethiopia, Dercon and Krishnan 
(2000) showed that women are more intensely affected by adverse illness shocks and this 
effect is accentuated by the age and pre-marriage wealth differences between husbands and 
wives. It is therefore to be expected that the failure of coping mechanisms could threaten 
household recovery from shocks due to chronic diseases and that the risk of failure may be 
proportional to the number of individuals suffering chronic diseases in the household. 
In this paper we use empirical data to investigate the evidence to how chronic diseases 
affect household healthcare expenditure, non-health consumption, labour (earned) income, 
and to demonstrate how households' unearned (transfer) income may provide some insur- 
ance against shocks from chronic diseases. Our a priori hypothesis is that because chronic 
diseases naturally occur throughout the course of a lifetime, they will adversely affect the 
health status of individuals to the detriment of the household's economic production. Our 
working questions are as follow: Do chronic diseases burden increase household health 
expenditure and to what extent? How do chronic diseases affect non-health expenditure? 
How do households ftind increased household expenditure due to chronic diseases? Is there 
household productivity loss (indirect costs) with chronic diseases? 
In 2004 the GDP per capital in Russia Brazil and India was $10,865, $8,140 and 
$1,830 (international dollars; source WHO (2006)). These countries are in different stages 
of epidemiological transition where chronic diseases are growing in importance. Deaths 
fonn chronic diseases are projected to increase by 22% in Brazil and 18% in India in the 
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next ten years (WHO 2005). Only around 59%, 45% and 25% of total health expenditure 
is funded from public sources in Russia, Brazil and India respectively and private sector 
ftinding through either private insurance or out-of-pocket spending is still a major source 
of funding for health care in these countries. Out-of-pocket payments represent 97%, 71% 
and 64% of the total private health expenditure in India, Russia and Brazil respectively 
(WHO 2006). 
5.2.1 Chronic diseases in developing countries 
The objective of this paper is to provide evidence on the effect of chronic diseases on house- 
hold health care expenditures and income, and also to establish the extent of consumption 
insurance provided to non-health items. Two reasons determine the focus on chronic dis- 
cases. 
The first is that chronic diseases, by their very nature, affect the long tenn. health 
status of individuals, imposing substantial direct and indirect costs. For example, a victim 
of stroke will require continued medical attention after the event. Since the monetary costs, 
especially in developing countries, are not always fully covered by private insurance or the 
public health system, ultimately the burden of treating the patient is responsibility of the 
household. Also, it is not uncommon that the patient's ability to work and to take care of 
himself becomes compromised. Consequently, other members of the household are forced 
to either stop working in order to take care of the patient, or to increase their own supply of 
labor in order to generate additional resources. It is clear that there are many unanswered 
questions and it is relevant to study the consequences of chronic diseases, since they inflict 
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the same kind of adverse effect imposed by the catastrophic shocks documented by Gertler 
and Gruber (2002) and Wagstaff (2005). 
The second motivation for the study of economic effects of chronic diseases is their 
increasing relevance for the populations of developing countries. The burden of disease 
in these countries has traditionally associated to communicable diseases. However, at the 
present moment several changes are taking place which are projected to increase the im- 
portance of chronic diseases. On the first place, the recent relative advances in the combat 
of communicable diseases and child mortality have contributed to the increase of life ex- 
pectancy. As a consequence, the older populations are more vulnerable to the development 
of chronic diseases. 
More importantly, however, is the current trend of change in traditional life styles, 
with the adoption of habits associated with risk factors for chronic diseases. Among such 
risks factors it is possible to include the ingestion of saturated fats and sugars, the increased 
use of tobacco and alcohol and the decreased levels of physical activity. Consequently, the 
incidence of chronic is projected to increase significantly in developing countries in the 
next decades (see Beaglehole and Yach 2003, Greenberg et al. 2005), with coronary heart 
disease and stroke being projected to become the "leading causes of death and loss of 
disability-adjusted life years by 2020" (Beaglehole and Yach 2003). 
Beaglehole and Yach (2003) also remark that the adoption of risk factors for chronic 
diseases is not uniform among developing countries. Specifically, they show that coun- 
tries where the control of communicable diseases has been more succesfiil, like Brazil and 
China, are also where risk factors for chronic diseases are currently more prevalent. This 
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process has been particularly intense in eastern and central Europe, the region that has reg- 
istered the highest rates of mortality due to non-communicable diseases. 
5.3 Methodology 
The two-part model (2PM) was adopted for the analysis to address three problems that are 
typically encountered with household health and expenditure data: 
* First, the usual nontrivial proportion of zero response in any given period, 
19 Second, the characteristically skewed distribution of expenditure data and 
* Third, household health and expenditure data often suffer enclogeneity either from 
missing data, reverse causality or simultaneity. 
A number of modelling alternatives were considered prior to the selection of to the 
two-part model (see Blough, Madden and Hombrook 1999, Cameron and Trivedi 2005, 
Jones 2000, Mullahy 1998). The two-part model distinguishes the decision process into 
two separate stages. For example, in the case of health expenditures, households first de- 
cide whether to incur health expenditure or not and later decide on the intensity of the 
expenditure. A binary choice model is specified for the first stage or censoring mechanism, 
and a linear regression model is specified for the outcome conditional on the outcome being 
observed on the second stage (Cameron and Trivedi 2005, p. 545). 
The implicit assumption is that the two decisions are generated by separate probabil- 
ity processes (Pohlmeier and Ulrich 1995). We use the logit model to model the first stage 
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partly because it is more amenable to the panel data estimation planed for Russia among 
other reasons. 
Let yj denote one of the five continuous outcomes and xi the explanatory covariates. 
The probability of reporting the outcome of interest yj is estimated as: 
lialogit 
Pr(yj > Olx) exp(xz 
)= 
A(x I., 810git). (Xý'alogit) 1+exp 
, 
Where A(-) represents the logistic distribution, xi is the 1Xk vector of covariates and 
)3 
logit is the kXl vector of parameters to be estimated. 
The second part is then estimated using ordinary least squares (OLS) regression on 
In(yi): 
= ZIOOLS OLS OLS-N(O, a 
2), (5.2) ln(yi) i+EIEE 
where zi is the lXq vector of covariates and OOLS is the qXl vector of parameters to be 
estimated and --OlS is the error term. The vectors xi and zi are not restricted to contain the 
same set of regressors. We estimated the effect of chronic diseases on five different out- 
comes: (1) household healthcare expenditure, (2) non-healthcare expenditures, (3) earned 
income, (4) unearned income and (5) work loss for the head of the household. Two of the 
outcome variables: non-health expenditure and earned income that were reported by most 
households were however estimated using only OLS models following log transformation. 
Although the effect of chronic diseases on each outcome is estimated separately, we 
cannot rule out the possibility that the outcomes are determined simultaneously. In this 
case it would be preferable to run a joint estimation of the system of equations determining 
the outcomes of interest. However, we follow other published studies which nonetheless 
estimate the effect separately (e. g. Gertler and Gruber 2002, Wagstaff 2005). The implicit 
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assumption in this modelling strategy is that the effects of chronic diseases on the different 
outcomes do not interact. 
The main advantage of using the two-part model is to obtain estimates of the ef- 
fect of explanatory variables on both the propensity to engage and on the conditional level 
of engagement. This can provide important insights on the decision process followed by 
households that might help the design of policy interventions. For instance, assume by hy- 
pothesis that in a given country chronic diseases affect the first stage of determination of 
health expenditures but not the second. That is, chronic diseases might increase the propen- 
sity to have health expenditures, but do not affect the conditional level of expenditures. If 
that is the case, then policy interventions should place additional effort on making sure that 
households do not incur on health expenditures in the first place, instead of trying to limit 
the overall level of expenditures. Of course, other effects with different implications are 
also possible, the important point being that the two-part model allows disentangling the 
effect on the two separate decisions. 
The predictions from the two parts of the model were combined to recover estimates 
of the unconditional mean of the dependent variable in the models. Predictions on the 
original scale of y were based on Duan's smearing estimator, which prevents bias from the 
nonlinear transfonnation of the log residuals (see Duan 1983, Manning 1998, Manning and 
Mullahy 2001): 
L2 (Xi OLS +c E(yj > Olx) = E(exp ?, a 2 
(5.3) 
The Russian LSMS panel was unbalanced; therefore, both fixed and random effects 
models were estimated. This allowed for accounting for household unobserved heterogene- 
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ity (see Cameron and Trivedi 2005, Gertler and Gruber 2002, Wagstaff 2005). Similarly 
to the cross-sectional case, the following equation was implemented for the household- 
specific effects model: 
Yit := ai + Xit, 3 + Eit. (5.4) 
Where Yit represents the logarithm of any of the outcomes of interest for household 
i at period t, xit is a vector of covariates, ai represents unobservable household-specific 
effects, which are assumed to be time-invariant. Denote the averages of household out- 
come, covariates and errors over-the-time by ! IL Y", : tj ZLE--' and Ei El " TTT 
respectively. The fixed effects models were implemented as: 
Yt - Y; = ai + x' (5.5) 12A+ eit - (ai + 40 + Ei) 
If unobserver effects are assumed to be time-invariant, taking the difference between 
each observation and the household average eliminates cii. Though estimates from Fixed 
Effects (FE) models are usually less biased, they were compared with the Random Effects 
(RE) models. The RE model ignores the over-time variance in the data, and uses only 
the variation between households to estimate the marginal effect of chronic diseases and is 
estimated as follows: 
yit - 
ýYýi = 
(Xit 
-0+ 
(i 
- 
ý) ol + ai) + 
(Eit 
- 
ý: 
-i) 
. (5.6) 
Where p is scaling parameter and ý provides a measure of the association between 
cei and Eit . Let a' 
denote the variance of the household-specific unobserved effec, and o, 
2 
ae 
denote the variance of the idiosyncratic error. Then ý is a consistent estimator for: 
(5.7) 
, VFo-r2 + Tor2 C, 
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In the absence of correlation between cei and the regressors the RE estimator is more 
efficient than the FE. However, it is inconsistent if the true model is FE. We used Hausman 
test to compare all the parameters jointly and separately (Jones 2000). The RE model was 
assumed if the null hypothesis of no correlation behveen the disturbances and the regressors 
could be rejected. 
Complementing our application of a 2PM, we employed Instrumental Variables (IV) 
estimator to further explore and control for endogeneity in order to obtain robust estimates. 
Respondents' place of residence and indicators related to the head of household (gender, 
age and month of birth) were considered possible candidates for controlling for suspected 
endogeneity for the cross-sectional data. For the Russian panel data, values of the depen- 
dent variables were additionally used as instruments. These instruments were expected to 
affect the health condition of the members of the household, whilst being uncorrelated with 
the error term in the main equation. The validity of the instruments was examined using 
the Hausman and Sargan's tests. All models were implemented using STATA software. 
5.4 Data 
The data for this study were obtained from the Life Standards Measurement Study (LSMS) 
household surveys for Brazil, India and Russia. The LSMSs are a series of surveys that the 
World Bank has performed in about 30 different countries since 1985. According to the 
World Bank, "the purpose of these surveys was to gather data that would allow the detailed 
study of household behavior and several aspects of living" (Grosh and Gle%vNve 1995). 
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The data collection for Brazil was carried out in 1996-1997 in the South-Easth and 
the North-East regions. The Indian study was carried out in 1997-1998 in south and eastern 
Uttar Pradesh and north and central Bihar, and covered only rural areas. The Brazilian and 
Indian surveys provide only one cross-section of data. The Russian data is a panel set 
that follows the same households over time. We used the eight most recent rounds (from 
1997 to 2004) to avoid the variation in the definition of the variables across earlier rounds 
in Russia. These eight rounds have standardized variable definition but combine into an 
unbalanced panel. There were 4,940 household samples in the Brazil data, 2,249 in the 
Indian data and an average of 4,179 in the data from Russia. Table 5.1 provides descriptive 
statistics for the variables used in the analysis. 
The LSMS sample design is based on the collection of data at the household level. 
For some variables, such as hours worked, the questions are also asked in an individual 
basis, so it is possible to disaggregate the observations up to the individual level. For 
most variables, however, such separation is not possible. This is particularly true for the 
variables on expenditures, which are the main interest for us. The majority of LSMS data 
was obtained for a 30-day period prior to the time of interview. 
The questionnaires are composed by several modules, such as labour, education, mi- 
gration and health, which cover different aspects of the living standards of the household 
and its individual members. The data collection is based on interviews performed at the 
households. We have access to information relative both to the household as a whole (e. g., 
income and expenditure) and to each of the other members in particular (e. g., age, sex, 
education, health status and hours worked for each member). 
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Five dependent variables were constructed to capture: household health expenditure, 
non-health expenditure, earned income, unearned income, and work days lost, to explore 
the possible dimensions to a household's economic adjustment to chronic diseases (see 
Gertler and Gruber 2002, Wagstaff 2005). All monetary variables are valued at 2000 inter- 
national currency. 
5.4.1 Dependent variables 
Household health expenditure 
About 56% of Brazil's and 62% of Russia's households reported incurring healthcare 
expenditure, compared to 98% of households in India. As discussed in section 5.2, this dif- 
ference is related to the organisation of the health system in India, which relies much more 
on private out-of-pocket payments compared to the other two countries. The household 
healthcare expenditure was obtained by aggregating all household expenditures on health- 
care goods and services. On average, healthcare expenditures ranged between 6%-10% 
of total household expenditures. They accounted for 6.4% of total expenditures in Brazil, 
9.6% in India, and around 7.0% in Russia. 
Household non-health expenditure 
Households may shift non-health consumption to health consumption in the event 
of chronic diseases: in this situation, non-health expenditure may decrease even as health 
expenditure increases (i. e. the occurrence of consumption insurance against chronic dis- 
eases). All non-health expenditure was aggregated to a dependent variable (nonhealthexp). 
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Table 5.1. Descriptive statistics 
earnea 
unearned 
LaDour income - Non-labour income* / /-i.: )z 590.99 1.5v. uu 22.34 / ILANS 522.47 
dunearned Dummy uneamed>O 0.54 0.21 0.82 
healthexp ealth expenditures* 66.57 13.62 86.86 
dhealthexp )ummy liealthexp>O 0.56 0.98 0.62 
nonhealthexp . qon-health expenditures* 543.56 129.15 
1,655.24 
chronic ndividuals with chronic disease 0.50 0.10 0.32 
nonchronic Individuals with non chronic disease 0.55 0.56 0.89 bad Individuals with bad health 0.11 0.38 
physical Individuals engage in physical activities 0.43 
smoke Smokers 0.71 
overwei ght Overweight individuals 0.80 1.08 , headactiv Days of activity ! ost by head in last 30 days* 8.18 3.40 10.08 
dheadactiv Dummy headactiv>O 0.08 0.26 0.04 
headwork Dummy head works 0.72 1.00 0.44 
headmale Dummy head is male 0.77 0.96 0.74 
sin le Y Dummy head is single 0.12 0.03 0.25 
ki s Children (below IS years) 1.48 2.98 0.67 
men Male adults 1.01 1.56 0.73 
women Female adults 1.29 1.63 0.78 
oldmen Males above 65 years 0.15 0.26 0.17 
oldwomen Females above 65 years 0.19 0.20 0.42 
ae 5 Average age** 40.20 38.20 47.26 
e ucation Average schooling years' 6.75 2.51 8.77 
insured Insured individuals 0.64 1.71 
urban ummy urban area 0.79 
caste ummy middle or backward castes 0.80 
NE ummy NE region 0.50 
Moscow Dummy Moscow region 0.10 
north ummy North region 0.07 
central Dummy Central region 0.20 
volga Dummy Volga region 0.19 
caucasus Dummy Caucasus region 0.12 
ural Dummy Ural region 0.15 
siberia Dummy Siberia region 0.19 
Year 1997 0.13 
Year 1998 0.13 
Year 1999 0.13 
Year 2000 0.14 
Year 2001 0.15 
Year 2002 0.16 
Year 2003 0.16 
Year 2004 0.16 
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Include only outcome>O; --Among adults; Monetary values in international dollars of`2000. 
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Earned (labour) and unearned (transfer) incomes. 
Changes in earned (labour) and unearned (transfer) incomes consequent upon chronic 
diseases were regressed against deterrninants to capture income impact of disease. This will 
also provide indications as to the strategies adopted by households to cope with the addi- 
tional burden caused by chronic diseases. For Brazil and Russia, labour income accounts 
for around 60% of total income, while for India it accounted for around 86%. " 
Indirect cost of chronic diseases 
Assuming that household productivity loss is inevitable in the event of chronic dis- 
ease these indirect costs were estimated by measuring the impact on the head of the house- 
hold's labour supply. This was proxied by the number of activity days lost to disease within 
the 30 days preceding the interview (headactiv). This information was available for Brazil 
and Russia though unavailable in the Indian data. 
5.4.2 Independent variables 
Crucial to this analysis are two explanatory variables: chronic and nonchronic, which in- 
dicate the number of individuals reported to have chronic and non-chronic (acute) diseases 
respectively in households. On average, there were 0.5 individuals reporting chronic dis- 
ease per household in Brazil, 0.1 in India and 0.32 in Russia. Given the average number 
of adults per household of 2.63 in Brazil, 3.66 in India and 2.11 in Russia, these imply 
an overall household "prevalence" of reporting chronic diseases to be 19.0% in Brazil and 
15 Some noted discrepancies between total income and total expenditures, especially for Russia may be due 
to underreporting of the income variables. 
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15.0% in Russia, but only 2.9% in India. " The prevalence of non-chronic (acute) diseases 
also varies between 21.0% in Brazil and 15.2% for India, and is slightly higher in Russia - 
around 42.2%. The variable bad, which refers to the number of individuals reporting bad 
health, was included to control for the fact that the perception of the severity of illness may 
influence reporting and help-seeking behaviour. 
Other covariates included in the models were selected either on theoretical basis or 
have been shown in related studies to influence household income and expenditure. Demo- 
graphic variables include household adults mean age (age); number of women (women); 
number of adults in the household; marital status of household heads (single); and caste 
in India data. All household variables were computed around number of adults (age 18 
and above) in the household as a denominator, since chronic diseases are infrequent below 
adult age group. 
Some chronic disease associated risk factors may also generate need for medical ex- 
penditure. For Brazil, these were physical (number of individuals that engage in physical 
activity), overweight (number of individuals with body mass index (BAII) above 25 units 
in the household), while overweight and smoke (number of individuals that smoke) were 
included in Russia. Infonnation on risk factors was unavailable in Indian data. The vari- 
ables overweight and obese were computed by taking into account the weight and height 
of individuals. With such information it is possible to compute the individual body mass 
16 The list of diseases varied among the surveys. For Brazil, they include heart problem, high blood pressure, 
diabetes, respiratory problems, digestive problems, gynaecological problems, prostate problems, allergy, can- 
cer, bone/muscle/joint problems, neuro-psychiatfic problems and high cholesterol. Included for India, are res- 
piratory problems, heart problem, blood pressure, cataract, and permanent disability. For Russia, the chronic 
diseases included are diabetes, infarction and stroke. 
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index (B. A11), by using the following fannula RAM = "'91". Individuals with a BMI be- height2 
tween 25 and 30 units are classified as overweight, while those with BMI equal or greater 
than 30 are considered obese. Again, there is an evident difference between the countries, 
and we note a higher incidence of both overweight and obesity in Russia as compared to 
Brazil. 
Accessibility to care reflects strongly on the healthcare expenditure relative to in- 
come. We broadly controlled for household geographical location by including rural or 
urban areas (as opposed to metropolitan areas). We assume rural dwellers have less access 
to chronic disease healthcare compared to urban dwellers. For Brazil, regional location was 
also controlled for because the Northeast region is markedly less developed compared to 
the Centre-South of the country. For Russia, the RE models include dummies for six areas 
(Moscow, Central, Volga, Caucasus, Ural and North/Siberia). The Indian survey covered 
only rural areas. 
5.5 Results 
In discussing the main results, the tests that were performed to assess the validity of the 
instruments and to determine the preferred estimation method (OLS or IV for Brazil and 
India; OLS-FE, IV-FE, OLS-RE or IV-RE for Russia) are highlighted. The complete set of 
results is reported in the appendix. 
5.5 Results 
5.5.1 Health expenditures 
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The presence of chronic diseases in a household significantly increased the propensity 
(probability) and the magnitude of incurring health expenditure (Table 5.2). The marginal 
effects for the logit models were computed approximately as g (I - y), 8, y being sample 
mean healthcare expenditure and 0 the estimated coefficient (Cameron and Trivedi 2005). 
Although there was no effect on the probability of reporting health expenditures in India 
(98% of households in India reported health expenditures), each additional case of chronic 
disease in the household increased the probability of incurring health expenditure by 17.8% 
points in Brazil, and 5.9% points in Russia. The Hausman test for Russia rejected the hy- 
pothesis of no difference between FE and RE estimators, suggesting the existence of un- 
observed household fixed effects in the deten-nination of the propensity to report health 
expenditure. 
In the second part of the model, the Hausman test for Bkazil and India did not show 
systematic differences between the OLS and IV estimates (see Hausman test IV for Brazil 
and India in Table 5.2). Although the instrument used for Brazil did not pass Sargan's test, 
we generally interpreted the result as evidence of no correlation between the endogenous 
regressors and the error term. Considering that IV estimates are potentially less efficient 
than OLS (Cameron and Trivedi 2005), we opted to assume the OLS estimates for Brazil 
and India. In the case of Russia, the Hausman IV test indicated significant differences be- 
tween the OLS and IV estimators for the fixed effects models, providing evidence of the 
presence of endogeneity. Similarly, the Hausman FE test detected systematic differences 
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Table 5.2. Two part regressions for health expenditures 
Variable tirazii LUR OLS inuia Legit OLS Kussia L q4iýt 
Kr- OLS 
cnronic . 72-31-7 2T-ýý 1.2 1.2*** . -i f, *** . 1T"-F- nonchronic . 84*** . 12*** 2.4*** . 82*** 1.1*** . 27*** bad 0.08 . 19*** . 16*** . 23*** Inincome . 14*** . 2*** -0.12 . 064** . 23*** . 2*** smoke 0.01 -0.01 physical 0.02 0.04 . 072*** overwei ht -0.02 . 058** -. 059*** headmale 0 0.06 0.39 0.02 -. 4*** 0.04 sil le 7 -. 32*** 0.03 -1.8** -. 47** -. 64*** -. 1** ki s . 15*** -0.01 0.09 . 059*** . 13*** . 028* men -. 15*** -0.04 0 -0.03 -. 3*** -. 096*** women -0.03 0.03 0.06 . 13*** -. 26*** -. 084*** oldmen -0.03 -. 13* 0.6 0.1 -. 54*** -. 086** oldwomen 0.12 0.06 0.67 -. 15* -. 35*** ------ -. 
19*** 
----- age -. Uz_ý, U1 /1 . 1011 U. U I -. u4j- -. uu9zsl 2 a c . 00034** 0 -0017* 0 00047*** . 000099* 5 e ucation . 2*** . 098*** 0.12 . 19*** . 15*** 0.01 
education 2 -. 01*** 0 -0.02 -0.01 -. 0062* . 
0041 * 
insured 
. 
096** 
. 
065*** 
. 
09*** 
. 054*** urban 0.1 -. 14** NE 
. 
22*** -. 44*** 
caste 0.07 -0.03 1998 
. 12** . 
094** 
1999 
. 
44*** 0.03 
2000 
. 59*** 0 2001 
. 
73*** 0.02 
2002 
. 87*** 0.04 2003 
. 76*** . 17*** 2004 . 95*** . 
14*** 
Moscow 0.1 . 
14*** 
central . 
31*** -. II ** * 
volga . 14** -. 19*** caucasus . 
25*** 
. 
27*** 
ural -0.08 -. 2*** 
cons -1.9*** . 
85*** -0.08 2.2*** -2.2*** 3.1*** N 
R2 
4,805 
14.00% 
2,695 
26.00% 
1,920 
15.00% 
1,886 
31.00% 
26,986 16,787 
12.00% 
R2 within 5.90% 
R2 between 15.00% 
Sargan test 22*** 1.3 
Hausman test IV 1.61 2.12 76.6*** 
Hausman test FE 336.64*** 79.1*** 
Orm 0.62 
or, 1.2 
A 22.00% 
- - ethods: Logit and Logit-R E (Russia) in first part; OLS and OLS-RE (Russia) in second. Legend: * p<. 1; .. p<. 05; ***p<. Ul . 
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between the OLS-FE and OLS-RE estimators, which suggest the presence of unobservable 
household fixed effects. However, the null hypothesis of non-systematic differences in co- 
efficients of the OLS and IV estimators (Hausman IV for RE column) could not be rejected, 
nor can the null for RE-IV and the FE-IV (Hausman FE for IV column). Similarly, for both 
Brazil and India, we opted for the OLS estimator with Random Effects, which provides 
greater efficiency when compared with the IV estimator. 
Each additional case of chronic disease increased household health expenditure by 
21% in Brazil and 14% in Russia. The estimates for many of the variables are consistent 
for Brazil and Russia. For instance, the estimated income elasticity of healthcare expendi- 
ture is between 0.12 and 0.22 for both countries. Similarly, the two other health indicators 
(nonchronic and bad) were also consistently associated with increased probability and in- 
creased level of health expenditures in all countries. The conditional effect of non-chronic 
conditions was between 12% and 28%, whilst for bad health it was between 18% and 29%. 
Male and single civil status of household headship was consistently associated with 
lower probabilities of expenditure, and lower levels of expenditure (for India and Rus- 
sia). This negative association may indicate the existence of access problems for house- 
holds headed by male or single individuals. Average schooling in the household positively 
increased the probability of expenditures, as often reported elsewhere (eg. Cowell 2006, 
Fuchs 2004, Grossman 2000). Health insurance increases both the propensity and the av- 
erage levels of health expenditure. 
NE households in Brazil had higher probability of spending, but lower average lev- 
els of health expenditure (urban households also report lower conditional levels of health 
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expenditure). In Russia, households from Moscow and Caucasus have higher average lev- 
els of health expenditure when compared with households from the North/Siberia, while 
households from other regions have lower levels of healthcare expenditure. An increasing 
time-trend was also observed. 
5.5.2 Non-health expenditures 
Results show that non-health expenditure increased positively with the average level of 
education of the household (at least in Brazil), average age of adults, while the number of 
ovenveight or bad health state (bad) reflects negatively on non-health expenditure. Only the 
second-stage (linear regression of log non-health expenditures) is used in this case because 
all households report non-health expenditures. Table 5.3 shows no significant differences 
between the OLS and IV estimators for the Brazil and India models hence the OLS estima- 
tor was considered efficient and preferred. Chronic disease showed no significant impact on 
non-health expenditures in the India data, while an increase in the number of people with 
chronic disease is associated with approximately 4% of growth in non-health expenditure 
in Brazil. For Russia, the Hausman tests indicated the existence of household unobserved 
heterogeneity (since both RE estimators are rejected) and evidence of endogeneity. Con- 
sequently, the IV-FE method was preferred, since it allows for controlling for both effects. 
Adopting this estimator, an increase in the proportion of household member with chronic 
disease resulted in 3.2% reduction in households' non-health expenditures as was expected. 
The countries considered in this study have fragile systems of social and healthcare 
services. This implies that households are frequently exposed to the economic conse- 
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Table 5.3. Regression for non-health expenditures 
Variable Brazil India Russia 
chronic . 039*** 0 -. 017" nonchronic . 
037*** 0 . 
014** 
bad -. 047* -. 069*** Inincome 
. 
42*** . 
06*** . 4*** smoke . 
057*** 
physical . 
041*** 
. 
067*** 
overwei ht 0 
headmale 
. 15*** . 
14** 
. 
068*** 
le si -. 15*** -. 39*** -. 17*** ing s k, s . 
049*** . 
079*** 
. 
093*** 
men -0.01 . 12*** 
0.03 
women . 
028* 
. 
12*** 
. 
033** 
oldmen -. 064** . 
13*** . 
058*** 
oldwomen -0.01 -. 065** -0.01 
age . 
023*** . 037*** . 
012*** 
e2 a -0029*** -0041*** -. 0002*** 5 
e ucation . 
067*** 
. 092*** -0.02 
education2 0 0 . 
0032*** 
insured 
. 
077*** 0.01 
urban . 
089*** 
NE . 
054*** 
caste -0.04 1998 -. 1*** 1999 -. 35*** 2000 -. 24*** 2001 -. 17*** 2002 -. 18*** 2003 -. 14*** 2004 0.03 
Moscow . 
092*** 
central -. 11*** 
volga -. 2*** 
caucasus -0.03 
ural -. 22*** 
cons 2*** 5.3*** 5.1*** 
N 
R2 
4,796 
65.00% 
1,920 
54.00% 
26,986 
45.00% 
R2 overall 21.00% 
R2 within 58.00% 
Sargan test 81*** 1 259.82*** 
Hausman test IV 1.19 3.97 1117.98*** 
Hausman test FE 0.38 
Orm 0.64 
or, 0.63 Methods: OLS and IV-FE (Russia). Legend: * p<. 1; ** p<. Uj; *** p<. Ul. 
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quences of illness. Chronic diseases can impact on non-health expenditures (e. g. ftirther 
expenses with informal carers), which may or may not be covered by the public system. 
On the other hand, results from Russia suggest the existence of unobservable fixed effects 
and that chronic diseases reduce non health expenditures. Whilst this sheds some doubts 
on the result from Brazil, we cannot rule out the possibility that the definition of what is 
considered health/non-health expenditures differs between the samples. 
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Considering that non-health expenditure is a reliable indicator of the income level 
of the household, these observations agree with the human capital notion of health status 
especially in the developing countries, that good health exerts positive effects on earnings 
potential (Thomas and Strauss 1997). Finally, in Russia there was a clear negative time- 
trend, which reflect general economic conditions in Russia during the period. 
5.5.3 Earned (labour) income 
As shown in Table 5.4, each additional case of chronic disease decreases the household 
earned income at an approximate rate of -7.9% in Brazil, and -4.3% in Russia. This reflects 
the household indirect costs (reduced productivity) due to chronic diseases. For Brazil, the 
Hausman test did not reject the (more efficient) OLS estimator, and similarly for Russia, 
FE-OLS was preferred. 
The number of individuals with perceived bad health also had a negative impact: - 
7.9% in Russia and -15% in Brazil. In the three countries, non-chronic (acute) diseases 
had a lower impact on income earnings compared to chronic illnesses. This suggests that 
the household economic capacity is more seriously affected by long-term health problems, 
as in the case of chronic diseases, than by short-term shocks. This argument has been put 
forward by Gertler and Gruber (2002), which, together with Wagstaff (2005), have reported 
similar effects on the impact of chronic and acute diseases. 
Similarly as is the case of non-health expenditure, measures of physical health (over- 
weight) and education, which reflect the human capital endowments, consistently increased 
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Table 5.4. Regression for earned (labour) income 
variame prazu ingia Kussia 
chronic -. 079*** 0.02 -. 043** 
nonchronic -. 06*** 0.02 0 bad -. 059*** Inincome 
smoke 0 
physical 0.03 
overwei ght . 089*** . 062*** . headmale . 25*** 0.09 . 16*** si ngle -. 15*** -0.15 -. 25*** i kM . 017* . 048*** . 067*** men 23*** . 18*** . 2*** women . 15*** . 059* . 16*** oldmen -. 13** 0.08 0.01 oIdwomen -. 15*** 0 -0.01 age . 035*** 0.02 . 11*** e2 a -. 00028*** -. 00033** -. 0013*** 5 
c ucation . 13*** -. 081 * -. 077** education 2 0 . 021*** . 0044* insured 
. 18*** . 054*** urban . 42*** NE -. 46*** caste 0.05 1998 -. 16*** 1999 -. 26*** 2000 -. 12*** 2001 -0.03 2002 . 052* 2003 . 11*** 2004 . 33*** Moscow 
central 
voIga 
caucasus 
ural 
cons 3*** - - 
6.6*** 
-- 
5.7*** 
N 
R2 
TT2 6 
55.00% 
1,810 
17.00% 
2Z866- 
31.00% 
R2 within 12.00% 
R2 between 40.00% 
Sargan test 133*** 3.5 484.08*** 
Hausman test IV 3.84 0.08 -187.94 Hausman test FE -446.84 Orm I 0.94 
& 
- 
54.00% 
thods: OLS and OLS4h (Russia). Lcgend: * p<. 1; ** p-<F: 037- ýp<. ý 
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household earnings. The number of smokers in the household had no effect on labour in- 
come in Russia. 
5.5.4 Unearned (transfer) income 
The results clearly show that chronic diseases increased the probability of receiving trans- 
fers (gifts and other remittances) by 7.0% in Brazil and 4.1 % in Russia as shown in Table 
5.5. This suggests that households were able to adapt to chronic health shocks by relying 
on informal coping mechanisms that reflect the degree of risk sharing among households 
(Gertler and Gruber 2002). Apart from chronic diseases, households headed by males had 
a lower probability of receiving remittances, while the number of old people increased the 
probability. The results also indicate a tendency for low caste Indian households to re- 
ceive lower remittances, both in tenns of the probability of receiving and of the level of the 
remittances. 
5.5.5 Productivity losses 
Finally, results show that chronic diseases may reduce labour productivity (measured by 
the number of workdays lost by the head of household) and as shown in Table 5.6. There 
was an increase in the probability of losing workdays in households with increasing cases 
of chronic diseases in the Indian data. However, in the Brazilian and Russian data, non- 
chronic illnesses showed significant positive effects on the probability of work loss. " Though 
" Given the limited number of observations, it was not possible to estimate the second part of the model for 
this outcome. 
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Table 5.5. Two part regressions for unearned income 
Variable 
t3razii 
Logil OLS 
inuia Lqgit OLS Kussia Kv- L? Zit OLS 
ctirome 
nonchronic 0 -0.03 
U. UL 
-0.05 
-U. U 
-. 18** 
. 29*** 
. 21*** 
. 08.5*** 
. 063*** bad -0.05 -0.07 0.01 -0.02 Inincome . 067* -0.01 smoke 
physical . 2*** . 055* ovcrwci ht 0.03 . 1*** -. 12*** 0.01 eadmale h -1.3*** -. 31*** -1.3*** -0.02 -. 51*** -0.02 - le SM -0.03 -. 15* -0.08 0.65 0.01 -0.05 I 
s ki s -0.04 -. 042** 0.02 -0.02 . 46*** -. 024** men . 1* . 11*** 0.09 0.1 -0.07 . 045* women 0.09 . 1*** 0.11 . 52*** -0.01 . 043* oldmen 1.5*** . 44*** 0.16 . 37** 1.1*** . 51*** oldwomen 1.5*** 0.03 -0.01 -. 36* 1.9*** . 42*** age -. 052** . 026*** -. 07** 0.03 -. 12*** -. 015*** 
a2 c . 0011*** 0 . 001*** 0 . 0013*** . 00017*** c5 ucation . 096*** . 093*** . 23* -0.02 . 39*** . 04* education 2 0 . 0022* -0.02 0.03 -. 019*** 0 insured 0.01 . 11*** . 14*** . 023** urban 0.03 . 25*** NE 0.03 -. 14*** 
caste -. 29** -. 54*** 1998 -. 81*** . 063** 1999 -. 56*** -. 3*** 2000 -0.09 -. 26*** 2001 0.12 -. 12*** 2002 . 14* -. 048* 2003 . 21 *** . 045* 2004 . 31*** . 065* Moscow . 39*** . 092** central . 4*** -. 1*** volga . 29*** -. 23*** caucasus . 22** 0.02 ural . 21*** -. 21*** cons 0.23 3*** 0.36 2.9*** 1.5*** 7*** 
Iv 
R2 
ýflyju Z, Uf-p 
00% 00% 32 23 
I -ful ýI 1ýju 
3 80% 29 00% 
.. 'ý Iý 
13 00% 
R2 within . . . . . 5.50% 
RI between 17.00% 
Sargan test 118*** 6* 
Hausman test IV 8.61 0.06 -85.11 Hausman test FE 88.13*** 111.45*** 
Orm 0.62 
or, 0.92 
A 31.00% 
- - cthods: Logit and Logn-l-E (Russia) in first part; OLS and O LS-Rh (Russia) in second. Legend: * p<. 1; . . p<. 05; *** p< DT . 
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5.5 Results 
Table 5.6. Regression for work days lost 
Variable Brazil India Russia FE 
chronic 0.11 2.8*** -0.01 
nonchronic 1.3*** 3*** . 
98*** 
bad 0.21 0.13 
Inincome -0.07 -0.07 0.05 
smoke -0.11 
physical -0.13 
ovenvei lit le -0.03 -0.08 headma -. 78*** -0.43 0.15 
si[ le 7 -0.02 0.65 -0.02 ki s 0.01 0 0.01 
men -. 34*** -. 22** -. 51*** 
women -. 56*** -. 38*** -. 3 1 ** 
oldmen -0.28 . 
35* -. 96*** 
oldwomen -0.2 -0.09 -1.2*** 
age 0 0.01 . 
084** 
a2 0 0 -. 0011** 
e5ecation -0.04 -0.17 0.4 
education 2 0 0.02 -0.02 insured 0.01 
. 
12* 
urban -0.12 NE 0.11 
caste 0.1 
1998 -. 26** 1999 -0.2 2000 -. 54*** 2001 -. 44*** 2002 -. 44*** 2003 -. 55*** 2004 -. 71*** Moscow 
central 
volga 
cau-casus 
ural 
cons -1.1* -1.9* N 
Pseudo R2 
4,805 
19.00% 
1,925 
42.00% 
4,596 
12.00% 
Hausman test IV 
Hausman test FE 41.5 
P 
Methods: Logit and Logit-k- E (Russia). L egend: * p<. 1; - p<. O: ); *** p<. O L 
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this finding may seem counterintuitive, it should not be seen as completely unexpected, as 
work days lost may be more sensitive to non-chronic than chronic diseases: early retire- 
ment through disabilities would obviate labour participation at the time of interview. We 
would argue that productivity losses from chronic diseases could be better captured in data 
on early retirement from active labour than workdays lost within a period of 30 days as 
was captured in the data. Overall, the productivity loss model of our analysis had an ill fit, 
which prevented more rigorous analysis. One possible improvement would be to consider 
the effects at the individual, rather than household level. 
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Table 5.7. Marginal and conditional effects of chronic diseases 
Probabilit ofoutcome 
Brazil 
? ndia 
Russia 
- Conditiona 
Brazil 
l level of outcome 
India Russia 
U 
Brazil 
nconditional cttect 
India Russia 
Health expenditures 17.8%*** 2.10% 5.9%*** 2 1%- 120%*** 14%** 3.7%* ** 2.50% 0.8%. - 
(55.8%) (98.2%) (62.5%) (S66.48) ($13.62) (S89.94) 
Non-he3lth expenditures 3.9%* -3.2%* 3.9%* 
** 
- -3.2%* 
(S542.851 (S129.14) ($1620.26) 
Earried income -7.9%* 2% 4.8%* -7 . 
q%* 2% 4.8%* 
(S772.51) (S138.99) (S812.75) 
Unearned income 8.2%* 0.30% 4.1%*** 3.10% -2% 8.7%* 8.20% 0% 4.1%* 
** 
54A X '4 ( * O 1 ý 
! , &. 7 P ý5? 0 2 ! S 22. 3ý (S542.05) 
l Average values given in parent 
ýeses, 
-- a , 
Pu 
onetary . es ternational dollars per in 30-day period; Legend: . 
ý ý 
.O1 pp . 
05 
. 
5.5.6 The effects of chronic disease in the household 
A summary of the effects of chronic diseases on the evaluated outcomes are presented in 
Table 5.7. Each additional case of chronic disease increased the probability of incurring 
health expenditure. On average chronic diseases exposed households to 30% higher prob- 
ability of incurring health expenditure relative to the benchmark average of 56% in Brazil 
and 10% higher than the 62% benchmark in Russia. Transfers and remittances to Russian 
and Brazilian households increased with chronic diseases. The probability of receiving 
transfers from other households in Russia and Brazil also increased with the occurrence of 
chronic diseases. 
We show the annualized impact of chronic disease on households in Table 5.7. Chronic 
diseases significantly increased health expenditure to an annual $965 and $1,042 (2000 in- 
temational currency) in Brazil and Russia respectively. If the 2003 per capita total expen- 
diture estimates of $597 in Brazil and $ 551 in Russia (international dollars; source WHO 
(2006)) are converted to per-household estimates (by multiplying by the average individu- 
als per household), the increase represents 61% and 90% total expenditure per household. 
Annual household non-health expenditure decreased considerably in Russia by $19.862 
and increased by $6.523 (3.9%) in Brazil. No significant increase was observed in India. 
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Results indicate that the presence of a chronic disease in a household decreased 
labour income by 4.8% ($9,272) in Russia and by 7.9% ($9,282) in Brazil. The possi- 
bility for underreporting income should however be taken into account in interpreting these 
results. The reduction of labour income seemed to be at least partially offset by an increase 
in transfers and remittances associated with the presence of chronic diseases as observed in 
the three countries. 
Overall, chronic diseases increased household healthcare expenditures and reduced 
earned income. Although there was an increase in transfers and remittances, the increase 
in health expenditures and the decrease in labour income tended to dominate, and conse- 
quently imposed a reduction in the consumption of non-health related items. The net effect 
in Russia was a reduction of 3.2% on the level of non-health expenditures", suggesting that 
chronic diseases in fact reduced household overall welfare. 
In Figure 5.1 are displayed the impacts of the number of persons with chronic dis- 
eases in the average household on the outcomes of interest. Healthcare expenditure and 
remittances increased proportionately to the number of chronic diseases in households in a 
similar manner in the three countries regardless of the presence of health insurance schemes 
in Brazil and Russia. Income fell gradually in Russian and Brazil to the third chronic dis- 
cases in a household. The observed rise in income in the fourth and fifth is mainly due to 
small number of households and outliers in this category. It would be expected that chronic 
disease related rise in health expenditure is insured by reduction in non-health expenditure. 
18 The estimated positive impact on household non-health expenditure in Brazil may be due to household 
unobserved heterogeneity which was significant in the in the Russian estimates, but could not be accounted 
for in the Brazilian data. 
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Fig. 5.1. The effect of chronic diseases 
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However, non-health expenditure gradually increased with increasing number of chronic 
diseases. This may be due to: (1) the increase in remittances to household with chronic 
diseases, whereby household health expenditure shocks; (2) increased self-care needs fol- 
lowing chronic disease and; (3) it may be that households tend to protect against threats to 
household consumption. 
5.6 Conclusions 
Controlling for endogeneity behveen chronic diseases and socioeconomic indicators, and 
household unobserved heterogeneity, this study shows that chronic diseases have a signifi- 
cant effect on household welfare including both healthcare and non-healthcare expenditure 
in addition to their impact on labour and transfer incomes. Each additional case of chronic 
disease in the household generated a conditional effect on health expenditures of 21%, 
120% and 14% in Brazil, India, and Russia, respectively. Insured households in Brazil and 
Russia tended to spend more on health care and incurred higher health expenditure than the 
uninsured. 
Since the potential to work is affected by chronic diseases, labour income reduced 
by 7.9% in Brazil and 4.8% in Russia. On the other hand, households seemed to have 
received some compensation in the form of remittances, which increased by 3.1 % in Brazil 
and 8.7% in Russia. However, the final effect of chronic diseases was an increase of 3.9% 
of non-health consumption in Brazil and a reduction of 3.2% in Russia. Overall, there is a 
negative net effect of chronic diseases on the household economy. 
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The prevalence of chronic diseases is projected to increase over the coming years 
especially in low- and middle-income countries (WHO 2005). Given that formal social 
support systems in many such countries are limited in coverage, households' sociocco- 
nomic wellbeing and indeed grass-roots development may be hindered by the burden of 
chronic diseases without appropriate intervention. This study provides empirical evidence 
for the theoretical links between chronic diseases, socioeconomic inequality and poverty. It 
has some policy implications for the treatment and control of chronic diseases in the coun- 
tries included in the analysis. For instance, there is justification for reviewing the financing 
mechanisms to address chronic diseases particularly if the economic impact on individu- 
als and households is to be mitigated. This is because there is a limit to what end infonnal 
financing could aid households in coping with the socioeconomic burden associated with 
chronic diseases. 
The results also indicate that socio-economic status also influences the impact of 
chronic diseases on household welfare. Households headed by women or single parents re- 
ported consistently lower levels of labour income and higher levels of health expenditures. 
Higher average level of education in households is associated with higher earnings and 
consequently higher expenses. Households that are more educated had both higher labour 
and unearned (transfer) incomes, suggesting the importance of social capital indicators in 
detennining access to assistance from other households. These suggest that the fon-nula- 
tion of health financing policies should take into account country-specific inequalities that 
influence the impact of chronic diseases. 
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A number of limitations are noted. We have used self-reported data from the LSMS 
series of surveys although it was not possible to fully account for systematic misreporting 
of errors, which are probable with self-reported income and expenditure data. We assumed 
that the rigorous and detailed data collection process employed in the LSMSs might have 
palliated this problem. Except for Russia where an eight-year panel was available, we have 
used only cross-sections for both Brazil and India. Panel data would have been preferable 
for all countries were they available. Nevertheless, the conclusions are generally similar 
among all three countries. 
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5. A. Appendix 
In order to deal with the skewness of the data, we estimated two part models (2PM) with 
log transformation in the second part, which reduced the skewness of the cumulative dis- 
tribution and stabilized the variance over the observations. The major difficult associated 
with this kind of model arises when one tries to retransform the dependent variable to its 
original scale. As several authors have remarked (see Duan 1983, Manning 1998, Mullahy 
1998, Manning and Mullahy 2001, Deb and Burgess 2003), the retransformation from the 
log-scale to the original scale is affected by the variance of the log-scale. In our case, since 
the data did not present heteroscedasticity in the transformed scale, it was possible to apply 
Duan's smearing parameter (5.3). 
An alternative method would be to employ generalized linear models (GLM) (see 
McCullagh and Nelder 1989). The advantages of this approach are that it imposes "min- 
imal assumptions and obviates the need to transform the data; rather it represents a repa- 
rameterization of the model that retains the original scale ( ... ) of the response" (Blough 
et al. 1999, p. 154). Although the use of GLM was not strictly necessary in this applica- 
tion, in this appendix we discuss how to implement them and present the results from the 
estimation. Overall these results are qualitatively similar to the estimation using the log 
transfon-nation presented in the main text. 
5. A. 1 Two part model using GLM 
Assume that y represents health care expenditures and x is the vector of covariates that one 
believes to affect y; 2PM make use of fundamental probability to decompose the deten-ni- 
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nation of health care expenditures into two components: 
E[y 1 x] =P[y> 01 x] E[y 1y >O, x]. (5.8) 
In this specification, one first estimates the probability of incurring expenses and 
then computes the expected disbursement for those with positive levels of expenditures. 
The overall expected expenditure is given by the product of the two estimates. 
The first part, also referred to as the hurdle component, models the probability of 
incurring in any expenditure during a given period of time. It may be estimated using any 
standard model of binary choice, like the Probit and Logit models. 
By its turn, the second part of the model considers only those observations with 
strictly positive expenditures. One cannot proceed by simply applying OLS to this subset 
of observations, since doing so would result in counter-intuitive estimates. In other words, 
in this case if one merely applies the OLS method (that by construction is defined to the 
whole of real numbers) the estimated values of expenditure might turn out to be negative, 
which is logically impossible. Another shortcoming of OLS is that, as it would not account 
for the possibility of heteroscedasticity in the distribution of expenditures, the estimates 
would be biased. 
One possible and very popular alternative consists on imposing a transformation on 
the dependent variable, such as taking the logarithm of the expenditures. This transfor- 
mation smoothes the distribution of expenditures, inducing it to approximate a Normal 
distribution. In this case, the estimated model would be: 
E [log(yi) 1 yi > 0, x] = xiß. (5.9) 
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In principle, one could then retransform the estimated values fitted by Eq. ((5.9)) in 
order to recover the estimates for y in the original scale. However, There is an additional 
complication associated with that retransformation. As shown by Mullahy (1998, p. 252), 
according to Jensen's inequality, if one simply takes the exponential of the fitted values on 
the logarithmic scale: 
E[exp(log(yi))Iyi>O, x)=E[yilyi>O, x]>exp(E[Iog(yi)lyi>O, xl). (5.10) 
This implies a retransformation error that calls for the use of an additional component 
to compensate for it. Duan (1983) proposed the use of a smearing estimator that would 
get round the retransformation error represented in Eq. ((5.10)). As suggested by Deb 
and Burgess (2003, p. 5), the smearing factor (p(xi)) may be computed in the following 
manner: 
N 
P(Xi) exp i 
Ilog(yi) 
- X'ý 
Hence, p(xi) depends on the deviations on the logarithmic scale. It is then used to 
recover the estimates for health expenditures in the original scale 
Üi = exp xi, 0 -px, . 
Also according to Deb and Burgess (2003, p. 5), however, the smearing estimator is 
"not robust to heteroscedasticity in the transfonned scale". 
5. A. 2 Generalized linear models 
GLMs are an extension of the classical linear models (see McCullagh and Nelder 1989, 
Blough et at. 1999). Therefore, following McCullagh and Nelder (1989), in order to sim- 
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plify the exposition we start with the structure of the classical linear models and subse- 
quently we generalize it to the case of GLM. 
Consider that the realization of a random variable Yj is given by a vector of observa. - 
tions yj , N(pi, ui'), where the index i denotes the individual observations. The realization 
of yj is governed by two components: the systematic and the random components (Nelder 
and Wedderburn 1972). The systematic component corresponds to the variation that is ex- 
plained by covariate variables and is given by pi, while the random component is given by 
the residual variation that cannot be explained by the covariates. Thus Iti may be defined 
as a ftinction of the p covariates Xil i Xi2 7 ... xip: 
p 
E(yi) = pi Ojxij. 
The classical linear model is thus characterized by the following configuration, where 
the index i is suppressed by resorting to the matrix notation: 
N(p, 0,2) 
E(y) = [t 
I-L = XO 
5. A. 3 The generalization 
(5.14) 
GLMs extend the classical linear models by relaxing the assumptions behind ((5.14)). 
Thus, they are based on three components (see McCullagh and Nelder 1989, Blough et al. 
1999): 
1. The random component. 
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The independent variable is assumed to follow a probability distribution from the 
exponential family (see Table 5.8 below for list of possible distributions). This implies that 
there is a relationship between the variance and the mean and this relationship is given by 
the variance function: 
var(yi) = cri = OV(pi). 
Thus, the specification of a distributional family implies a given relationship between 
the variance and the mean. For instance, "the variance function for the Gaussian distribution 
is 1, because variance and mean are independent, whereas for the skewed Gamma and 
Inverse Gaussian distributions the variance functions are quadratic (var(yi) oc p? ) and z 
cubic (var(yi) cc /. ti'), respectively" (Barber and Thompson 2004, p. 198. ). 
2. The systematic component. 
It is assumed the existence of a linear predictor 71i based on the covariates Xil i Xi2 3 ... XiP: 
p 
E, 8jxij. 
1 
3. The link function g(ILi). 
(5.16) 
The random and systematic components are assumed to be related by a linear function 
g(pi). This function, which is usually called link function, in fact determines how the mean 
of the independent variable (Iti) is related to the linear predictor (71) 
g(Iti) = Tli. (5.17) 
It is clear that the classical linear model is a special case of GLM where the prob- 
ability distribution of the response variable (component 1) is Normal or Gaussian (yj - 
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N(pi, oi')) and the link function (component 3) is the identity (see Nelder and Wedderburn 
1972, McCullagh and Nelder 1989). 
Table 5.8 below (from Blough et al. (1999)) shows possible exponential distribution 
families, their natural link functions and the associated variance function: 
Table 5.8. Exponential families of distributions 
Distribution 
- 
Natural link function Variance ftinction 
Ga- ussian 1 
Bernoulli log /1(' - fl) 1 
Binomial lo- PP-fl) t3 1 -, U n 
Poisson log(p) IL 
Gamma 1 it 
2 
Inverse Gaussian 3 
Quasi g(IL) VGZ) 
Source: (Blough et al. 1999, p. 158. ) 
5. A. 4 Estimated equations 
In order to estimate the two part model households are divided into two groups, according 
to the existence or not of health expenditures. The first part of the model uses observa- 
tions from both groups to model the probability of incurring in any health expenditure in 
the surveyed period. The second part uses only the observations with strictly positive ex- 
penditures and analyses the factors influencing the level of health care expenditures for 
households which reported any expenditures. 
The anaysis of the deten-ninants of the probability of reporting any expenditure is 
implemented as a Logit model given by equation ((5.1)). The second part can be estimated 
either using equation ((5.2)) or with a GLM model as follows: 
g(p) = X, 8GLAI + EGLM, /I - 
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where g(-) is the link function relating the raw-scale mean of the dependent variable (p) 
and the linear prediction from the regressors. We assume y follows an unkown. distribution 
from the exponential family (E). Both the link ftinction and the probability distribution of 
the mean are selected according to the criteria specified below. 
The set of variables in the first and second parts need not be the same, as is the case 
if one believes the two outcomes are driven by distinct data generating processes. In our 
case, however, we assume the two parts are affected by the same set of variables, although 
we do not restrict beforehand the effect of a given variable to be the same in both parts. 
5. A. 5 GLM model selection 
Two crucial elements in the specification of the GLM model are the choice of the appropri- 
ate link function and the family of probability distribution. The link function is determined 
using a Box-Cox test, which selects from several transformations which one is most likely 
to render the dependant approximately nonnal. The general form of the Box-Cox transfor- 
mation is given by: 
T(y) =yi A 
(5.19) 
The dependent variable is transfonned according to ((5.19)) using several values of 
the parameter A. The resulting variable is then tested for normality, and the optimal value 
of A is the one which maximizes the likelihood of normality for the transformed variable. 
Additionally, given integer values of A are equivalent to familiar transformations. For in- 
stance, A= -1 corresponds to the inverse transforniation (T(y) = -1), A=0 corresponds y 
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to the logarithmic transfon-nation (T(y) = In(y)) and A=2 corresponds to the quadratic 
transfonnation (T(y) = y2). 
On the other hand, the family of probability distribution is chosen using the algorithm 
proposed by Manning and Mullahy (2001). The Manning-Mullahy algorithm is based on 
the fact that each distribution family implies an specific relationship between the variance 
and mean ((5.15)), and uses the residuals from a candidate GLM in order to deten-nine 
which distribution family is more appropriate. 
Assume that the function 0 in ((5.15)) is a power function of the form: 
var(yi) = p7, (5.20) 
The question then becomes to determine the value of the parameter -y. In order to do 
that, we estimate the raw-scale residuals of the candidate GLM model. We then apply a 
Park test to determine the value of -y, which in turn implies a given family of probability 
distribution, according to Table 5.8. That is, if the variance is directly proportional to the 
mean (-y = 1) one should use the Poisson distribution, if it is proportional to the square of 
the mean (-y = 2) one should use the Gamma distribution, and if it is proportional to the 
cube of the mean (-y = 3) one should use the Inverse Gaussian distribution. 
5. A. 6 Results 
Table 5.9 below reports the estimates for the parameter -y from equation ((5.20)), which are 
used to base the choice of the GLM family. In the great majority of cases -y is significantly 
estimated to be around 2, supporting the use of the Gamma distribution. Additionally, in 
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all cases we used the log link and, in the panel models for Russia, the regressions were 
estimated with exchangeable within-group correlation structure. 
With respect to the regression results, the GLM estimated effects in general agree 
with the OLS models. More specifically, the GLM regressions show that chronic diseases 
a) increase health expenditures; b) increase non-health expenditures in Brazil, but have no 
effect in the two other countries; c) reduce labour income in Brazil and Russia, and d) have 
no statistically significant effect on remittances in any of the three countries. 
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Table 5.9. GLM Family test 
Estimated, y in -*, ar(v)=E(u)'y 
prazi naia Kussia 
Health ex enditures ' 2.1*** 2*** 1.9*** 
Non heal iý expenditures 2*** 2*** 1.9*** 
Earned income 2*** 2.2*** 1.4*** 
Unearned income 2.3*** 2*** 3.1*** 
Work day loss 1.7*** 3*** 2*** 
Legend: * p<. 1; ** p<. U5; * ** p<. 01. 
Table 5.10. GLM for health expenditures 
Loa link and eannna distribution 
Variable Brazil India Russia' 
chrome 
nonchronic . 
16*** 
. 16*** 
. 99*** 
. 91*** 
. 15*** 
. 24*** bad . 28*** . 21*** Inincome . 19*** . 079* . 2*** physical 0.01 
smoke -0.04 
overweiýht 0.08 . 067*** headmale 0.08 0.11 0.11 
sin le -0.06 -0.51 0.06 il s ks -0.02 . 046* -0.01 men -0.05 -0.05 -. 084* 
women 0.03 0.11 -0.04 
oldmen -. 27* 0.04 -0.03 
oldwomen -0.07 -0.08 -. 24*** age 0.02 0.03 . 013* 
a5e 2 - 0.00 -0.00 -. 00014** 
e ucation . 16*** . 32*** 0.05 education 2 -. 0041 -0.02 0.00 insured . 079* 0.02 urban -. 2* NE -. 47*** 
caste -0.09 
round7 0.00 
roundS -0.06 
round9 -0.03 
roundIO 0.01 
roundl 1 0.04 
round12 . 14** round13 . 11* MOSCOW . 17*** central -. 23*** 
volga -. 21*** 
caucasus . 24*** ural -. 32*** 
cons 1.1** -0.23 1.9*** N 
Pseudo R 2t 
2,695 
5.8% 
1,886 
13.1% 
19,647 
4.3% 
AIC 26626 12,468 
Deviance 3NO 3,175 32,601 
174 
Legend: * p<. 1; ** p<. 05, *** p< 01 -'Computed as the scfuare of the correlation 
between observed and prýJicted vafýe; for the dependent variable; 
* Panel model with exchangeable u ithin-group correlation structure; 
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Table 5.11. GLM for non-health expenditures 
Lop- link and 2amma distribution 
Variable Brazil India Russiaý 
- chronic 
nonchronic . 
042** 
. 051*** 
-0.02 0.00 
0.02 
-0.01 bad -. 091** -0.07 Inincome . 43*** . 058*** . 34*** physical . 056*** smoke -0.09 
over%vei ght . 037** 0.07 , h cadmale . 15*** . 11* 0.13 - le SM -0.07 -. 38*** -0.20 I 
s ki s . 05*** . 074*** 0.14 men -0.02 . 12*** 0.04 women 0.01 . 13*** -0.01 oldmen -. 097** . 11*** 0.01 oldwomen 0.00 -. 059* -0.07 
age . 02*** . 039*** -0.00 
e2 a -. 00026*** -. 00042*** -0.00 5 
e ucation . 064*** . 097*** -0.00 education 2 -0.00 0.00 0.00 insured . 078*** 0.03 urban . 066* NE 0.02 
caste -. 068** 
round7 -0.05 
round8 0.03 
round9 -0.26 
roundlO -0.26 
roundl 1 -0.26 
round12 -0.19 
round13 -0.22 
Moscow . 54** central -0.16 
volga -0.24 
caucasus -0.03 
ural -0.28 
cons 2.2*** 2.7*** 5.1*** 
N 
Pseudo R 2t 
4,796 
33.5% 
1,920 
44.0% 
31,328 
AIC 66,782 22,113 
Deviance 1.810 377 23,101 
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Legend: * p< , 1; ** p< , 05- *** p<. Ol; 
I Computed as the square ofthe correlation 
between observed and prelcted values for the dependent variable; 
I Panel model with exchangeable within-group correlation structure; 
5. A Appendix 
Table 5.12. GLM for earned (labour) income 
Loa link and izarruna distribution 
Variable Brazil India Russiaý 
-- chronic 
nonchronic 
-. 092*** 
-. 041 * 
-0.04 0.03 
042**51ý 
-0.00 bad -. 2*** -. 075*** 
physical . 06** smoke -0.02 
over-, vei ht . 075*** . 072*** p headma e . 21*** 0.12 . 2*** s1 le i 14* -0.19 -. 23*** U 
s 0.02 . 035*** . 022** men . 26*** . 17*** . 17*** women . 15*** . 065* . 11*** oldmen -0.06 0.09 . 063** oldwomen -. 19*** -0.00 -0.00 
age . 029** . 026* . 081*** 
e2 a -0.00 -. 00036** -. 00 11 * ** 5 
e ucation . 16*** -0.06 -. 15*** education' 0.00 . 023*** . 012*** insured . 17*** . 038*** urban . 23*** NE -. 36*** caste 0.10 
round7 -. 068*** 
round8 -. 26*** 
round9 -. 096*** 
roundIO -0.00 
roundll . 09*** round12 . 14*** round13 . 24*** Moscow . 3*** central -. 24*** 
volga -. 38*** 
caucasus -. 45*** 
ural -. 35*** 
cons 3.4*** 3.7*** 5.3*** 
N 
Pseudo R 2t 
4,126 
18.3% 
1,810 
16.1% 
26,52 
18.0% 
AIC 59,234 21,267 
Deviance 2.932 1.028 27,250 
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Legend: * p< , I- ** p< , 05- *** p<. Ol; I Computed as the square ofthe correlation between observýd and prýdicted values for the dependent variable; 
$ Panel model with exchangeable within-group correlation structure; 
5. A Appendix 
Table 5.13. GLM for unearned income 
Loe link and earnma distribution 
Variable Brazil India RussiO 
- - chronic -0.02 -0.02 0.0 6 
nonchronic 0.05 -0.14 0.05 bad -0.15 -0.06 physical 0.09 
smoke -. 097*** 
overwei, ght . 12*** 0.05 headmale -0.01 -0.10 0.13 sin le -0.05 0.77 -0.05 
,I s ki s -0.03 -0.04 -0.04 men . 1* 0.12 0.10 women . 11* . 47*** 0.03 oldmen . 23** . 63*** . 28*** oldwomen -0.03 -0.35 0.07 age 0.01 . 089** -0.02 
e2 a 0.00 -. 00084* 0.00 5 
e ucation . 16*** . 41** 0.02 education 2 -0.00 -0.03 0.00 insured . 14*** 0.02 urban . 16* NE -. 26*** caste -0.26 round7 0.03 
round8 -. 33*** 
round9 -. 25*** 
roundlO -. 2** 
roundl 1 -0.04 
round12 0.14 
round13 0.13 
MOSCOW 0.10 
central -. 23*** 
volga -. 29*** 
caucasus . 19** ural -. 35*** 
cons 3.6*** -0.97 6.2*** N 
Pseudo R 2t 
2,673 
12.3% 
481 
13.9% 
26,320 
0.7% 
AIC 37,335 3,577 
Deviance 3.323 878 33.720 
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Legend: * p<. 1; ** p<. 05- *** p< 01 -'Computed as the square of the correlation 
between observed and prelcted vafýe; for the dependent N-ariable; 
I Panel model with exchangeable within-group correlation structure; 
Chapter 6 
Conclusion 
This thesis has set out to analyse two classes of questions in health economics. The 
first part has focused on a range of issues related to the provision of health care and the 
regulation of providers and insurers. The results of this analysis provide some important 
extensions of the literature. 
Chapter I has compared the process of negotiation between purchasers and providers 
of health care under three scenarios: the purchaser sets the price, but activity is bargained 
between purchaser and provider: activity bargaining; the price is bargained between pur- 
chaser and provider, but activity is chosen unilaterally by the provider: price bargaining; 
and price and activity are bargained simultaneously behveen purchaser and provider: effi- 
cient bargaining. We have compared the scenarios and the effect of changing the bargaining 
balance in terms of four outcomes: prices, activity, the welfare of purchaser and the welfare 
of the provider. In the cases without closed-form solutions, we have perfon-ned numerical 
simulations of the equilibrium outcomes. 
The comparison of the scenarios provides interesting policy implications. We show 
that if the purchaser has low bargaining power, efficient bargaining leads to higher price, 
lower activity and lower purchaser's utility, compared to pfice bargaining. Consequently, 
the first policy implication is that purchasers with low bargaining power might be better off 
if restricted to bargaining on prices only, and not on price and activity. 
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The second result of the analysis is that if purchasers can set prices (activity bargain- 
ing), net consumer welfare is highest. This result holds for any level of bargaining power 
of the purchaser. The analysis therefore supports policies such as "payment by results" in 
the UK, where prices are fixed by the purchaser or the regulator. 
One less intuitive result concerns the effect of changing from efficient or price bar- 
gaining to activity bargaining. In the first case the results suggest an unambiguous decrease 
in activity, while in the second case the effect depends on the bargaining power of the pur- 
chaser. More precisely, activity decreases if the bargaining power of the purchaser is low, 
but increases in the opposite case. 
Among possible extensions that might contribute to take matters further, Chapter I 
proposes some interesting hypotheses which would deserve empirical examination. In par- 
ticular, a useful exercise would be to estimate the balance of bargaining power in health care 
markets. Although there has been some effort in this direction (e. g. Melnick et al. 1992, Dor 
and Watson 1995, Propper 1996, Brooks et al. 1997), most analyses are restricted to the US 
context and aim only indirectly at estimating the bargaining power. This information might 
be useftil for governments to decide whether to encourage purchasers to bargain on prices 
only or on price and activity simultaneously. Another possible empirical extension would 
focus on the effect of bargaining power and negotiation framework on the level of activity. 
A particularly interesting case would be to test whether policies such as "payments by re- 
sults" in the UK, which might be identified as an example of activity bargaining, are likely 
to increase or decrease activity compared to previous policies. 
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Chapter 2 addresses an important question: What is the effect of waiting times on 
hospital costs? It is possible to identify in the literature some suggestions that wait- 
ing times, by regulating excess demand, should reduce hospital costs (e. g. Gaynor and 
Anderson 1995, Keeler and Ying 1996, Hughes and McGuire 2003). However, Iversen 
(1993) argues that this negative effect exists only to a certain extent. Beyond a given point, 
however, the management of the waiting list and repeated examinations become too costly, 
and then waiting times start to increase total hospital costs. 
In this chapter we use a sample of 259 acute hospitals over the period 1998-2002 in 
the English NHS to estimate the elasticity of hospital costs with respect to waiting times. 
We have estimated pooled OLS, fixed effects and random effects models for total hospital 
cost. In each case waiting times are entered in the regression in both linear and quadratic 
terms, which should assist in identifying the curvature of the cost function. The signs of 
the estimated coefficients are consistent with Iversen's (1993) model: the coefficient is 
negative for the linear effect and positive for the quadratic effect, suggesting a U-shaped 
relationship bet-ween hospital costs and waiting times. However, the coefficients are gen- 
erally not statistically significant. It is possible to argue that to a certain extent the results 
give some support for Iversen's (1993) model: although the coefficients are not significant, 
the signs are correctly estimated. 
The results suggest that waiting times have no impact on hospital costs. This casts 
some doubt on the effectiveness of waiting times as a tool to control hospital costs. In the 
ftiture more research would be desirable in order to further understand this issue. 
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Chapter 3 provides an analysis of the incentives for the provision of health care in 
a competitive health insurance market. This study extends the model of health insurance 
with adverse selection proposed by Rothschild and Stiglitz (1976) by considering the effect 
on both curative and preventive care. We assume that prevention affects the probability 
of illness. Patients belong to two groups, which have different probability of illness and 
different levels of efficiency of prevention. 
The results suggest that, in addition to distortions on curative care, the level of pre- 
vention is also distorted. The direction of distortion depends on the relative efficiency of 
prevention for each risk type: low-risk patients receive lower (respectively, higher) mar- 
ginal benefit from preventive care if prevention is relatively more (less) efficient for them. 
This result might have implications for the implementation of optimal risk adjustment 
schemes (see Glazer and McGuire 2000, Glazer and McGuire 2006). According to this 
method, the best way to avoid health plans distorting the amount and quality of services 
under capitation systems is to over- and underpay based on observable characteristics of 
individual enrolees. However, this applies to curative care only. As the results of this 
analysis suggested, health plans face different incentives for the provision of curative and 
preventive care. It is desirable that optimal risk adjustment policies take this into account. 
Othenvise, the incentives for the provision of preventive care might in fact become even 
more distorted. 
A potential empirical extension of this analysis might focus on policies that are cur- 
rently in place among private health insurance regarding the access to preventive care, per- 
haps focusing on the effect on lifestyle choices. There are currently several examples of 
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plans that provide financial benefits for enrolees that adopt healthy lifestyles. It would be 
interesting to test to what extent employers are taking that into account when providing the 
choice of health plans to employees and to measure the potential economic benefits that 
might be accrued from this. 
The second part of the thesis has focused on the economics of chronic diseases, par- 
ticularly in developing countries. Until recently, a widespread view has sustained that 
chronic diseases are a problem restricted to rich countries. According to this view, the real 
issue to be tackled in developing countries would concern communicable diseases. 
In recent years, however, new evidence has started to challenge this view. Interna- 
tional studies have drawn attention to the fact that chronic diseases are becoming increas- 
ingly prevalent in developing countries (see WHO 2005, World Bank 2005). This transition 
has been associated with several elements which are characteristic of developing nations, 
such as the rapid increase in urbanisation, changes in traditional lifestyles and the lack of 
information and access to good nutrition. Chapters 4 and 5 contribute to this debate by 
presenting two strands of evidence. 
Chapter 4 starts by analysing the association between socioeconomic inequality and 
chronic diseases. We quantify and analyse the detenninants of the inequalities in the preva- 
lence of heart disease, hypertension and diabetes in two countries, Brazil (1998 and 2003) 
and Russia (2000 to 2004). The results of the analysis suggest that socioeconomic sta- 
tus is a significant detenninant of the prevalence of chronic diseases and that households 
from lower standing bear a disproportionately high share of the chronic diseases burden. 
The computation of concentration indices shows that i) inequality in chronic diseases has 
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risen in Russia during the period and ii) the inequity concentration index is negative in both 
countries, but considerably higher in Brazil. 
We then set out to analyse the determinants of the socioeconomic inequality in chronic 
diseases. We apply three different methods, as proposed by Wagstaff et al. (2003): decom- 
position analysis, the Oaxaca decomposition and the total differential decomposition. We 
find that socioeconomic status, co-morbidities and education make a significant contribu- 
tion to worsening inequalities in chronic diseases. Standardising variables have opposite 
effects in each country, increasing pro-poor inequalities in Russia, while decreasing them 
in Brazil. Moreover, the results indicate that changes in inequality have been driven mainly 
by changes in the elasticities, rather than changes in the sample means of the determinants. 
The main conclusion of the analysis is that socioeconomic inequality is not the only 
detenninant of inequality in chronic diseases. Inequalities in education and co-morbidities 
also contribute to worsening the inequality in the prevalence of chronic diseases. Therefore, 
efforts to relieve the burden of chronic diseases from poor households should focus not only 
on income redistribution, but should also aim to maximise the impact of externalities from 
other related policy areas. 
The main limitation of this analysis is that it is based on cross-sectional methods. 
Possible extensions of this study could incorporate longitudinal methods, which are more 
appropriate to deal with unobserved heterogeneity and could potentially provide more ro- 
bust results. 
The study of the economic effects of chronic diseases is taken further in Chapter 
5. This chapter provides some additional evidence which might help to disentangle the 
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relationship between the chronic diseases and the socioeconomic status of the household. 
The analysis estimates the effect of chronic diseases on household health expenditures, non- 
health expenditures, labour income and transfers income in Brazil (1996), India (1997) and 
Russia (1997 to 2004). 
The results suggest that chronic diseases have a significant effect on household wel- 
fare. In particular, chronic diseases are shown to imply higher health expenditures, lower 
labour productivity and labour income. On the other hand, this negative impact is partially 
offset by an increase in the amount of remittances from other households The net effect 
at least in Russia where we were able to account for unobserved heterogeneity using lon- 
gitudinal data, was a significant reduction on non-health consumption, which is generally 
considered a measure of household welfare. 
This analysis could be improved if we had access to more complete and uniform data 
for the three countries. Although for Russia an eight-year panel was available, we have 
used only cross-sections for both Brazil and India. Panel data would have been preferable 
for all countries were they available. Nevertheless, the conclusions are generally similar 
among all three countries. 
The prevalence of chronic diseases in projected to increase over the coming years 
especially in low- and middle-income countries (WHO 2005). Given that fon-nal social 
support systems in many such countries are limited in coverage, households' socioeco- 
nomic wellbeing and indeed grass-roots development may be hindered by the burden of 
chronic diseases without appropriate intervention. 
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Overall, the analysis contained in Chapters 4 and 5 provide empirical evidence for 
the theoretical links between chronic diseases, socioeconomic inequality and poverty. It 
has some policy implications for the treatment and control of chronic diseases in the coun- 
tries included in the analysis. For instance, there is justification for reviewing the financing 
mechanisms to address chronic diseases. This is because there is a limit to what end infor- 
mat financing could aid households in coping with the socioeconomic burden associated 
with chronic diseases. 
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